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An Appraisal of Naturalism in Contemporary Meta-Ethics 
Thesis Abstract
The view that ethics is a discipline which can operate within the 
constraints o f naturalism, whereby all principles, properties and terms are 
accessible to natural science, can be subdivided into logical, semantic, and 
synthetic. Logical naturalists defend the naturalist claim with an appeal to 
the validity o f the logical progression from premises without moral terms to 
conclusions with them. Semantic naturalists defend it with an appeal to an 
analytical equivalence between certain nonmoral and moral expressions. 
Both o f these approaches have been thoroughly criticised in this century. 
Relatively recently, naturalists have begun to defend their naturalist thesis 
not from either o f these perspectives, but with a direct appeal to synthetic 
facts which can be employed or referred to in scientific explanations. 
Effective critique o f naturalist theories o f this newer type involves 
examination o f both the scientific and the ethical claims made. One such 
synthetic naturalist approach to ethics is the evolutionary naturalism 
proposed by Michael Ruse. Critique based on a thorough examination o f  
both the science o f sociobiology and the moral philosophy involved in Ruse's 
theory yields informative conclusions, rendering his theory implausible from
vii
both perspectives. In light o f this case study, a general strategy o f argument 
can be developed which has potential for critique o f other naturalistic 
ethical theories as well. This strategy is the Argument from Moral 
Experience, which operates by comparing descriptive claims regarding the 
fundamental nature o f morality that are presented or implied by ethical 
theories, with the fundamental nature o f morality as it is actually 
experienced. I f  arguments o f this type are sound, they can be used in an 
exploration o f whether or not naturalism is an appropriate perspective for 
morality to be understood and explained properly.
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An Appraisal of Naturalism in Contemporary Meta-Ethics
David Christopher Lahti
in t r o d u c t io n '
In the beginning of the seventeenth century Sir Francis Bacon 
mourned that science in his time was so embryonic that it could not even 
distinguish between what is good to wish for in life and what is not; but he 
spoke of a future where a complete science would remedy this situation.^ 
Thirty years later, René Descartes, delighted with recent scientific 
discoveries, was led to assert that 'all things, to the knowledge of which man 
is competent, are mutually connected in the same way', and so the same 
method is sufficient for understanding everything we are able to 
understand.^ He wrote of 'morals' as one of the most important areas that 
would someday be elucidated by the growing science.^ Towards the end of 
that century, John Locke too came to the conclusion that the new science 
would provide the keys for understanding morality, and explained 
something of what the new scientific ethics might look like when it was 
developed.^
The idea of'science' has certainly been scrutinised and heavily 
debated since those early modem years. Some of today's prominent 
scientists and philosophers hold ideas about the nature of science which are
1 Cross-referencing in this thesis follows the following rule: capitalised Roman numerals 
refer to chapters, capitalised letters to sections, and Arabic numerals and lower-case letters 
to subsections. (E.g. 'see IV.B.3a’).
^Bacon (1603), Preface.
^Descartes (1637), 16.
4ibid., 22.
^The general belief is asserted in Locke (1689), IV.iii. 18-20; the outline of his ethical 
theory is proposed in n.xxi.31-47.
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very different from those of the early pioneers;^ whilst others describe the 
significant and meaningful continuity which has been maintained through 
the centuries.^ Whatever the relationship between the science of Bacon's 
day and that of our own, we are nearing four hundred years since the first of 
the confident prophecies above, and it may be interesting today to discuss 
the same issue in our own terms. Can science (however it might be 
understood today) provide all the raw materials which ethics requires in 
order to describe morality?^ This thesis will be an examination of this 
question and a contribution to the search for an answer.
Such an exploration could only be helpful, however, if it is sensitive 
to the historical backdrop of such questions at this point in the history of 
philosophy. We are presently at the end of a century during which this type 
of question has been asked and answered by a great number of philosophers. 
Sensitivity to this history will affect at least two aspects of an exploration in 
this area: the terminology used, and the arguments presented.
A. Terminology
The Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore sought to pin a label on a 
certain group of those who believed that science could provide the key to 
understanding morality. In his seminal work Principia Ethica he elaborated 
upon their view, which he held to be erroneous:
'Ethics is an empirical or positive science: its conclusions
could be all established by means of empirical observation
^See Feyerabend (1995) for an account of the divergence of modem philosophy of science 
from the prominent seventeenth century thinkers. More specifically, Pickering (1992) 
documents some recent arguments against the early notion of science being an activity of 
'reading from nature'.
^e.g. Stephen Hawking (1993), Preface; and Peter Medawar (1984).
Kin this thesis (except when representing the ideas of others), 'ethics' will be synonymous 
with 'moral philosophy', or the philosophical enquiry into morality and moral issues, 
whereas 'morality' will be used for the actual process or capacity of contemplating moral 
issues and making moral decisions.
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and induction... This method consists in substituting for 
"good" some one property of a natural object or of a 
collection of natural objects; and in thus replacing Ethics by 
some one of the natural sciences... By "nature", then, I do 
mean and have meant that which is the subject-matter of the 
natural sciences and also of psychology.'^
Moore therefore concluded that the concept of'natural sciences', and thus 
'nature', was central to this view, so he categorised it as 'naturalism'. For 
Moore, and for many philosophers before and since who have used the term, 
'naturalism' means other things in addition to the bare notion that science 
provides the necessary raw materials for doing ethics; some of these are 
implied in this very passage. ^  ^  But this one root aspect of his understanding 
of'naturalism' does by itself provide a safe and appropriately inclusive 
understanding of the term, in the opinions of several who claim to be 
providing overviews of modem philosophy. For instance. The Oxford 
Companion to Philosophy describes naturalism in general as dependent on 
the 'natural', which is defined as 'accessible to investigation by the natural 
sciences'. When applied to ethics, then, naturalism becomes the idea that 
any ethical property or term is 'one that can be employed or referred to in 
natural scientific explanations.'^^ In a detailed history of naturalism, Philip 
Kitcher describes it as the attempt to use 'science to address the great 
questions of epistemology and ethics'. 'Towards Fin de Siècle Ethics:
% oore (1903), 39-40.
^®ibid. Unless otherwise stated, 'naturalism' in this thesis will be assumed to be applying to 
ethics alone {ethical naturalism). Other applications exist, the most common being 
epistemological naturalism (see Kitcher (1992)) and metaphysical naturalism (see Papineau 
(1993)).
1 Ipor example, neither the claim that the term 'good' must be substituted by a natural 
property, nor the claim that ethics is substituted by a single natural science, is entailed by 
the idea that science encompasses ethics. With respect to the former claim, one could 
believe that science renders ethics ungrounded in any properties. With respect to the latter, 
one could believe that ethics is not encompassed by a single science but is a field which 
incorporates the conclusions of many sciences.
^^Lacey (1995a), 604.
^^Lacey(1995), 603.
Ncrisp (1995), 606.
 ^^ Kitcher (1992), 53. The relationship between epistemological and ethical naturalism is 
dealt with briefly in I.A, and I.B.2a.
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Some Trends', another comprehensive paper which describes and assesses 
twentieth-century approaches to ethics, assumes this understanding of the
concept as well. -
On this understanding of naturalism, the term is defined with respect 
to science. Another way of defining 'naturalism' is for 'nature' to be the 
fimdamental idea instead, such that 'naturalism is something to do with 
nature'. ^  ^  This route might be better because it does not beg any questions 
about the content of nature or the extent of its accessibility to science, for the 
term 'nature' admits of a great latitude of interpretation: In fact, one study 
(aiid tliis before the bulk of this century's debate on naturalism!) 
distinguished thirty-nine definitions of'nature', twenty-seven of them 
explicitly normative in a way relevant to ethics. ^  ^  Perhaps moral 
philosophers such as John McDowell and Peter Simpson, who have 
conceptions of 'nature' which are larger (to differing extents) than that 
portion of the world that science presents to us, should nevertheless bear the 
label 'naturalism'; This, in addition to being an etymologically more 
respectable move, would prevent the above philosophers fi*om being 
construed misleadingly as 'supematuralists' or 'nonnaturalists', when both of 
them firmly insist on the naturalness of goodness in some sense. The 
imprecision of a definition of'naturalism' in terms of'nature' should perhaps 
be endured rather than evaded. But, since this thesis deals with the prospect 
of science providing the key to understanding morality, and since so many 
significant comprehensive works in recent years have used 'naturalism' to 
represent this prospect, such terminology will be retained here. Any
^^Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992), 165-180.
^^Ruse (1995), 1. Ruse does later become more precise.
^^Lovejoy and Boas (1935), 447-456.
l^See P. Simpson (1987), pp. 1, 5 for his definition of naturalism, and ch. 7 for his broad 
understanding of the natural; and McDowell (1995a) for a criticism of a definition of 
naturalism which is tied to science.
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conclusions, therefore, cannot be seen to relate to the question of whether 
goodness is natural, unless 'natural' is defined in terms of science.
One idea often linked with naturalism is co^tivism.^^ Cognitivism 
is the belief that there is a primary cognitive element to morality (that moral 
judgments are capable of truth and falsity).^ ^  Noncognitivism, then, is its 
opposite, namely that morality does not primarily involve something 
cognitive (that moral judgments are incapable of truth and falsity).^-^ 
Although it is true that many naturalists have been cognitivists in the past, 
many contemporary naturalistic theories of ethics hold that morality does 
not primarily involve a cognitive aspect. Philosopher Peter Railton has 
made the point that 'One can be a cognitivist without being a naturalist (as, 
for example, the Intuitionists were) or a naturalist without being a cognitivist 
(as, for example, some contemporary expressivists are)'.^^ If we were to 
presuppose cognitivism at this point, simply because many naturalists have 
been cognitivists, this would ignore the great variety of theses which have 
been produced by those naturalists who are not cognitivists. For example, 
Michael Ruse called his recent book Evolutionary Naturalism, and in it 
disagreed with theorists who insist on truth and falsity in ethics, instead 
saying that 'No ethical statement is true'.^^ Therefore, this exploration will 
cover moral philosophies of both cognitivist and noncognitivist persuasions.
Among those who have assumed that naturalism involves cognitivism are Moore (1903), 
ch. 2, esp. pp.37-39; Mackie (1977), 32-33; Mayo (1986), ch.3; P. Simpson (1987), 1; and 
Pigden (1991), 421.
21pigden (1991), 421; Harrison (1995a), 625.
22some, such as Hare (1989a), 96, prefer to utilise the distinction of 
descriptivism/non-descriptivism rather than cognitivism/non-cognitivism, which is logical 
or conceptual instead of epistemological.
^^Railton (1993), 315. This point is also made by David Wiggins (1993), 301.
24Ruse (1995), 271.
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These issues, as well as o t h e r s , are potential sources of ambiguity 
in an understanding of naturalism, and will result in the fact that not all 
philosophers cited in this thesis will agree on the definition or boundaries of 
naturalism. Indeed, some notable critiques of'naturalism' have actually been 
composed by thinkers who themselves are within the bounds of naturalism 
as defined here. This does not mean that their arguments are inconsistent; it 
simply requires a study of naturalism to be meticulous. There are several 
varieties of naturalism, but thanks to much recent work the domain is 
capable of precise organisation. The terms and arguments of avowed 
naturalists must be examined in the light of any relevant distinctions in order 
to place them correctly. Critics of naturalism must be examined in this way 
as well, which will clarify the ranges over which their critiques are 
applicable. All of this will be undertaken in the first two chapters and 
applied in the remainder of the thesis. Potential for ambiguity in the term 
'naturalism', then, rather than being an obstacle to philosophy, can aid it by 
acting as a reminder of the necessity of rigour and care.
The present study can be seen as a description of ethical naturalism 
and a contribution to its critique. Naturalist theories, by defimtion, hold 
ethics to utilise only principles, properties and terms that are 'accessible to 
investigation by the natural sciences',^^ and are therefore based on 'the kinds 
of facts that science could countenance'.^^
Moreover, if the anachronism can be overlooked. Bacon, Descartes, 
and Locke may be interpreted as believing that naturalism was the proper 
way for ethics to operate, and that someone someday would prove this by
2^0ther distinctions are between reductive and non-reductive naturalism (see I.B.3); 
analytical (logical and semantic) and synthetic naturalism (see I B); and a priori and a 
posteriori means of justifying naturalist claims (see I.A, B.2-3). Still another is the 
distinction between methodological and substantive naturalism, which will not be 
elaborated here but is described first in Railton (1989), 155-57, and then in more detail in 
(1993) and (1995), 86-7. It may suffice here to say that the definition opted for in this 
thesis is intended to encompass both sides of all four of these distinctions.
26Lacey (1995), 603.
27pigden (1991), 422.
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elucidating a truly naturalistic ethic. Of course, this connection across four 
centuries of thought is vague because clarification of the key terni 'science' 
has been avoided. Because this notion is so varied in its meanings for 
philosophers today,^^ a philosophical definition will not be provided here.
In general it could be described as the practice of describing and explaining 
the workings of the physical universe through the production of theories, 
which are supported by empirical evidence and coherence with other such 
results. It will be assumed that science is actually a conglomeration of many 
disciplines, each of which considers a particular area of the umverse or level 
of explanation and applies similar kinds of criteria and methodology.
Instead of offering a particular, and therefore limiting, philosophical 
definition here, two things will be done during the course of the thesis.
First, during discussion of naturalism in general, it will be assumed that the 
philosophers involved have unproblematic understandings of the nature of 
science. Views on the nature or extent of science per se will not be 
examined or challenged. Rather, views on the particularities of the 
connection between science and ethics will be the focus for the discussion. 
Second, when discussion concentrates on a specific naturalist theory, the 
particular kinds of scientific information appealed to for support of the 
theory will be taken into consideration, rather than examimng the theory on 
the basis of a general notion of 'science'. If the particular theorist makes 
certain claims about the nature of science, these will be considered as well.
2Ka way into the immense literature on this subject is Hacking (1983), which describes 
what has been called the 'fruitful confusion of post-Kuhnian thought' (Feyerabend (1995), 
809). Also see the references in n6 above. The classic referred to is T. Kuhn (1962); for 
contrast see Popper (1959) and Nagel (1961).
2^0ne relevant issue is the question of whether 'social science' is considered part of 
science. Sociological theories of ethics will not be examined in detail in this thesis, but will 
appear occasionally. Insofar as their proponents claim sociology to be a science, the issue 
will not be challenged here. Sociology, insofar as it is the description of the dynamics and 
statistics of cultures, is at least theoretically an empirical discipline and thus has potential 
for status as a science. The obstacles to objective conclusions could perhaps be 
characterized as 'practical difficulties' rather than 'intrinsic impossibility' (Nagel (1961), 
ch. 15, esp. p.502).
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so that the theory will be examined according to the particular theorist's 
conception of science where that is applicable. If and when this conception 
is controversial, it will be designated as such.,
B. Arguments
Sensitivity to the history of the issue of naturalism in ethics requires 
care not only in tenninology, but also in the presentation of arguments. 
Various kinds of naturalism have been criticised vehemently in this century, 
and so no helpfiil examination of naturalistic theories can proceed blindly 
and assume that it is breaking new ground. This discussion will therefore 
begin with a more detailed exposition of naturalism, as well as an 
assessment of the scope of two prominent types of arguments which have 
been delivered during this century against naturalist theories. The first type 
of argument is often posed in terms of a dichotomy between 'is' and 'ought', 
and is of a logical nature: it claims that in light of certain conventions of 
logic, certain naturalist theories can be seen to be flawed. The second type 
of argument is often called the 'naturalistic fallacy'. It concentrates on 
semantics, or the meanings of words: it claims that the meanings of certain 
moral terms show many naturalist theories to be false. Given the limitations 
of these arguments' scopes, there may be a range of theories which lies 
beyond both criticisms; if this can be shown to be the case, theories in that 
range will be chosen to be discussed in the particular examination to follow. 
Consequently, this thesis will not primarily be a judgement as to the efficacy 
of famous arguments against naturalism; whether the 'is-ought' distinction 
and the 'naturalistic fallacy' are successful in their indictments is not the 
main issue here. The primary issues are the determination of the scope of 
those indictments, and a contribution to the effort of critical examination of
Introduction 9
naturalist theories which evade those arguments, by claiming to operate on a 
different level than either logic or semantics.
After such an area of naturalism has been underscored, examination 
can proceed in the knowledge that the history of the discussion of naturalism 
has been properly taken into account. This examination will take place in a 
case study format. A naturalistic ethical theory of an evolutionary sort will 
be described and criticised in light of the interpretation of naturalism which 
was presented in the first half of the thesis. Reasons for choosing this 
particular scientific discipline, and the particular theory utilising this
discipline, will be explained.
The critique offered in the case study will then be interpreted with 
the aim of producing a generalisable argument regarding naturalism. After 
any such argument has been recast in a general form, relevant implications 
will be drawn out. Then a suggestion will be made as to what the thesis's 
results taken together mean for naturalism and for moral philosophy as a 
whole.
Chapter I: AN EXPOSITION OF ETHICAL NATURALISM
A. The Naturalist Claim in Ethics
In the first years of this century, G. E. Moore distinguished two ways 
to interpret the question 'What is good?'.^ On one interpretation, a proper 
way to answer is to provide examples of particular things which are 
appropriately labelled 'good'. We might call books or pleasure good, for 
example. The other interpretation involves seeing the question as one about 
the meaning or significance of good in general, apart from any examples: 
'We may... mean to ask, not what thing or things are good, but how "good" 
is to be defined'.^ Moore chose to concentrate on this latter interpretation.
When enquiring into the definition of'good', Moore was acting 
within a subdiscipline known today as 'meta-ethics'. Meta-ethics deals with 
the meanings, but also any significance which may extend beyond the 
meanings, of proper ethical terms, judgements or arguments,^ including 
those regarding 'good'. Meta-ethicists do not discuss what things have the 
quality of goodness; they discuss what is being done when one attributes 
the quality of goodness to something. Although a few have criticised this
1 Since Moore believed ethics to be 'the general enquiry into what is good' ((1903), 2), his 
comments about 'good' are intended as comments about the fundamental term of ethics. 
For those who do not employ 'good' as a fundamental term of ethics, it can be replaced by 
another (e.g. 'riglit', 'wrong', 'duty', 'virtue', or a collection of specific virtues). The 
distinction Moore presents is understandable when any of these terms are used. 
Uiroughout this thesis, however, 'good' will most often be used to represent the 
fundamental idea of ethics.
^Moore (1903), 5.
^Singer (1991), xiv; Harrison (1995), 555.
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study as trivial,^ most moral philosophers have seen meta-ethical questions 
to be of paramount importance in ethics.^ To illustrate, if two people say 
that 'honesty is good', a potential meta-ethical difference is for one to believe 
this statement to essentially be an expression of a desire, and the other to 
believe it to represent a belief in a fact. This seems hardly a trivial 
difference, considering for example that a belief can be true or false, but an 
expression of desire is in itself neither true nor false.^
Meta-ethical categories, therefore, group families of ethical theories 
based on the types of answers they provide to questions about meaning or 
significance. Some of the categories used by meta-ethicists have already 
been presented in the Introduction. What follows is a study of one of these: 
naturalism. As such, what follows is a study in meta-ethics. Naturalism as 
defined here is the belief that science can provide the raw materials for 
moral philosophy to operate; more specifically, it is the following 
meta-ethical view:
(Ethical) Naturalism: The view that ethics, properly understood, 
deals only with principles, properties, and terms that can be employed or 
referred to in natural scientific explanations.
That a principle, property, or term can be employed or referred to in natural 
scientific explanations will be abbreviated in this thesis to being 'accessible 
to science'. Thus a naturalist, in the sense employed here, responds to 
questions like 'What is good?' by saying, at least initially, that the proper
^E.g., Singer (1973); Midgley (1981), 59, sardonically defines 'meta-ethics' as 
'propounding and refining moral scepticism'.
^Smith (1994a), 1. Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992) discuss the predominantly 
meta-ethical character of many of the most notable debates within moral philosophy this 
century. The current state of die field is summarised and sampled in Smith, ed. (1995). 
^This is a central issue debated in Smith, éd. (1995). The issue of whether morality should 
be seen as a matter of belief or desire is responsible for what Michael Smith has called 'The 
Moral Problem' (1994a).
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answer must not be incomprehensible within the limits of what science can 
tell us.
One way in which this definition permits naturalism to be variously 
understood should be clarified at this point. Accessibility to science does 
not necessarily require that every possible statement concerning etWcs, or 
even every possible statement leading to an ethical conclusion, be of a kind 
that directly depends on science for its justification. For example, 
statements which, if denied, would entail a logical contradiction are 
fi'equently considered to be acceptable to a naturalist. One candidate for 
such a status is 'Not every possible statement is true'. If this statement were 
false, it would be therefore proved true, which is logically impossible.^ If 
logic is seen, as it perhaps always is, as an indispensable part of scientific 
enquiry (no scientific conclusion is an illogical conclusion), then a 
naturalist's acceptance of such statements as the example above is 
understandable and uncontroversial.
Another, more controversial, claim made by some philosophers, 
including some ethical naturalists, is that the meanings of certain words in 
ordinary language are, or else logically imply, truths which are not justified 
by science. For instance, a statement that is sometimes claimed by 
philosophers to be true in this way is 'x is a value iff [if and only if] practical 
reason is on the side of valuing x, i.e., the deliverances of good practical 
reasoning support the conclusion that x is a value'.^ This statement (it is not 
relevant here to examine its import or truth) is considered by some to be 
justified as true by an investigation into the meanings of the terms used, 
meanings which are inherent in the language used. The study of the 
meanings of words and the provision of definitions is known as semantics, 
and for some philosophers this study should be categorised as a logical
^Putnam (1978); (1981), 83. 
® Johnston (1989), 154.
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enquiry, since definitions are relations where the word defined and the 
definition both logically imply each other.^ After a seminal paper by W. V. 
Quine, many philosophers have decided to abandon some or all alleged 
examples of truths gleaned fi*om a study of ordinary language, but an ethical 
naturalist may theoretically reside in either camp. Some ethical naturalists 
are confident in their use of statements which they feel could not possibly 
require scientific evidence because they are true by virtue of the very 
meanings of the words used; whereas others believe that some or all of 
these statements are theoretically révisable in the face of new scientific 
evidence. Those who allow for truths to be justified by a logical
investigation into the semantics of ordinary language call such an 
investigation philosophical analysis, and the resultant truths analytic. This 
is distinguished (by them) fi-om a mode of investigation which produces 
synthetic truths- truths that are 'original' in the sense of not being justified 
as true by being shown to be either logically derivable fi-om or inherent in 
the meaning of other statements.^^ Other philosophers, including followers 
of Quine, avoid making such a distinction. 13
Any analytic truth (for those who uphold them) is a member of a 
class of truths that do not depend upon experience for their justification; one 
way of stating this is that such a truth 'requires reflection and conversation.
Williams (1985), 122.
l^Quine (1951). His views are elaborated further in (1969), and concisely summarised in 
(1990).
1 l-phe debate over this issue is chronicled in Kitcher (1992), which also functions as a 
defence of epistemological naturalism, the belief that all statements are at least theoretically 
révisable in the light of scientific evidence. This Quinean idea contrasts with the views of 
Frege (1884), v-x, 3,38, 105, and Wittgenstein (1921), 4.11 If., who maintained that 
philosophy was distinct from science and therefore could never be challenged by scientific 
conclusions. Criticism of epistemological naturalism can be found in the works of Hilary 
Putnam, e.g. (1979); (1981), esp. ch.4, 8; and (1983). The point here is that an ethical 
naturalist may opt for a Quinean view of epistemology, a Fregean-Wittgensteinian view, or 
any one on that continuum. In other words, ethical naturalism does not assume or logically 
require epistemological naturalism.
12Lowe(1995), 28. 
l^Kitcher (1992), 53-74.
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not empirical investigation'.^^ A truth derived from the meaning of a word 
is not justified with any type of evidence gained through experience. The 
term for this category is a priori, as in 'prior to' or apart from experience. ^  ^  
So, if one believes that a certain statement is true and requires no evidence at 
all for its justification, then one believes this statement to be an a priori 
truth. The existence of a priori truths is hotly contested by philosophers,^^ 
but insofar as many ethical naturalists do propose analytic truths in support 
of their theories, they are assuming the possibility and relevance of not only 
the analytic/synthetic distinction previously described, but also the existence 
of a priori truths. ^  ^  Those who propose a priori truths in support of their 
ethical theory are responsible for defending this 'apriority' against attacks.
In principle, an aprioristic ethical naturalist is subject to two types of 
arguments. First, a critic can claim that the alleged a priori truth is actually 
false, and that the falsity of the claim is itself an a priori truth, in which case 
there is a danger that the conflict will be insoluble. Second, and more 
commonly, a critic can simply say that the claim has no a priori status 
whatsoever. If A believes a claim to be an a priori truth whereas B is
l^Smith (1994a), 187.
1 ^ C.f. Moser, ed. (1987). An a priori truth is most often thought to assume logically 
necessary truth, i.e. truth on pain of logical contradiction. This linking of logical necessity 
with the a priori has been questioned by Kripke (1980), and anyway the concept of the a 
priori can be explained without reference to any type of necessity, logical or otherwise, as 
it has been above. Another type of necessity sometimes linked with a priori truth is 
metaphysical necessity, or trutii 'in all possible worlds'. Unless qualified, however, a priori 
in this thesis means simply 'justified independently of experiential evidence', so it cannot 
automatically be seen to have such strong connotations as being true in every possible 
universe, set of experiences or conceptual scheme. As Martha Nussbaum writes, using 
Aristotle as an example, one can believe in the a  priori, and yet regard this kind of 
necessity as a 'question that we are in no position either to ask or to answer' (Nussbaum 
(1986), 254-55). 
l6Kitcher(1992), 56.
^^The a priori at least theoretically includes two possibilities: the usual 'analytic' a priori, 
which has to do with a priori truths that are inherent in the conventions of logic and the 
meanings of words in ordinary language. The second, and more unusual, possibility is the 
'synthetic' a priori, where truAs that are inherent in neither logic nor ordinary language are 
nevertheless claimed to be justified independently of experience. Incidentally, no naturalist 
moral philosopher cited in this thesis has claimed the defrnition of a moral term to be a 
synthetic a priori truth; naturalists generally repudiate the existence of such truths. For 
more information on the synthetic a priori, see its locus classicus in Kant (1781), 
lntro.B.1-19.
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consistently unable to see it as such, B is likely to cite Ockham's razor, or 
perhaps a healthy scepticism about A having what seems to be a privileged 
access to truth, in order to make a rejection of a priori status more attractive 
than acceptance of it. This does not mean that the critic is necessarily right- 
an apriorist may have tools to support his claim and therefore refute the 
charge that his assertion is esoteric. In short, insofar as the ethical naturalist 
can enlist truths derived from logic and the analysis of ordinary language as 
part of an ethical theory, ethical naturalism permits the utilisation of a priori 
truths. However, since the existence of such truths is a contentious matter 
among naturalists, such a philosopher is responsible for explaining these 
convincingly as well as defending the very possibility of their existence. 
Aside from these, truths utilised by ethical naturalists must be in principle 
justifiable by science. This means that they will require experience for their 
justification (i.e. they will be a posteriori rather than a priori), and it also 
means that what is meant by 'experience' here is strictly limited to the kind 
that science can countenance.
B. Varying Levels of Justification of the Naturalist Claim
Whatever the divergence within modem philosophy of science, there 
is probably no one who insists that moral principles, properties or terms are 
clearly an ordinary part of the conclusions of science, as obvious and 
incontrovertible as a simple empirical discovery. So a question inevitably 
arises as to the justification for seeing morality as employing only 
principles, properties and terms that are accessible to science. Here all
1 ^ 'Ockham's razor* is a term used to describe the tendency in philosophy or science to 
choose the simplest among a number of possible solutions to a problem, all other things 
being equal. In this case, an opponent of the a priori may claim that a rejection of the 
existence of a priori truths may be simpler than maintaining their existence, and yet still 
consistent with all known facts.
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naturalists do not agree. There are three levels on which a naturalistic moral 
philosopher may seek to justify or defend his position. Each of these three 
levels of justification corresponds to a particular level on which to 
understand the naturalist claim itself. These levels will be called the logical, 
semantic, and synthetic}^ The logical and semantic levels can be subsumed 
under the category analytic, since both of them appeal to analytic truths, or 
truths that are gained from an investigation into logic and the meanings of 
words.
1. LOGICAL NATURALISM IN ETfflCS
a. Description
The first level on which one might seek to justify the naturalist claim 
is the logical. One operating on this level defends naturalism by defending 
the validity of a particular type of logical progression: the derivation of 
moral conclusions from nonmoral premises. The logical justification for 
naturalism depends on the truth of the following statement:
Logical Justification: Premises consisting entirely o f nonmoral 
terms can be used logically to derive conclusions containing moral terms.
Of course, this assumes that some terms can (at least in certain contexts) be 
set apart as 'moral terms'.^® Suppose that in the assertion One ought not to
similar distinction was recognised by W. K. Frankena in his noted article of 1939, and 
again in (1973), 97-99; by Pigden (1989,1991); and by Crisp (1995), 606. The latter two 
levels have been distinguished by Smith (1994a), ch.2. Frankena and Smith call the second 
level 'definitional', whereas Pigden calls it 'semantic'. Smith calls the third level 
'metaphysical', whereas Pigden calls it 'ontological'. None of these use the term 'synthetic', 
but a defence of its appropriateness can be found in subsection 3a, below.
^®This is relatively noncontroversial, although Anscombe (1958) and B. Williams (1985), 
ch. 10, have called for the removal of the notion of'moral' altogether from ethics, insofar as 
'moral' carries with it the notion of an obligation. Contrast Prichard (1912), who wished to 
remove any term from ethics which did not carry with it the notion of obligation. Some 
(e.g. Putnam (1981), ch. 6,9) have emphasised the 'value-laden' nature of all terms we use.
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murder', 'ought' is a moral term. Someone justifying naturalism on the 
logical level might say that such an assertion can be properly derived from a 
series of premises containing no moral terms. Perhaps the premises contain 
reference to the termination of the life of the murdered, or the psychological 
damage done to the prospective murderer, or the disruption of an ordered 
society caused by such an action, or the contradiction of an earlier explicit or 
implicit promise made, or any of a number of other ideas. One or a series of 
such premises containing no moral terms are seen by such naturalists as 
capable of being assembled into a logical progression concluding in a 
statement such as 'one ought not to murder', containing a moral tenn 'ought'.
This Logical Justification can easily be shown to combine with the 
definition of naturalism presented earlier. Naturalism, as has been defined 
here, simply states that any principle, property or term in ethics is accessible 
to science. The logical level of justification makes the point more specific 
by describing why this is the case. An example of a procedure for making 
moral decisions which is consistent with both naturalism and the Logical 
Justification is the following:
1. Science provides us with information.
2. We construct premises containing only nonmoral terms to reflect 
that information.
3. We proceed logically from those premises to conclusions 
containing moral terms.
There is a difference, however, between this issue— whether and to what extent we can 
divorce our concepts from our system of values— and the issue of the distinction between 
terms which purport to convey a moral claim and those which do not. Someone adopting a 
position on the first issue is not logically bound to a position on the second. It is possible to 
believe that use of language is always value-laden in some sense, while recognising a 
distinct place for terms whose meanings are fundamental to moral discourse.
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No premises are introduced which are inaccessible to scientific enquiry.
This assures that the process is consistent with naturalism.
Some^^ would object to a combination of the logical justification for 
naturalism with a science-related definition of naturalism. According to 
them, a nonmoral premise does not necessarily have to be a scientifically 
supported premise, so science should be left out of the picture of naturalism 
altogether. Naturalism on the logical level would therefore be seen as any 
belief that conclusions containing moral terms can be derived fi*om premises 
containing nonmoral terms. The problem with describing naturalism in this 
way is that it implies that tiiere is nothing more to the term 'naturalism' for 
these adherents than the logical justification of their position. On the 
contrary, if one does call oneself a 'naturalist' and defends this with the 
logical argument above, there may very well be some content to the notion 
o f 'n a tu r a l i s m 'se, i.e. over and above the argument one uses to defend it. 
In this case, the identification of the logical argument with the naturalist 
position would leave out any notion of what this content might be. 
Furthermore, if one can be called a 'naturalist' merely for accepting the 
validity of the Logical Justification above, the term 'naturalism' will 
subsequently lose any etymological grounding it may have had. One might 
expect 'naturalism' to have some relation to the 'natural', however that is 
interpreted (in this thesis the natural is that which is accessible to science). 
But if the meaning of'naturalisni' is allowed to be completely dictated by the 
Logical Justification, the term could then be properly used to describe 
theories which cannot in any sense be seen as rooted in something 'natural'. 
For example, C. D. Broad^^ wrote of'theological naturalism', whereby 
moral claims are understood by reference to supernatural divine conunands. 
According to such so-called 'theological naturalists', premises containing
21including C. R. Pigden (1991), 422,428. 
22Broad (1930), ch. 4.
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reference to God’s commands, but with no moral terms, can logically derive 
conclusions with moral terms. God's having said 'Do not murder' is seen 
logically to imply the conclusion 'One ought not to murder', where 'ought' is 
a moral term.^^ This theory is committed to the Logical Justification, but to 
call this type of belief'naturalism' would remove fi-om that term any sense of 
the root 'nature' or 'natural'. That such an avowedly supematuralist position 
could, ironically, be labelled 'naturalism' has been attributed by William 
Frankena^^ to a misunderstanding of the term which was facilitated by a 
certain ambiguity in G. E. Moore's influential Principia Ethica?^ This 
ambiguity was essentially the confusion o f 'naturalism itself with an 
argument (though not this one) which Moore found many naturalists to use 
to justify naturalism.
Although one should not view the Logical Justification as being all 
there is to the position of naturalism justified at the logical level, this is not 
to say that the means adopted of justifying a position has no bearing on the 
nature of that position. On the contrary, the way in which one justifies a 
position may go a great distance towards defining it. For instance, someone 
could justify his certainty of the sun rising tomorrow with an argument 
regarding Phoebus's fiery chariot, whilst another utilises an argument 
containing reference to the constant rotation of Earth. The fact that a 
difference is now evident between these two people's ideas of sunrises, 
shows that a justifying argument can be very relevant to an understanding of 
one's position on a matter. Concerning naturalism, the use of a logical
23 There is a difference between a .statement including a moral term, and a statement being 
relevant to morality. It is possible that an assertion like 'God says "do not murder'" can be 
very relevant to morality, while the assertion itself contains no moral terms. The Logical 
Justification has to do not with moral relevance, but with the presence of terms that are 
logically fundamental to moral discourse.
24prankena (1939), 471.
25Moore (1903), e.g. pp.13-14,39-42,110-114. In these passages Moore uses 'naturalism' 
and its cognates in two different senses: one science-related, and one having to do with a 
certain type of argument which is often used to justify the science-related sense (viz., a 
semantic argument; see subsection 2). Moore's use of both of these two senses 
interchangeably gave rise to the ambiguity Frankena mentioned.
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justifying argument is an obvious pointer to the fact that the person using the 
argument believes that the truth of naturalism is dependent on a certain 
conception of logic (at least). If that conception were cast in doubt, that 
person's idea of naturalism would be cast in doubt as well. On the other 
hand, it would not be sensible for someone who believed that naturalism was 
fundamentally something other than a logical point to use a logical 
justification for naturalism. Because of this, someone who utilises a logical 
justification for naturalism can be called a logical naturalist. A logical 
naturalist is therefore not oply portraying a certain level on which to justify 
natiu-alism, but is also, and more importantly, portraying a certain theoretical 
level on which to understand the naturalist claim itself.
This having been said, there is a sense in which it is likely to be a 
formality to include logical naturalism among the levels of understanding 
the concept of naturalism. The reason for this is that on some views, a 
premise can be omitted from a logical progression if it is a necessary 
truth^^— that is, if the truth of the premise could not possibly be in question. 
This might be the case because the negation of the premise entails a 
self-contradiction, or because another similarly binding circumstance holds. 
It is perhaps rare that anyone would attempt to challenge the rule known as 
the 'conservation of logic' (the rule that no terms left unstated in the 
premises may appear in the conclusion) o t h e r w i s e . ^ 7  Presumably, then, 
when one proceeds from premises with no moral terms to a conclusion with 
a moral term, there is such an implicit premise demonstrating a necessary 
equivalence relation between one or more of the nonmoral terms and the 
moral term. In this case, however, the responsibility is on the naturalist to 
show that the nonmoral term(s) are necessarily equivalent to the moral term.
26Smith (1994a), 192; see also Frankena (1939), 468.
^^Although see Prior (1976); but his examples are limited to conclusions where the moral 
term does no work: e.g., from the statement one can logically move to the following: 
'either x=% or I ought to help old ladies across the street*. See II.B.2 for more discussion of 
this issue.
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Regardless of the success of this, the issue is no longer a matter of the 
logical validity of the progression; the inclusion of the implicit premise, 
even if it happens to be false, dispels any doubts as to this. Since in such a 
case the moral term is introduced in a premise and not just the conclusion, 
the Logical Justification is not being invoked and thus the attribution of 
'logical naturalism' is a misnomer. Apart from this, at least theoretically, the 
possibility of logical naturalism remains. An example may serve to 
illustrate this possibility.
b. Example
Providing an example of logical naturalism in recent moral 
philosophy is dangerous, because it assumes that a ^ t e r 's  intention was to 
make a logical point rather than a point on the semantic or synthetic level. 
This may not in fact be the case, although it is true that if one appeals to the 
Logical Justification, then the point one has made is a logical one. Another 
difficulty in providing examples of logical naturalism arises from many 
writers' ambiguity as to whether the nonmoral premises' entailment of moral 
conclusions is supposed by these writers to be a logical entailment, or an 
entailment by some other set of guidelines which they have not explained. 
Although logical terminology is often used, this is not sufficient to show that 
the entailment is actually considered by the user to be logical (e.g., we 
sometimes say that someone has 'implied' something when the thing we 
have inferred does not logically follow from anything the other has said or 
done, on any acceptable understanding of logic). Finally, there is the 
possibility nientioned above that there is an implicit premise which asserts a 
necessary equivalence between nonmoral term(s) in the premise and the 
moral term of the conclusion, in which case it is not logical naturalism at all.
Despite these difficulties, there are several notable examples of 
arguments which are at least presented in the form of a logical justification
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for naturalism, although the writers may not actually espouse this. G. E. M. 
Anscombe, in her secular ethical writings, discusses the possibility of 
proceeding from a premise containing no moral terms to a statenient 
containing the moral term 'ought'. According to Anscombe, we can proceed 
from a statement about nonmoral facts to a moral statement, because we can 
understand a moral obligation as logically deriving from certain facts 'in the 
context of our [social] institutions'.^^ She provides an example (P=premise, 
C=conclusion):
P1 : We are under certain social institutions which prescribe,
among other things, the payment of debts.
P2: I have knowingly received goods in an ordinary marketing
situation from a grocer (in the context of said social institutions).
C: I ought to pay thé grocer the cost of the goods.^^
This argument properly follows the three-part procedure outlined earlier for 
naturalism understood on the logical level. First, sociology provides us with 
nonmoral information about our social institutions; then, the above 
premises are constructed with reference to that scientific data; finally, moral 
conclusions are drawn from those premises. If one holds that this train of 
reasoning is logically valid, that sociology is a science and can provide us 
with knowledge concerning pur social institutions, that PI and P2 are true 
and contain no moral terms, that C contains a moral term, and that there are 
no implicit premises which contain a moral term, then one advocates the 
justification of naturalism on the logical level, and is consequently a logical 
naturalist.^ ^
2^Anscombe (1981), 22.
29ibid.
3® Anscombe herself has never shown signs of having accepted the last one of these 
stipulations. In fact, she elsewhere says that 'it must be impossible to infer... "ought to be" 
from "is"' (1958). The present point is that she here presents an argument in the same form
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2. SEMANTIC NATURALISM IN ETfflCS
a. Description
The second of the three levels on which one might seek to justify the 
naturalist claim is the semantic. This involves the invocation of the 
meanings of certain words as a support for naturalism. One operating on 
this level demonstrates that the meanings or definitions of certain moral 
words are nonmoral. The semantic justification for naturalism is dependent 
upon the following idea:
Semeuitic Justification: Moral terms can be defined, or their 
meanings exhaustively expressed, using solely nonmoral terms.
Suppose that 'good' is a moral term. Someone defending naturalism on the 
semanlic level would claim that good' means, or can be defined as, a single 
nonmoral term or a group of them. The proper meaning of 'good' might be 
'tending towards individual well-being', or 'minimising of suffering', or 
'productive of the greatest happiness', or 'adhering to the conventions of 
society', or any of a great number of other definitions, as long as these 
definitions are not seen to contain any moral terms.^ ^  If someone believes, 
for example, that 'good' in a moral sense means 'productive of the greatest 
happiness', that person need only discover that giving to the poor is 
productive of the greatest happiness to realise that, by the simple
as if she were actually a logical naturalist. Other writers who have advocated a move from 
nonmoral premises to moral conclusions are Searle (1964); Kohlberg (1971); and Gewirth 
(1982), 108ff.
^llf, on the other hand, one of these definitions is seen to contain a moral term (e.g. if 
'minimising suffering' is seen as an irreducible virtue in itself), then the issue of justification 
is merely once removed. Can that moral term be defined in nonmoral terms? If the answer 
is 'yes', then one is employing the Semantic Justification. If'no', then one is not employing 
it.
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substitution of a term for its definition, giving to the poor is good. Of 
course, this assumes that the person knows how to use his language 
properly.
If a definition is seen as a kind of logical relation,^^ the Semantic 
Justification can be seen as a logical matter. This does not mean, however, 
that the Semantic Justification reduces to the Logical Justification. The 
difference between them is how the equivalence relation between the 
nonmoral term and the moral term(s) is presented. If the relation 
necessitates an exception to the 'conservation of logic'— the rule that no term 
can be introduced in a conclusion unless it first appears in the premises— 
then the Logical Justification is being invoked^ On the other hand, if the 
'conservation of logic' is accepted, and the equivalence relation requires a 
premise of its own, then the Logical Justification is not being invoked. The 
premise establishing equivalence of the two terms must be justified by an 
appeal not to logical conventions, but to the meanings of the words used, 
and so in this case it is the Semantic Justification which is being invoked.^^
When combined with the definition of naturalism provided earlier, a 
possible procedure for making moral decisions is as follows:
1. Science provides us with information.
2. Definitions are constructed fi*om nonmoral terms that are 
comprehensible within the scope of that information.
3. Moral terms are substituted for their appropriate definitions.
Someone might object at this point that the second premise is vague, 
and possibly conceals a requirement for knowledge that is not accessible to 
science. An important question to ask seems to be how we know that a
32b . Williams (1985), 122.
33por further elaboration of this point see II.C, introductory subsection.
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certain assembly of moral terms constitutes a definition which will 
appropriately represent the meaning of a moral term. On this point, one 
employing the Semantic Justification seemingly has two options. The first 
is to claim that such knowledge has an a priori status; that is, its status as 
knowledge is justified in a manner which requires no experiential support. 
The second is to claim that such knowledge has an a posteriori status; that 
is, its status as knowledge can only be justified by an appeal to experience. 
As was said in section A of this chapter, the route one chooses to take does 
not endanger one's status as an ethical naturalist, as long as one realises that 
for a naturalist, 'experience' can only include that experience which is 
accessible to science.
Taking an a priori approach to semantics is very common, and for 
most of this century, particularly in Britain, it was more or less 
unquestionably seen as the only way to handle the subject properly.^^
Again, analysis is the general term ascribed to this a priori method of 
seeking and utilising concepts to make sense of other, more difficult 
concepts by virtue of their meanings and the logico-grammatical structure of 
language.^^ Moral philosopher Richard Brandt has maintained that 
throughout history this way of approaching ethical theory has dominated 
among ethical naturalists— that most naturalists have presented a priori 
definitions of moral terms as the bases for their ethical theories.^ ^  In the 
first few decades of this century, this approach to ethical naturalism led into 
the great battles of what has been called the 'heyday of analytic 
m e t a - e t h i c s ' , ^ 7 when philosophers tried to get a grip on the grammatical 
structure of moral language, still in this a priori manner. It is a semantic
^^Kitcher (1992), 54-55; Quinton (1995).
 ^^ Grayling (1995).
36Brandt(1959), 156ff.
J^Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), 116-120.
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naturalist's contention, if this a priori route is chosen, that moral language 
can support a naturalistic meaning to moral terms.
In the past few decades, however, analytic philosophy's hold on the 
assessment of the meanings of words has been questioned by the 
epistemological naturalists.^^ Recently, stress has been laid on the. 
far-reaching implications of Saul Kripke's claim that a priori methods of 
doing philosophy do not even have a monopoly on necessary truths 
(statements which are 'true in all logically possible worlds'), which has 
largely been assumed since Kant stated that apriority and necessity were 
practically equiva len t ,So ,  even if morality is thought to make use of 
necessary truths, there may no longer be a reason to see this as a tight case 
for the a priori status of definitions of moral terms. If Kripke is right, the 
realm of the a posteriori may very well contain necessary truths too. In this 
atmosphere, a posteriori ways of establishing the meanings of moral words 
have been allowed to take root among ethical naturalists. Here science is 
seen as the arbiter of our moral language, and empirical evidence is sought 
to justify and even to discover what definitions are appropriate for moral 
terms.
Before concluding firom this that there are two well-precedented 
options open for a naturalist utilising the Semantic Justification when 
formulating definitions for moral terms, one should step back and look at the 
nature of the second option. The a posteriori approach to defimtions has 
been called at least two different things, both of which are telling as to the 
extent to which they can be called semantic means of justifying naturalism. 
First, it has been called an approach of'reforming definitions', which 
involves the restructuring of a definition on the basis of our scientific 
knowledge.^^ Second, it has been called 'synthetic identity', which involves
3^See Sec. A, esp. nlO, n i l .
39Kripke (1980), 34-39. This developed from Kripke (1972). See also Putnam (1975). 
40Brandt(1979),ch. 1.
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two terms being shown to represent the same thing on the basis of 
experiential evidence.^ ^  What is common to both of these terms is that they 
make plain that semantics per se is not the root of the matter, but that a 
word's meaning is an incidental outcome of a conclusion on another level. 
This explains why philosophers looking for 'reforming definitions' and 
'synthetic identity' claim to ignore or supersede the meanings of certain 
words in ordinary language. Such philosophers seek to replace these 
meanings with others (in the first case) or just place them aside (in the 
second). Thus, although some of these people do speak in terms of 
definitions, it would be a misnomer to characterise them as utilising the 
Semantic Justification. Far from justifying their naturalism by appealing to 
the meanings of moral terms, they are either changing or ignoring those 
meanings, in order to establish their naturalist claim. The next section will 
deal with this a posteriori level of justifying naturalism. The semantic level 
should, then, be restricted to those naturalists who justify their position in an 
analytical, a priori manner- that is, by an appeal to the meanings of words 
as we ordinarily use them. A corollary of this is that there are no 
epistemological naturalists who are ethically naturalistic on the semantic 
level, for epistemological naturalists believe that 'you have got to appeal to 
experience- you cannot just think things through apriorf
The Semantic Justification itself should not be seen as being 
identical with the doctrine of naturalism, by the same argument that was 
given for the Logical Justification. Such an identification results in the idea 
that naturalism is a matter of semantics alone for those who employ the 
Semantic Justification, which implies that there is nothing more to the term 
'naturalism' for these adherents than the semantic justification of their 
position. As was said of logical naturalism, it is certainly possible that a
41putnam (1975a); and (1981), 82-85,206-208. 
42rusc(1995), 2.
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naturalist defending this claim on the semantic level could intend some 
significant content by the notion o f 'n a tu r a l is m 'se, i.e. over and above 
the argument being used to justify it. When this is the case, claiming that 
'naturalism' is simply the definition of moral terms in nonmoral terms 
ignores this content altogether. The mistake of confusing naturalism's 
justifying argument with its definition can be clearly seen in the effects of 
such a neglect of the etymological grounding of'naturalism'. G. E. Moore, 
who has already been cited as having been a source of confusion on this 
matter, at times identifies naturalism with its semantic justification by 
saying that naturdism is the doctrine that 'good' can be defined with terms 
other than itself.^^ As Moore admits, this means that the term 'naturalism' 
and its cognates can be applied to 'metaphysical e th ics ' .S ince  
'metaphysical' is actually defined by Moore 'in opposition to "natural"',^^ it 
is more than a little confusing for Moore to be attributing 'naturalism' to 
theories of ethics whose foundations are as far fi-om natural as conceptually 
possible. Such can be avoided by regarding the Semantic Justification as 
just that— a justifying argument for naturalism (and not the only one); 
whereas naturalism itself is the idea that ethics employs only principles, 
properties and terms that are accessible to science, or some such definition.
As on the logical level of justification, the Semantic Justification 
does provide evidence for the way in which its adherents view naturalism. 
Since they utilise a justifying argument which is rooted in the nature of 
words and their meanings, they evidently view naturalism as being a matter 
which is appropriate to that level of discourse. They view the truth of 
naturalism as being dependent on the meanings of certain words (at least). If 
that particular set of meanings were to be cast in doubt, naturalism for those 
adherents would also be cast in doubt. If they viewed naturalism as being
43Moore (1903), 9-10, 37-38. 
44ibid., 38-39.
45ibid., 110.
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dependent on something other than the meanings of words, they would not 
employ the Semantic Justification, for it would not be to the point.
Therefore, this level of justification corresponds with a specific 
understanding of the naturalist claim itself, and therefore a person who 
utilises such a justification can be called a semantic naturalist.
b. Example
Philosophers have not always been explicit as to whether their 
theories of ethics were true by virtue of the meanings of certain words, or by 
virtue of truths on another level. This ambiguity is rapidly diminishing, 
however, for the distinction has been explicated several times in recent 
years. One philosopher who has recently described this distinction is 
Michael Smith. He contrasts a semantic, a priori, or 'definitional' 
understanding of naturalism with a synthetic, a posteriori, or 'metaphysical' 
understanding of it, and defends a theory which is in the former category 
Smith, recognising the fact that a priori knowledge need not be obvious, 
develops a process in order to arrive at a definition for moral terms. This 
involves the summarising of as many platitudes or obvious truths about 
morality that can be m u s t e r e d . ^ 7  This process leads Smith to the conclusion 
that 'our judgements about what we are morally required to do are simply 
judgements about what the categorical requirements of rationality or reason 
demand of us'.^^ In other words, morality is defined by Smith in terms of 
rationality. And what we have reason to do, and therefore what is right, he 
defines as 'what I believe I would desire to do if I were cool, calm and 
collected',^^ or in other words, 'fully rational'.^^ If one does something 
which one believes is not what one would desire to do in this ideal reflective
46smith (1994a), 29-35. 
47ibid., ch. 1-2.
48ibid., 91.
49smith(1991), 406-7. 
50smith(1994a), 181,184.
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state, then one does something which, by definition, is wrong, since it is 
irrational. An understanding of the meaning of the terms 'right' and 'wrong' 
here forms the foundation for an ethical theory. Thus, Smith's theory is 
semantic.
Whether Smith is a naturalist is, of course, a different question. He 
does claim that he is, as the properties he invokes to support his theory are 
not 'over and above those which earn their credentials in a natural or a social 
science',^ ^  else he would have branded himself a 'non-naturalist'. But 
properties are not the only materials used in constructing an ethical theory.
If Smith were to employ a principle or term that he claims is inaccessible to 
science, he would not be a naturalist by the present definition. But, he 
recognises that 'a fully rational creature is simply someone with a certain 
psychology'^ and the idealised condition he discusses 'requires nothing 
non-natural for its realisation'.^^ Finally, he shows that after defining 'moral 
terms in non-moral terms... all of the non-moral terms in our definition are 
themselves thoroughly naturalistic'.^^ It should be remembered that neither 
the assertion that morality is grounded in rationality, nor the nature of the 
specified idealised conditions, have to be directly supported by science, for 
Smith's type of theory to be naturalistic. Since Smith believes these 
statements to be fundamentally semantic (i.e. dependent for their truth only 
on the rules and definitions in our language), the burden of supporting them 
falls not on scientific enquiry, but on semantics. And semantics. Smith 
claims, can succeed in resolving these issues. So, this theory is properly 
categorised under the heading of semantic naturalism.
3. SYNTHETIC NATURALISM IN ETHICS
51 ibid., 25. 
52ibid., 186. 
53ibid., 35-6.
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a. Description
The third and final level on which the naturalist may seek to justify 
his claim will be called the synthetic. This level of justification might 
involve an appeal to the nature of reality, or else to the 'set of things whose 
existence is acknowledged by a particular theory or system of thought'.^^ 
What unites all who operate on this level, however, is that they appeal to 
facts, or 'actual states of affairs'.^^ A synthetic justification for naturalism 
does not make its final appeal to conventions of logic (although it will 
undoubtedly involve the use of these conventions), nor does it find its 
grounding in the structure or function of ordinary language (altliougli if must 
use this structure and function in order to convey its points). The synthetic 
appeal goes further, beyond our logical and linguistic conventions, to 
something that is held to be true independently of these things. The 
Synthetic Justification for naturalism is dependent on the following idea:
Synthetic Justification: The results o f enquiry into facts or actual 
states o f affairs are necessary and sufficient to explain the principles, 
properties and terms used in moral experience and moral discourse.
This definition is very broad as it stands, because no mention has been made 
of the type of enquiry or type of fact that explains moral experience. Such 
breadth was not so evident at the logical level, for the number of logical 
conventions that can be appealed to is relatively small. At the semantic 
level the breadth was a little more obvious, for the whole realm of'nonmoral 
terms' was open for utilisation. Here, however, the field has been changed
5^Lowe (1995c), 634.
55lowc 0995b), 267. The term 'actual states of affairs' must, as is evident from the 
preceding quote, be interpreted broadly enough so as to accommodate theories on which 
our knowledge is to some extent constrained by our conceptual scheme. For those so 
inclined, 'actual states of affairs' can hereafter be interpreted as 'states of affairs whose 
actuality is entailed by the particular belief system being endorsed by such-and-such a 
community'.
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again, and the range of things which may be used includes any and every 
synthetic or factual truth, i.e. every truth justified by any means excepting its 
inherence in logical convention or ordinary language. The results of such an 
enquiry are on this view necessary for an explanation of moral experience 
and discourse; but such results are also seen as sufficient for such an 
explanation. Although both logic and ordinary language are undoubtedly 
used in the means of such an enquiry, neither the conventions of logic nor 
those of ordinary language are able to offer explanations of moral experience 
and discourse. The results of the enquiry are neither logical conventions nor 
ordinary language definitions.
As with the other levels, this justification may be joined with the 
concept of naturalism. When this is done, the result is synthetic naturalism. 
One procedure for arriving at moral conclusions that is consistent with both 
the definition of naturalism and the Synthetic Justification is the following:
1. Science provides us with information.
2. All aspects of moral experience and discourse (principles, 
properties and terms) are explained in terms of that information.
3. This explanation is utilised to provide moral conclusions.
Thus the Synthetic Justification allows science to do more work than it did 
on either the logical or semantic levels, where a good deal of the job of 
explaining moral experience was done instead by the rules of logic or by the 
meanings of words in ordinary language. Here, however, science not only 
provides the informational basis, as it has on all three levels, but it also acts 
as the bridge between the nonmoral and the moral. This bridge is not a 
convention of logic that allows one to proceed fi"om a nonmoral term in a 
premise to a moral term in a conclusion; nor is it a nonmoral definition that 
is able to encompass the meaning of a moral word. Here this bridge is an
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interpretation of moral principles, properties, or tenns in those nonmoral 
terms that are deemed appropriate with regard to science. Among the 
important consequences of having science do this work is the limitation of 
the range of possible synthetic truths. Moral experience and discourse is 
explained by the naturalist with reference only to scientifically accessible a 
posteriori (experientially justified) truths.^^
The second stage of the process outlined above contains reference to 
the fact that moral experience is 'explained in terms of scientific 
information. This conceals a distinction between two modes of relating 
scientific conclusions to moral conclusions within a naturalism justified 
synthetically. The distinction is between reductive and nonreductive 
naturalism. Peter Railton describes this distinction well. Reductive 
naturalism is the more obvious of the alternatives, which is simply 'a 
synthetic identification of the property of moral value with a complex 
non-moral property'. But naturalism need not be reductive:
'One could, for example, hold that in the best a posteriori 
account of moral properties they emerge as irreducible 
natural moral properties— supervenient upon the nonmoral to 
be sure, but able to "pull their weight" in the sciences in their 
own right. That is, moral properties might simultaneously be 
natural and sui generis
'Sui generis' means that moral properties could be in a realm all their own,
that is, not reducible to other properties. A nonreductive naturalist must
show how a moral property can indeed be both natural and sui generis’, this
usually involves a notion of'supervenience'. Simon Blackburn explains
supervenience as follows:
'The ' idea is that some properties, the A-properties, are 
consequential upon some other base properties, the 
underlying B-properties. This claim is supposed to mean that
5^Although synthetic claims can theoretically be a priori, naturalists do not postulate 
synthetic a priori truths, for science cannot countenance them.
^/Railton (1993), 317. This point is also made in Sturgeon (1988), 239-42.
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in some sense of necessary, it is necessary that if an A-truth 
changes, some B-truth changes; or if two situations are 
identical in their B-properties they are identical in their 
A-properties. A-properties cannot (in this same sense) vary . 
regardless of B-properties.'^^
He then goes on to describe the various types of supervenience that follow 
jfrpm the fact that there are several ways to understand the term 'necessary'. 
As both Blackburn and Railton, as well as many others, point out, the notion 
of supervenience in and of itself is not enough to establish a nonreductive 
naturalist theory— it doesn't have much explanatory power, but merely 
clarifies the situation that the nonreductive naturalist is then expected to 
support somehow.^^
Before continuing, some defence must be given for the use of the 
term 'synthetic', since the majority of existing descriptions of this level of 
understanding naturalism either do not label it at all or label it differently. In 
considering possibilities, other candidates seem to have serious 
shortcomings. 'Metaphysical naturalism' has been used for this level.^^ 
Unfortunately, use of this term invites confusion both with Moore's use of 
the term,^^ and 'metaphysical naturalism' as it is generally viewed today, 
which is roughly the doctrine that any metaphysical statement must be 
accessible to science.^^ It also may presuppose the same thing that another 
proposal, 'ontological naturalism',does even more explicitly: that matters 
of morality are matters of being or existence. Although this is the case in 
many naturalistic ethical theories, it is not necessarily the case. A naturalist 
can theoretically justify his position on the basis of scientific evidence in a
^ ^ Blackburn (1984), 182-3.
59Hare (1984); Schiffer, S. (1987), 153-4; Kim (1990) and (1993), ch. 9; Blackburn 
(1985a); (1993); Morgan (1993); Railton (1993a), 298n. Some, e.g. Post (1987), ch.6, 
disagree with this explainability requirement, but Morgan and Timmons (1992a) show that 
a rejection of it would entail a 'queer relation' in Mackie's sense (1977), 39-41, since the 
requirement is met in virtually every other commonly accepted case of supervenience. 
60Smith (1994a), 28-35.
Moore (1903), ch. 4.
^^Papineau (1993).
63pigden (1991).
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maimer which is neither semantic nor logical at its root, without making a 
statement about whether or not something exists; and so it seems awkward 
and misleading to try to tie every naturalist claim on this level to some 
statement about what exists.^^ 'A posteriori naturalism' is another 
possibility, but the fact that such an appeal is a posteriori is not determined 
by the manner of justification itself, but only becomes evident when we 
combine the term with the definition of naturalism. The Synthetic 
Justification itself does theoretically allow for a priori truths, insofar as 
there are such things as the synthetic a priori. Such has been in contention 
ever since Kant made it an object of his Critique o f Pure Reason to answer 
this question.^^ Whether or not there are any such truths, and even though 
naturalists do not enlist such truths in support for their ethical theories, 'A 
posteriori naturalism' as a title would ignore the fact that this is an issue at 
all. 'Synthetic naturalism' seems most to the point, although it may not be 
without its own problems. For one thing, doubt has been cast on the 
analytic-synthetic distinction by philosophers such as Quine.^^ But, an 
argument could be made that Quine's real focus was the dubious status of 
analytic truth, and so hopefully problems can be avoided by the above 
definition of'synthetic' not explicitly in terms of the analytic, as is most 
often done, but more positively in terms of facts or states of affairs, 
exclusive of any 'facts' arising out of logical convention or ordinary 
language. By doing so, the present level of justification can be distinguished 
fi-om the past two, and it can be joined meaningfully with the definition of 
naturalism to produce the procedure for arriving at moral conclusions 
outlined above.
^^Kant (1785), sec. 2, initial passage, claims that something being good does not preclude 
the possibility that 'perhaps the world has hitherto never give an example' of it. Moore 
(1903), 119-120, makes this point as well. Presumably a naturalist could concur, so we 
must leave open the possibility that something could be good but not existing.
^^Kant (1781), Intro.B.1-19.
66Quine (1951).
^^Note that 'moral conclusions' does not rule out the possibility that on a synthetically
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Thus, instead of naturalism being true by virtue of logical 
convention, or by virtue of the meanings of certain words, naturalism on this 
interpretation is true by virtue of the natural facts of the matter. When we 
are examining the structure of logic we do not necessarily see this to be the 
case. When we examine the way our language functions we do not 
necessarily discover this either. When we look at things in an a posteriori 
manner, however, using any tools of science at our disposal and providing 
an appropriate philosophical interpretation of the results, we discover that 
morality can be properly understood within the framework of naturalism.
As one can be a logical naturalist or a semantic naturalist, one can 
likewise be a synthetic naturalist. A  naturalist who believes that ethics is 
only properly practised when truths justified by scientifically accessible 
experience form the basis for the ethical theory, is a synthetic naturalist.
Such a philosopher justifies the naturalist claim directly with natural facts, 
rather than with definitions or laws of logic. In so doing, a specific 
understanding of naturalism is advocated.
b. Example
In Beast and Man: The Roots o f Human Nature and in The Ethical 
Primate: Humans, Freedom and Morality, Mary Midgley deftly applies the 
findings of ethology and psychology to the task of outlining 'human nature'. 
Her conclusion, which is intended as an empirical one (the empirical 
methods involved being those of the behavioural and mental sciences), can 
be divided into two parts. The first part is that there are 'natural dispositions' 
within which humans are designed to operate; there are definite 
psychological parameters within which humans flourish and find life 
fulfilling. The second part is that these natural dispositions form the basis of
naturalistic theory, science could in some sense undermine ethics. For example, 'no moral 
statements are true' could be a moral conclusion.
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human m ora l i ty .T h is  second aspect of her work is that which makes her 
a naturalist. The fact that she justifies her position on the basis of scientific 
findings about the nature of reality classifies this naturalism as synthetic. 
Her ethical views are developed more fully in Heart and Mind: The 
Varieties o f  Moral Experience. Here she agrees with Philippa Foot that a 
point of view being 'moral' means that it retains 'a certain sort of seriousness 
and importance... other implications, whether of form or content, flow fi-om 
this'.^^ The exact nature of that 'seriousness' fiom which all moral 
implications flow is described later. It is that which, in a person, 'affects 
something central among his systems of purposes' and 'involves connections 
with what is naturally important for a human being'. That system she calls 
'human nature' or 'our emotional constitution', and describes it as 'a very 
large and general empirical fact'.^^ Consequently, the better moral course 
of action in any situation is the one that effects consequences which are in 
line with our inherent psychological needs.^^ Thus, according to Midgley, 
there is a common human nature which is scientifically discoverable, and 
moral decisions are decisions on the basis of the effects which certain 
actions and attitudes have on that common nature. These two aspects of her 
thesis thus combine to provide what seems to be a simultaneously 
naturalistic and a posteriori— and therefore synthetically naturalistic- 
means of doing ethics.^^
This section has shown that different justifying arguments defend 
different notions of 'naturalism', although the general definition might be 
held in common. That such a thing is possible is evident when one notices 
that a doctrine of this sort can be defended either on the basis of its logical
68Midgley (1978); (1994), ch. 13-14.
^^Midgley (1981), 106.
70ibid., 16-17.
71ibid., 125-132.
^^However, Midgley (1997) could be interpreted as implying a relaxation of the 
naturalistic claim.
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form, or on the basis of the meanings that certain words have for a 
competent user of the language, or on the basis of factual evidence. There 
are three ways in which the idea that ethics requires only principles, 
properties and terms that are acceptable for use within scientific 
explanations can be established as true. It could be true if one is logically 
allowed to proceed fi-om statements composed only of nonmoral terms to 
statements including moral terms, or if the nature of our language is such 
that the meaning of moral claims can be expressed just as well in nonmoral 
terms, or if a diligent enquiry into science and the nature of moral 
experience and discourse leads one to that conclusion.
C. The Relationship Between These Levels
Before applying this distinction to the ways in which modem 
philosophers have critiqued naturalism (which is the work of the next 
chapter), one question must be answered: How important is this distinction 
between logical, semantic and synthetic levels of justifying naturalism? For 
if the areas distinguished imply each other, then the conclusion reached in 
the last section is not very significant. On the other hand, if their 
relationship is not so close, this may have profound implications for an 
understanding of the idea and may establish certain stipulations for critique 
of naturalism. Specifically, if semantic naturalism has a certain degree of 
independence fi-om logical naturalism, a refutation of the Logical 
Justification will not affect the possibility of semantic naturalism. In the 
same way, if synthetic naturalism has a certain degree of independence fi-om 
the other two levels, then successful refutation of both Logical and Semantic 
Justifications will have no necessary effect on the synthetic version of 
naturalism.
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1. INDEPENDENCE OF THE SEMANTIC FROM THE LOGICAL
Suppose that the Logical Justification is false, that one cannot 
proceed fi-om a premise which contains no moral terms to a conclusion that 
does without incurring a logical fallacy. Semantic and synthetic levels of 
understanding the idea will be affected by this fact only insofar as they 
include such a fallacious logical progression. Otherwise, the falsity of 
logical naturalism will have no bearing on them.
The example of semantic naturalism described earlier (that of 
Michael Smith), if put into a modem logical form, could be reduced to a 
simple syllogism:
PI : 'Right', as a moral term, is defined as 'What we believe we 
would desire if we were calm, cool and collected'.
P2: The set of actions which satisfies the condition of'What we 
believe we would desire if we were calm, cool and collected' is determined 
by empirical psychology.
C: The set of actions which satisfies the condition of'right', as a 
moral term, is determined by empirical psychology.
No term was introduced in the conclusion of this progression that was not in 
one of the premises. The moral term 'right' was defined in the beginning, 
and so there are no grounds for believing Smith's theory, or any in this form, 
to depend on the Logical Justification being true. So logical naturalism can 
be false without affecting semantic naturalism. Of course, there are different 
types of definition, and not all are compatible with the idea that a term is
equivalent, and therefore substitutable, with its definition. However, the
/
validity of the above syllogism is enough to demonstrate that it is easily
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possible for a semantically naturalistic theory to be proposed which does not 
involve a progression from premises without moral terms to conclusions 
with them. The syllogism above involves no such progression since the 
moral terra 'right' is introduced in the first premise. Semantic naturalism, 
then, has a certain degree of independence from logical naturalism such that 
the latter can be refuted without effect on the former.
The theoretical possibility that a logical conclusion could be invalid 
if it contains a term y  i f  y  was not introduced in the premises, whilst y  might 
still be definable in terms of x, can also be illustrated in non-ethical terms. If 
logic is conservative then one cannot proceed from premises containing 
'European daisy' to a conclusion referring to 'Beilis perennis' unless 'Beilis 
perennis' appears in the premises somewhere. However, since Beilis 
perennis is the scientific name for the European daisy, one would not have 
to be acquainted with the analytic philosophical tradition to be able to define 
one in terms of the other. Therefore one cannot infer anything about the 
validity of defining something x in terms of something else;/, from a 
refutation of the logical derivation of y from x.
2. INDEPENDENCE OF THE SYNTHETIC FROM THE LOGICAL
Again supposing logical naturalism to be false, the question of 
whether this fact affects the viability of synthetic naturalism can be 
answered by the conversion of a synthetically naturalistic justification (such 
as Mary Midgley's, summarised earlier) into a simplified logical form:
PI : An action's rightness is inherent in or a product of its 
contribution to human flourishing.
P2: An action's contribution to human flourishing is determined by 
empirical psychology and ethology.
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C: An action's rightness is determined by empirical psychology and 
ethology.
Here again, there is no term in the conclusion above which is not present in 
one of the premises, and the above progression is valid under the laws of 
conventional modem logic. Logical naturalism involves the introduction of 
terms in the conclusion that were not in the premises, and so this example 
demonstrates the viability of synthetic naturalism whether or not logical 
naturalism is true. Of course, as in the Michael Smith example, Mary 
Midgley's ethical theory is much more complex than this. However, even if 
this theory is not identical with Mary Midgley's, or the former one identical 
with Michael Smith's, this does not diminish the point that both semantic or 
synthetic theories can easily be formulated in such a manner that they are 
unaffected by a refutation of logical naturalism. The syllogisms presented 
demonstrate this point.
The theoretical possibility that either y is supervenient on x, or x and 
y  refer to the same thing (depending on whether one is a nonreductive or 
reductive naturalist respectively), whilst logical progression from terms 
involving x to terms involving y  is invalid, can also be illustrated outside of 
ethics. It may be illogical to derive a conclusion regarding a proton from 
premises which contain no reference to protons but only to hydrogen 
cations. This logical invalidity, however, cannot imply that hydrogen 
cations are not protons, for they are. Their identity is a synthetic truth, and 
one which has been discovered by science. Therefore, one can not 
necessarily infer a distinction between what x and;/refer to by a refutation 
of the logical derivability of y-terms from x-terms.
3. INDEPENDENCE OF THE SYNTHETIC FROM THE SEMANTIC
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In order to discover whether this degree of independence exists 
between synthetic and semantic understandings of naturalism, one can 
assume semantic naturalism to be false, and then determine whether 
synthetic naturalism could still be true. Semantic naturalism being false 
means that one cannot provide a definition of a moral term in nonmoral 
terms on the basis of an analysis of ordinary language, and so one cannot 
appeal to semantics to justify naturalism. We can determine whether 
synthetic naturalism can survive in this situation by simplifying the example 
of it provided earlier. Let us suppose that according to facts we discover 
through scientific enquiry (i.e. naturalistically and synthetically speaking), 
our minds operate in such a way that certain actions contribute to our 
psychological health whilst other actions detract fi-om it. A synthetic 
naturalist might claim that rightness consists in the pursuit of actions that 
contribute, and in the avoidance of actions that detract, from our 
psychological health (exactly to whom 'our' refers is not important here).
The possibility of our morality being this way is not lessened at all by the 
lack of a basis in ordinary language for 'right' being defined in terms of 
'contribution to psychological health'. Any conclusions claimed by a 
synthetic naturalist like Mary Midgley are immune to such arguments, for 
she has invoked no a priori analytic definitions. This difference separates 
synthetic naturalism from semantic naturalism in a significant way. A 
refutation of semantic naturalism, since it is restricted to talking about what 
is justified a priori, cannot affect the possibility of synthetic naturalism 
being true, for synthetic naturalism makes no a priori claims but states that 
something has been discovered a posteriori.
How a synthetic discovery could establish identity between x and y 
where an account rooted in semantics could not, may be illustrated outside 
of ethics. Perhaps the simplest way in which such a situation could arise is 
when ordinary language has evolved out of an incorrect understanding of the
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way things are. For instance, there is an ancient view of the heavens 
whereby the sun and the stars are believed to be fundamentally different 
types of things, to have different ontologies (viz., the sun a great light, and 
stars holes in the roof of the world). This view will result in meanings for 
these terms which are different. A synthetic astronomical discovery could 
and did, however, establish identity between sun and star where ordinary 
language could not. Now, a synthetic naturalist can say to us that we today 
are in precisely the same position when it comes to moral terms. We may 
have two terms, one moral (say, 'right') and one nonmoral (say, 'contribution 
to psychological health'), which have different meanings. A synthetic 
naturalist will tell us that this fact of our ordinary language could be rooted 
in an erroneous view of the way things are. Those two terms might actually 
represent the same thing, and until we realise this we will continue to use 
them as if their different meanings necessitated different ontologies. In 
actuality, different ordinary-language meanings do not necessitate anything 
of the sort.
Synthetic identity without semantic equivalence is not only possible 
when there is an error in one's conception of the world. Another illustration, 
again from the physical sciences, is provided by Hilary Putnam. The object 
of semantic investigation is called here a predicate or concept, and the 
object of synthetic investigation a property:
'Consider, however, the situation which arises when a 
scientist asserts that temperature is mean molecular kinetic 
energy. On the face of it, this is a statement of identity of 
properties. What is being asserted is that the property of 
having a particular temperature is really (in some sense of 
"really") the same property as the property of having a 
certain molecular energy; or (more generally) that the 
physical magnitude temperature is one and the same physical 
magnitude as the inean molecular kinetic energy. If this is 
right, then since "x has such-and-such a temperature" is not 
synonymous with "x has blah-blah mean molecular kinetic 
energy", even when "blah-blah" is the value of molecular 
energy that corresponds to the value "such-and-such" of the
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temperature, it must be that what the physicist means by 
"physical magnitude" is something quite other than what 
philosophers have called a "predicate" or a "concept". To be 
specific, the difference is that, whereas synonymy of the 
expression "X is P" and "X is Q" is required for the 
predicates P and Q to be the "same", it is not required for the 
property P to be the same as the property Q. Properties, as 
opposed to predicates, can be "synthetically identical".
This shows that even if semantic naturalism were false, and we could not on 
the basis of our ordinary language define moral terms in nonmoral terms (or, 
in Putnam's terminology, substitute moral concepts or predicates with 
nonmoral ones), synthetic naturalism could still be true— we could still 
discover on the basis of experiential evidence that moral terms and nomnoral 
terms represent the same property.^^
4. RESULTANT STIPULATIONS FOR CRITIQUE OF NATURALISM
To sum up, the distinction between logical, semantic and synthetic 
naturalisms is a significant distinction because the second can be true if the 
first is false, and the third can be true if the first two are both false. In the 
context of an examination of naturalism this distinction yields interesting 
consequences. An argument claiming to refute logical naturalism has no 
efficacy against semantic or synthetic naturalism. Likewise, an argument 
claiming to refute semantic naturalism has no efficacy against synthetic 
naturalism. In light of this set of stipulations, this discussion can proceed 
now by presenting the most prominent of twentieth-century arguments 
against naturalism. When these stipulations are applied to them, a
^^Putnam (1981), 83-85. He also makes the point on p.206-208, and in (1975a).
^^This is a point which has been made by several writers besides Putoam in recent 
literature. Among those who have done so are Harman (1977), 19-20; Sturgeon (1988), 
242; Brink (1989), 163-167; Pigden (1989); (1991); Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton 
(1992), 169-180, who summarise the attempts of some modem moral philosophers to take 
advantage of this concept; Railton (1993a); and Smith (1994a), 28-29.
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determination can be made as to which of the three versions of naturalism, if 
any, are left unaffected by these arguments.
Chapter 11: AN INTERPRETATION OE TWENTIETH-CENTURY
CRITIQUE OF NATURALISM
A. Attention to Level in Talk of Naturalism
. In the Introduction the suggestion was made that naturalism has been 
criticised vehemently in this century, and that the first chapter's description 
of naturalism might be able to throw some light upon the nature and scope 
of that criticism. The first chapter distinguished three levels of 
xmderstanding naturalism: the logical, semantic, and synthetic. It also 
showed that there is a certain degree of independence of these levels such 
that a refutation of naturalism at one level does not affect the concept at any 
later level (in the order discussed). Since naturalism can be formulated as 
primarily a logical issue, a semantic issue, or an issue to be decided 
synthetically, an interesting question is which level or levels this century's 
prominent critique has targeted. If this question can be answered, and 
critique of naturalism can be interpreted in terms of its level, then 
determination can be made whether any of the levels remains unaffected by 
this critique.
To this end, this chapter will present an interpretation of arguments 
against naturalism which have figured prominently in this century, in terms 
of the threefold distinction of logical, semantic and synthetic naturalism. 
The suggestion here will be that this prominent critique can be divided into 
two strategies, each of which aims particularly at one level of understanding 
naturalism. The first strategy concentrates on the logical derivation of
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values from facts, or (as it is sometimes phrased) the logical derivation of
conclusions containing 'ought' from premises containing 'is'; as such, this is
an objection to the Logical Justification. The second strategy is occupied
with showing the impossibility of producing a definition of'good' or some
other moral term in nonmoral terms; this is aimed specifically at the
Semantic Justification.
Of course, it may be the case that either one or both of this century's
most prominent strategies of critique of naturalism are faulty and do not
produce insuperable objections to the levels of naturalism that they
scrutinise. Establishing their soundness is not the primary goal of this
chapter. However, clarification of the nature and scope of the arguments
may contribute to such a goal, because both defence of and objection to such
arguments have been known to conflate the levels of naturalism. Such
conflation is not always obvious, and can foster a misrepresentation of
naturalism and the arguments against it. Consider one example, from a
philosopher arguing against naturalism:
'...a value-judgment contains a value element and therefore 
cannot be derived from premisses which contain only matters 
of (natural) fact. But if M cannot be derived from N, they 
certainly cannot be equivalent; so naturalism fails.'^
The first sentence clearly attacks the Logical Justification, but the second 
sentence is too general. The last section of Chapter I has provided examples 
of how M might not be derivable from N but nevertheless be semantically or 
synthetically equivalent to it. Conflation of the levels of naturalism is also 
evident among those more favourably disposed towards naturalism:
'Philosophers who argue for the adoption of any normative 
framework... employ a common, strategy, namely to justify 
the adoption by showing that the framework sanctions certain 
empirical descriptions that are deemed well confirmed. This
Mayo (1986), 42.
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leads me to reject the common belief that inferring values 
from facts is ipso facto fallacious'.^
The first sentence contains a description and endorsement of the Synthetic 
Justification. It claims that empirical study is the means by which one 
properly justifies a normative (e.g., ethical) theory. However, the second 
sentence claims that acceptance of the Synthetic Justification led the writer 
to accept the Logical Justification despite objections. This does not follow. 
One can easily accept the Synthetic Justification and at the same time reject 
the Logical justification. An empirical study may justify an ethical theory 
in a way which does not involve the inference of values from facts, as was 
shown in the last section of Chapter I. Since this is the case, philosophers 
'employing the common strategy' this writer mentions can still believe that 
'inferring values from facts is ipso facto fallacious'. Whether or not this 
writer is aware of the distinction between synthetic and logical naturalism, 
or intended to make the claim that is implied, such wording certainly opens 
the door to conflation of the different levels of understanding naturalism. 
This chapter, together with the previous one, should clarify these kinds of 
issues and remove the confusion which can arise from either casual use of 
terminology or a lack of understanding of the relevant distinctions in this 
area.
The primary contribution of this chapter to the thesis, however, is the 
determination of whether and how naturalism can evade the two prominent 
critical strategies which this century has witnessed; and if so, to provide an 
outline of what this escape route looks like and whether any problems may 
confront it. Once this is done, the way will be prepared for further chapters 
to examine a specific theory in this less criticised area of naturalism, and to 
attempt to distil a generalisable argument from this examination.
^Richards (1989), 337.
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B. Arguments Against Naturalism on the Logical Level
The Logical Justification for naturalism is the idea that premises 
consisting o f nonmoral terms can be used logically to derive conclusions 
containing moral terms. Some of the arguments that have been offered in 
recent decades against naturalism have operated at this level. Such 
arguments have depended on what has been called a logical fallacy in 
proceeding fi-om 'is' in premises to 'ought' in conclusions.
1. HUME'S LAW
The notion that one can come to conclusions which contain moral 
terms (such as 'ought') by a logical progression from premises which do not 
contain any such terms was criticised by the Scottish philosopher David 
Hume in 1739:
'[moralists] proceed for some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning... of the being of God... or observations concerning 
human affairs... when of a sudden, I am surprised to find that 
instead of the usual copulations of propositions is and is not,
I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an 
ought, or an ought not... as this ought or ought not expresses 
some new relation or affirmation 'tis necessary that it be 
observed and explained; and at the same time a reason 
should be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, 
how this new relation can be a déduction fi:om others which 
are entirely different fi-om it.'^
Hume could not imagine how, in a process of logical reasoning about 
morality, one could deduce a statement which contains an 'ought' fi-om any 
number of premises, none of which contain an ' ough t 'The  above passage
^Hume (1739), Ill.i.l.
^The fact that 'ought' in many cases is nonmoral, but that Hume was talking specifically 
about a moral understanding of the term, is explicated in Mackie (1977), 67.
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has been cited abundantly in this century, and the impossibility of logically 
deriving an 'ought' from an 'is' has been named 'Hume's Law'.^
a. Content based interpretations
At first glance the passage seems to have at least two possible 
interpretations, each of them fairly simple. The first is that Hume was 
merely defending what is often called the'conservation of logic': the 
requirement that 'when a deduction is made formally explicit, no statement 
employing a given expression can be logically derived from premises that do 
not also contain the expression'.^ On this interpretation, any two words 
could be inserted in place of'is' and 'ought' and his point will be made just as 
clearly. For instance, one philosopher has proposed that the law would be 
just as forceful if'need' replaced 'ought'.^ Another has been even more 
explicit, saying that Hume's prohibition holds equally well of conclusions 
which contain the term 'hedgehog' from premises which do not contain 
'hedgehog'.^ Hume was, one might say, defending a particular instance of a 
general rule. The second interpretation claims that Hume seems in his 
passage to view facts and values as very different types of things, and that 
this, and not just the 'conservation of logic', is the force of the passage. It is 
not merely because 'is' and 'ought' are two different words that one may not 
derive one from the other in a logical progression; rather, the meanings of 
'is' and 'ought' statements are so different that one could hardly understand a
 ^Among the works of this century which strive for an understanding of this passage are 
Broad (1930), ch. 4; Frankena (1939), 465-66; Dennes (1960), 94-96; MacIntyre (1966), 
173-174; the articles collected in Hudson, ed. (1969), especially the first of the four parts; 
Stroud (1977), 187ff.; Mackie (1977), 64-73; (1980), 61-63; B. Williams (1985), ch. 7; 
Pigden (1989); (1991), 423-425.
% . Nagel (1961), 374.
^Anscombe (1958), 31.
Spigden (1991), 423-24.
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conclusion in terms of one as having anything to do with premises which 
contain the other.^
As the literature regarding this passage attests, there are several 
intermediates between these two interpretations. For instance, according to 
one interpretation, nothing is wrong with progressing from an 'is' to an 
'ought', but Hume's Law insists that to claim that such a progression is 
logical is a fallacy. Instead, the progression should be described as 
psychological, meaning that we tend to make the progression in our minds 
although there is no logical constraint on our doing so.^^ Whatever point on 
this continuum is chosen, however, Hume's prohibition stays fundamentally 
the same: one cannot logically derive an 'ought' statement from any number 
of'is' statements. The difference in interpretation arises in attempts to 
answer the question why (e.g. 'because logic is conservative', 'because values 
are very different from facts', or 'because the progression is psychological 
and not logical'). So, all interpretations based on the content of this passage 
agree on what Hume was fundamentally prohibiting, and all interpretations 
involve a refutation of the Logical Justification for naturalism. Different 
interpretations might disagree on why the Logical Justification is claimed to 
be invalid, but all agree that it is so claimed. ^  ^
Alasdair MacIntyre has mentioned the possibility that perhaps Hume 
meant only that the 'transition from is to ought needs great care', rather than 
being necessarily fallacious.^ ^  However, as long as the logical progression 
remains in the form Hume described (an 'ought' in the conclusion but not in 
the premises), his comment that the derivation 'seems altogether
^E.g. Moore (1903), 124-26, argues that existence and goodness are two different things, 
such that the latter cannot be understood in terms of the former. 
lOstroud (1977), 187.
^^Some philosophers have advocated using the term 'naturalistic fallacy' to describe what is 
prohibited in this passage. Since Hume did not use this term, and since it was used very 
notably by G. E. Moore in his discussion of semantic naturalism, this term will here be 
restricted to naturalism discussed at that level.
^^Maclntyre (1966), 173-74.
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inconceivable' leads one away from 6 e  view that any amount of'great care' 
could avoid a fallacy. If, on the other hand, MacIntyre was referring to care 
in constructing the premises of the argument, such that one is careful to 
respect the 'conservation of logic' but still yield the same conclusion, then it 
may be possible that a transition close to a derivation of'ought' from 'is' 
could effectively be made without incurring a fallacy. This possibility will 
be investigated further, after another possible interpretation of Hume's Law 
is described.
b. Contextual interpretation , ,
By ch^acterising Hume's is-ought distinction as solely a logical 
matter, this treatment might be vulnerable to an objection that Hume has 
been not been given sufficient attention. This oft-quoted passage has been 
taken out of context, one might say, and to understand his point one must 
step back to view the place of the passage in A Treatise o f Human Nature, 
and in Hume's moral philosophy as a whole. This citation appears in a 
section of his treatise entitled 'Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Reason', 
which is an attempt to answer the question of whether morality is ultimately 
a product of reason or sentiment', 'whether we attain the knowledge of them 
by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer 
internal sense'. The 'Hume's Law" passage is found in the middle of a 
sustained argument against the first possibility, that morality is a matter of 
reason. In this light, the passage can be seen to contribute (in addition to a 
number of other arguments provided before and after it) to a major ethical 
point of Hume's: that no judgement made by reason determines any moral 
conclusion— that morality is essentially nonrational.^^ Hume went on at 
even greater length twelve years later to make this point again. He
13Hume(1751),2. 
14Hurae(1739), in.i.1-2.
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emphasised that when a person recognises a moral obligation, or an 'ought',
a feeling of attraction towards the virtue and a repulsion to the vice is
necessarily a part of such a recognition.^^ Reason, which makes
judgements concerning matters of fact and the relations among objects,
cannot provide us with any such attraction or repulsion; it merely gives us
the facts. That is why, according to Hume, there is a 'great difference' .
between a matter 'of fact and one of right \ for a fact (an 'is') is an
emotionless calculation using the tools of reason, whereas what is right (an
'ought') always involves attraction and repulsion and thus must primarily be
a matter of feeling. ^  ^
It is possible, therefore, to interpret Hume's Law not only as a
prohibition of certain types of logical progression with regard to morality,
but as a defence of a certain position on the perennial issue of the
relationship between morality and rationality. This position is that doing
something morally wrong 'is not contrary to reason', but rather is contrary
to the dictates of an emotion. The typical opposing view is that with respect
to morality 'we can rationally decide what to do, or what to ask or advise
others to do'.^^ This quote is from R. M. Hare, who has stated that for his
entire life he has tried to show that Hume's way of looking at reason was 'a
fundamental mistake'.^^ If reason can be practical, moral decisions could
91
ultimately rest on rational considerations rather than sentimental ones.
15Hume(1751),4:
l^ibid.,127.
^^ibid., 132. This does not mean diat Hume claims reason to be irreievant to the m ^ in g  of 
moral decisions; its place is not primary, but it does aid in the process (p. 130-2).
l*Hume(1739), H.iii.3. 
l^Hare (1989a), 93.
20Hare (1989), 100.
^^Some believe that the dichotomy Hume presents between reason arid sentiment is à false 
one or at least needs radical qualification; e.g. T. Nagel (1970); McDowell (1978);
Midgley (1981); Dancy (1995).
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The abundance of recent literature regarding this and related issues suggests 
that such debate remains a fixture in moral philosophy
Although Hume's Law did figure into Hume's argument regarding 
this reason/sentiment issue, the question still remains as to whether 
accepting Hume's Law actually commits one to a position in favour of 
sentiment. The last chapter showed the dangers of confusing an argument - 
for a position with the position itself, in the context of logical and semantic 
justifying arguments for naturalism.^^ In order to determine whether a 
similar situation is present here, one can imagine the position of a rationalist 
who accepts Huiiie's Law, and then look for a logical conlradiction. One 
need not look far to find someone of this persuasion: Hare, the example of a 
rationalist provided above, nevertheless endorses Hume's Law.^^ The 
worth of such an example depends on Hare's not having compromised or 
'watered down' Hume's Law. Hare does place two qualifications on the 
passage as it stands. The first has only to do with using 'ought' in a 
nonmoral sense,^^ and thus has nothing to do with the present project. The 
second allows for proceeding from premises without an 'ought' to certain 
conditional conclusions of the form 'If ^ 4 ought to do x...'.^^ Embedding 'A 
ought to do x' in a conditional, as Hare agrees, refrains from making a 
statement as to whether A really ought to do x, and so this qualification 
cannot be seen to justify naturalism. Whether A ought to do x is left as an 
open question in this conclusion; no answer to it logically follows and 
therefore this qualification does not compromise Hume's Law. In fact. Hare 
in another place uses the basis for this qualification (his doctrine of
22e.g. Foot (1972); (1978); B. Williams (1981); Korsgaard (1986); Brink (1986), which 
contains additional bibliography; (1989), 39ff.; Wallace (1990), which is a review and 
commentary on the variety of positions; Smith (1994a); McDowell (1978); (1979); 
(1995); Dancy (1993); (1995); Blackburn (1995); Lawrence (1995).
^3see I.B.1-2.
24Hare (1952), 2.5; (1981), 1.4, 12.1; (1989a), 90-91.
2% are (1952), 2.5.
2% are (1977), 469.
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universalisability) to argue against a large region of naturalism.^^ Hare, 
though he disagrees with Hume's objection to rationalism, sounds very much 
like him when he says of'It is wrong' that 'I have repeatedly made clear that 
I do not think that such a statement can be derived from any statement of 
fact.'28
So, unless Hare and other notable philosophers" have been blind to 
a contradiction, a philosopher can accept Hume's Law while also accepting 
the ethical position (rationalism) which Hume was repudiating. Thus, it is 
likely that Hume's Law can be properly understood even if it is taken out of 
the context in which it figured in his philosophy. The Hume's Law passage 
makes a coherent argument apart from its context, an argument which can be 
endorsed even by those who disagree with the context. This argument is a 
condenmation of logically proceeding from premises in which there are no 
moral terms, such as 'ought', to conclusions wherein there is such a moral 
term.
2. CONTEMPORARY DISAGREEMENT OVER EFFICACY
Although the argument of Hume's Law has been clarified, its truth 
has not yet been discussed; this issue has engendered at least as much, and 
probably more, controversy than the issues surrounding the passage's 
interpretation. While Hume's Law has been wielded by some as a bludgeon 
against naturalism during this century, it has by others been called into 
question.^^ A few of these challengers (some of which have already been
27Hare(1981), 4.2.
2®ibid., 12.1. Hare immediately clarifies that 'We have to distinguish between "Never do a 
thing like that," and "Jones said Never do a thing like that'",' and says that he is talking 
about statements of the former type.
29peter Singer is another example of a rationalist who explicitly defends Hume's Law 
(1981), 69,74-86. Bernard Williams (1985), 123, claims that there is no straightforward 
relation between Hume's Law and the notion of morality being nonrational.
3^A notable survey of this controversy is Hudson (1969).
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cited^ present their arguments by claiming to have discovered a way in 
which substantial 'ought' statements can appear in the conclusions of a 
logical progression without appearing first in the premises. Essays designed 
as instruction booklets, with titles such as 'How to Derive Ought from Is' 
and 'From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get 
Away With It', testify to the general approach.^^ The rebuttal to such an 
approach is often accomplished by demonstrating that any one of the 
following is the case (these are not necessarily exclusive):
L A psychological or other entailment is being offered, not a logical 
entailment,^^
2. A hidden, but still illogical leap from a nonmoral term to a moral 
term occurs in the offender's logic,^^
3. A supposedly nonmoral term in the premise is actually a moral
term,^^
4. A supposedly moral term in the conclusion is actually a nonmoral 
term.^^
The continued failure of such attempts to validly violate Hume's Law has led 
John Mackie to be confident that 'such arguments, therefore, constitute no 
threat to any sensible interpretation of Hume's Law*.^^
Not all of the challengers are vulnerable to these types of criticisms, 
however. At least one philosopher has attempted to diffuse Hume's Law by
31SeeI.B.l.
32These are the titles of Searle (1964) and Kohlberg (1971) respectively.
33E.g. MacIntyre (1981), 64-65, claims that our need for something (an 'is') does not 
logically entail that we morally ought to have it.
3%.g. Mackie (1977), 67-72, claims that such a covert move is found in premises wherein 
a promise (an 'is') is assumed to entail an obligation (an 'oughf).
3 ^ .g . Black (1989), claims that certain terms like 'sadistic' are smuggled moral terms, 
because they imply wrongness.
^^E.g. Prior (1949), ch. 5, claims that if a conclusion contains an 'oughf which is created 
by an individual simply because he wishes to do so, it is not a moral conclusion.
37Mackie (1977), 71.
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presenting a logical progression where the word 'ought' appears in the 
conclusion as the second half of an 'or' statement, where it is vacuous.^ ^
For example, if I am sitting in a chair, I can logically conclude that I am 
either sitting in a chair or I ought not to kill. Obviously, the second half of 
this conclusion could just as easily be replaced with its negation, or any 
other statement. Since its validity depends on its vacuity, and no moral 
claim is made by a vacuous statement, no justification can be made for any 
moral view, including any naturalist one, with such a statement.^^
Therefore, this 'exception' to Hume's Law, like the qualification Hare 
described (embedding 'ought' in a conditional), cannot be seen to 
compromise in any way the capacity of Hume's Law for undermining a 
justification of naturalism on the logical level.
There are still other challengers. Some have claimed Hume's Law to 
fail if the entire logical progression can be seen to operate within 'some 
institution'^^ or a certain 'structured context';^ ^  a common example of this 
is a 'backdrop of social institutions, expectations, and sanctions'.^^ Others 
claim that one might reject Hume's idea that moral judgment is practical and 
thereby remove 'the ground of his contrast between facts and values'.^^ The 
list could continue, but firom these examples it is becoming clear that the 
discussion has moved far away from the simplest interpretation of Hume's 
Law, based on the 'conservation of logic'. Only one of all of the criticisms 
mentioned here has attacked the 'conservation of logic' specifically, and that 
one could do so only by restricting conclusions to those which are vacuous. 
None of the other challengers to Hume's Law directly engage the 
'conservation of logic', and so even if their challenges are cogent they cannot
38prior(1976). .
39pigden (1989); (1991), 424.
^OMackie (1977), 72.
^iGewirth (1982), 108.
^^Raiiton (1993a), 295. See also Dennes (1960), 94-98; and Anscombe (1981). 
43Railton (1986), 170.
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necessarily be seen to endanger any meaningful interpretation of Hume's 
Law. In order to determine whether any of these challengers are in any 
indirect way calling into question the 'conservation of logic', one must first 
deal with a certain variable which has been latent in the discussion.
The fact that Hume's Law is a logical matter was understood fi-om 
Hume's language, where he talks of'reasoning' and 'deduction'. Therefore, 
Hume's Law cannot be said to affect those who claim to proceed fi-om 
nonmoral statements to a moral conclusion not by logic, but by some other 
means. For example, Hilary Putnam claims that an 'ought' can arise in our 
minds as a result of our recognition of an 'is'; in this way 'descriptive 
predicates naturally acquire an emotive force'.^ Others might suggest that 
a moral value emerges firom a certain collection of facts, insofar as 
emergence is defined as a nonlogical relation.^^ These philosophers do not 
violate Hume's Law because they admit to arriving at their moral 
conclusions in a nonlogical manner. Consequently, they are not appealing to 
the Logical Justification, and are not logical naturalists.
The variable which muddles discussion of Hume's Law, however, 
even when Hume is agreed to be making a logical point, is the fact that not 
every participant in the discussion places the same constraints on 'logic' 
when they attack (or defend) Hume's Law. At first glance this seems not to 
be a very important variable, since the logic behind Hume's Law is 
buttressed by the 'conservation of logic'; and as was stated in the last 
chapter, it is unlikely that anyone would attempt, or has attempted, to 
undermine this stable doctrine in a substantial way in the course of
44putnam (1981), 209.
45e . Nagel (1961), 367-374.
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defending an ethical view,^^ The 'conservation of logic', again, is the 
requirement that 'when a deduction is made formally explicit, no statement 
employing a given expression can be logically derived from premises that do 
not also contain the express ion 'There  is at least one way, however, for 
variation to arise within the constraint made by the 'conservation of logic' 
that can result in confusion regarding Hume's law. Specifically, a deduction 
may or may not be 'formally explicit', which is the only situation in which 
the conservation of logic can be tested. In other words, challengers to 
Hume's Law may or may not be involving implicit premises. Those who 
claim that a logical progression can be seen to operate within a set of 
institutions are either attempting to dispense with the 'conservation of logic' 
(which is not claimed in any of the challenges documented here), or else 
there is an implicit premise in their reasoning that certain institutions 
presuppose 'oughts' (which is sometimes claimed^^). Likewise, if one 
believes moral judgment to be nonpractical, this can be explicated by 
defining 'ought' as such in the premises, which removes the danger of 
contradicting Hume's Law. Such an implicit statement, or 'bridge 
pr inciple ' , i s  most often a definition or explanation of the meaning of the 
moral term to be included in the conclusion. Some philosophers require all 
premises to be explicit,^^ while others more casually allow for certain 
premises to be implicit, such as 'necessary truths'.^ ^  David Wiggins has
1 3 .1. One might cite 'deontic logic' (the study of the logical relations between 
normative matters) as an exception here, for it can involve obligation relating to such 
concepts as permission in a logical manner, and this might include cases of inference of one 
from the other. Among its proponents is Aqvist (1984). Deontic logic has been described 
by some (e.g. Pigden (1989)) as not being a type of logic at all, under any acceptable 
understanding of the term. S. Kuhn (1995) describes amain objection, its lack of 
'topic-neutrality'. If the entire programme is presupposed to operate entirely within an 
ethical or normative framework, however, deontic logic does not contradict the 
'conservation of logic'. Given the debate, the validity of deontic logic and its relationship to 
the 'conservation of logic' are here left as open questions.
47E. Nagel (1961), 374.
^®E.g. Railton (1993a), 295; Anscombe (1981).
^^E.g. Sinnott-Armstrong (1996), 11.
50pigden (1991), 425.
SlSmith (1994a), 192.
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suggested that discussions o f  is' and 'ought' often proceed by what might 
even be called a trick, because these words are presented as if they are to be 
understood as having certain meanings, when those meanings are never 
c la r i f i ed .Were a requirement instituted at the start of a discussion for all 
premises to be explicit, any who had fallen foul of Hume's Law would have 
the opportunity to vindicate their theories fi’om such a position. If the 
wording of the arguments of the objectors is any indication, virtually all of 
them would not be disobeying Hume's Law if their deductions were 
formally explicit. This is because they would be offering explanatory 
premises such as definitions, and as is generally accepted, 'on the truth or 
otherwise of definitions, logic is not competent to decide'.^^ Such 
objectors to Hume's Law, if all of their premises are made explicit, can be 
seen not to object to a logical matter, but to a matter on another level 
(regarding the truth of the bridge principle). In a situation where all 
premises are explicit, the only route by which one could accept the Logical 
Justification and thereby defy Hume's Law is to attack the 'conservation of 
logic' specifically, which is not generally done.
If this discussion of the 'conservation of logic' and implicit preniises, 
together with Hume's own talk of 'deduction' and 'reasoning', give credence 
to the interpretation that Hume's Law is a logical matter, then there are clear 
parameters within which it properly operates. Any argumentation for or 
against it which is semantic (e.g. 'One can proceed fi’om "is" to "ought" 
because "ought" can be defined as...'), or synthetic (e.g. 'Hume's Law is right 
because the nature of moral obligation has been determined to be...') is 
irrelevant to the substance of Hume's claim, which is logical. The only level 
of naturalism that Hume's Law clearly criticises is logical naturalism. In 
fact, if the conservation of logic is accepted, then Hume's Law, strictly
52wiggins (1995), 248. 
53pigden (1991), 425.
Chapter II 62
understood, follows: if'no statement employing a given expression can be 
logically derived from premises that do not also contain the expression', then 
the expression 'ought' is not exempt from this restriction. Since this directly 
contradicts the Logical Justification, it is enough to show logical naturalism 
to be fatally flawed. Of course, some might want to extend the spirit of 
Hume's Law beyond the letter of it, perhaps on the basis of its context, into 
the realm of the semantic or synthetic.^^ Philosophers who have explicitly 
criticised naturalism on these levels (of whom Hume is not one), will be 
discussed in the appropriate sections.
Some have found Hume's is-ought distinction awkward as a forum 
for discussion of naturalism for other reasons. For example, an 'ought' 
statement to many philosophers is considered to be a special kind of 
statement of fact, or 'is' statement; the matter of ethical significance here is 
not the choice of word, but the meaning of that word.^^ So it is to the study 
of meanings, or semantics, that a discussion of naturalism must turn.
3. AN ESCAPE ROUTE FOR NATURALISM: APPEAL TO 
SEMANTICS
Hume himself was a naturalist.^^ Some have used this as evidence 
for the allegation that he 'is a notoriously inconsistent author',^^ but in light 
of the threefold division of naturalism it is evident that Hume could 
consistently be a naturalist on another level while arguing against logical 
naturalism, whether he recognised the distinction as such or not. If this is 
the case, then his ethical theory is proof that the impossibility of deriving an
5^E.g. Stroud (1977), 187.
55q . Wamock (1967), 60-61; Midgley (1980), 219; Wiggins (1995), 248.
^^Hume believed that morality dealt with the experience of universal approval sentiments 
which are empirical facts: (1751), 4-5, 109-113, 129-132. This does not necessitate that 
his naturalism involves a reduction of moral language to those sentiments, however; on 
which see Wiggins (1993).
^^Maclntyre (1966), 174.
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'ought' from an 'is' can be admitted, and naturalism still maintained. One 
may show this is by attention to the wording of a logical progression. For 
example, the following reasoning would be criticised by Hume as invalid:
PI : The sentiment of contempt or disapproval is present in the
calm and healthy human soul towards the action of murder.
P2: Nero murdered Agrippina.
C: Nero ought not to have murdered Agrippina.
'Ought' appears above in the conclusion but in none of the premises, which 
is precisely what Hume prohibited in his famous passage. However, to 
remedy the situation, one could simply add a premise to the reasoning that 
could be said to have been an implicit 'bridge principle':
P3 : If the calm and healthy human soul experiences the sentiment
of contempt or disapproval at an action, then a person ought not to perform 
that action.
Whether the premise is true or not, if it is inserted the logic is indisputably 
valid. In fact, Hume himself, on the traditional interpretation of his ethical 
theory, would have endorsed this argument as sound and its conclusion as 
true.^^ Since the breaking of Hume's Law can be so easily avoided, his 
specific complaint in that oft-cited excerpt cannot be seen to be as potent a 
weapon against naturalism as has sometimes been supposed.^^ The reason 
for this is that the term 'ought' can be defined in a premise if one wishes to 
do 50 . To dispute this move, one cannot argue on the grounds of Hume's
^^The example of Nero murdering Agrippina is used by Hume to illustrate the process of 
determining the moral nature of actions in (1751), 131-132.
g Mayo (1986), 42, erroneously claims that 'naturalism foils' under the judgement of 
Hume's Law.
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Law nor cite any logical fallacy, for the above progression is logically valid. 
Instead, one must argue that the proposed definition of'ought' is incorrect, 
and so P3 is false. But doing this is not a matter of logic at all, but a matter 
of semantics. So, to escape the force of Hume's Law, one may shift the 
burden of proof fi-om logic to semantics; only the addition of a premise (or 
the explication of an implicit premise) is required to do this. One thereby 
shifts the level of justification of naturalism, and thus the level of 
understanding of the doctrine, fi'om the logical to the semantic. If one 
chooses not to do so, and insists on justifying naturalism with an appeal to 
logic, then it is likely that Hume's Law, with the force of the 'conservation of 
logic' behind it, will confute the attempt.
C. Arguments Against Naturalism on the Semantic Level
. The 'is-ought fallacy' discussed by Hume may be easily avoided in 
its strictest sense, but in order to do so one must justify the additional 
premise that was required in order to make the logic valid.^® The last 
section showed that one cannot avoid dealing with the justification of one's 
claims about morality by fobbing them off as being inherent in the very 
conventions of logical reasoning. If one is a naturalist, then one must justify 
this position— presumably on the basis of the meanings of the moral words 
used (semantically) or else with experiential evidence (synthetically). This 
section deals with the first of these two options, which is an appeal to the 
Semantic Justification. This states that moral terms can he defined, or their 
meanings exhaustively expressed, using solely nonmoral terms. As was 
explained in the first chapter, an appeal to the Semantic Justification must be 
an a priori matter, or a matter which does not depend on experience for the
^®Sinnott-Annstrong (1996), 10-12.
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justification of its claims. The reason for this is that any a posteriori, or 
experientially dependent, notion of definitions or meanings would constitute 
an appeal not to semantics per se, but to an understanding of experience, as 
represented in synthetic claims. Since semantics on such a view is not the 
last word, but is subject to revision on the basis of those synthetic claims, 
this type of justification will not be called semantic in this thesis, but rather 
synthetic.
Defining one term with another can be seen as a 'kind of logical 
equivalence or two-way implication',^^ and so defining moral terms in 
nonmoral terms might be considered a species of logical naturalism. This 
would be imprecise, however. Although the semantic equivalence of two 
terms is a logical relation, it is a logical relation that is being specified in a 
premise. This insures that there is a moral term in the premises of an 
argument, and so no illogical 'ought' fi-om 'is' will occur in the reasoning. 
Naturalism can arise out of logical considerations, such as definitions, 
without violating Hume's Law, which has a very specific content. Thus, R. 
M. Hare was speaking of semantic rather than logical naturalism when he 
said that 'the traditional programme of moral philosophers' is 'that of using 
logical considerations, arising out of the meanings of the moral words, to get 
them fi-om an "is" to an "ought"'.^^ The Logical Justification is not being 
appealed to here, for a premise will contain a definition of a moral word. It 
is the Semantic Justification on which this attempt relies.
As Hare said, what has here been called the Semantic Justification 
has had many adherents throughout the history of philosophy, as evidenced 
by the wide variety of naturalistic theories of ethics which have been 
defended on the semantic level. Other philosophers agree: 'historically, file 
main tradition of ethical naturalism has in fact presented itself as a semantic
61b . Williams (1985), 122. 
62Hare(1971), 8.
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theory which gives a reportive definition of the actual meanings of ethical 
terms in ordinary language.'^^ If this is true, then arguments against the 
Semantic Justification endeavour to refute this tradition as a whole, and 
therefore must be examined with assiduity.
1. 'IS' AND 'OUGHT: FROM HUME TO MOORE
Some think the spirit of Hume's Law to say more about the nature of 
moral terms like 'ought' than is recognised by a literal interpretation of the 
passage. A few decades later, the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant was 
more explicit (and extreme) about the distinction between 'ought' and 'is' 
than Hume ever was, to the point of claiming that attention to what is 
(naturalistically speaking) would actually corrupt an understanding of the 
moral ought rather than aid it:
'We see philosophy brought to a critical position, since it has 
to be firmly fixed, notwithstanding that it has nothing to 
support it either in heaven or earth. Here it must show its 
purity as absolute dictator of its own laws, not as the herald 
of those which are whispered to it by an implanted sense or 
who knows what tutelary nature. Although these may be 
better than nothing, yet they can never afford principles 
dictated by reason, which must have their source wholly a 
priori... Thus every empirical element is not only quite 
incapable o f being an aid to the principle o f morality, but is 
even highly prejudicial to the purity o f morals, for the proper 
and inestimable worth of an absolutely good will consists 
just in this, that the principle of action is fi-ee fi*om all 
influence of contingent grounds, which alone experience can 
furnish... To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing else 
but to contemplate morality stripped of all admixture of 
sensible things..
63s. Ball (1988), 198, emphasis in original. This point is also made by Brandt (1959), 
156ff.
64Kant (1785), 11.43-44,44n. (emphasis mine).
Chapter II 67
Perhaps the main point here is that morality must ultimately be based on an 
a priori foundation, rather than an a posteriori one.^^ The semantic 
naturalists, in accepting this point by attempting to justify their ethics by an 
appeal to the a priori meanings of words, are in Kant's good graces to a 
certain extent. However, there is another point in this passage which can be 
seen as a step towards the most prominent twentieth-century argument 
against semantic naturalism. Kant was a firm believer in the scientific 
enterprise, and defended the certainty of the knowledge gained from natural 
science in his Critique o f Pure Reason. To this extent he was like Hume, 
who respected science enough to devote what he saw as his greatest work to 
the introduction of the method of the sciences into moral philosophy.^^ 
However, whereas Hume did not advocate a gap between 'is' and 'ought' that 
was so wide as to divorce his ethics completely from a naturalistic study of 
the world, Kant from this passage may be interpreted to have done exactly 
that. Kant's belief that the proper contemplation of morality is 'stripped of 
all admixture of sensible things' and unsoiled by 'empirical elements' could 
easily be taken to mean that proper moral discourse should be stripped of 
any terms which represent those 'sensible things' and 'empirical elements'— 
anything which, from a naturalist's point of view, 'is'. On this interpretation, 
moral terms like 'ought' would have no relation, including any semantic 
relation, to the 'is'. For this reason, classic^ moral philosopher Peter 
Simpson has claimed:
'It is this Kantian doctrine of the "is" and the "ought" and the 
autonomous will that is really decisive, historically, for the 
emergence of the "Is/Ought" distinction... Only at this stage 
did non-naturalism come, as it were, fully of age. That is 
why it is Kant, rather than Hume or any other philosopher.
^^Kant believed the a priori to deal solely with necessary truths, and the a posteriori with 
contingent (nonnecessary, 'could logically have been otherwise') truths. Since Kant 
believed moral truths to be necessary truths, he assumed that they would have to be a 
priori.
66Hume (1751), subtitle. On this being in his opinion 'incomparably the best' of all of his 
writings, see Albert et ai, eds. (1988), 162.
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important though they were, who is principally responsible 
for its emergence.'^^
Hume, naturalist though he was, drove a small wedge between the 'is' and 
the 'ought', thereby outlawing logical naturalism. If the above interpretation 
of Kant is correct, he split the two completely apart, implying that 'ought' is 
not only underivable from any 'is', but is indefinable in terms of any 
naturalistic 'is' as well.
This claim was made explicitly in the next century by one who 
admitted to having been greatly influenced by Kant's ethical writings, 
although he departed from them: Henry Sidgwick.^® To the question of 
'What definition can we give of "ought"?', Sidgwick answered in his book 
Methods o f Ethics that the idea is 'too elementary to admit of any formal 
def i n i t i on ' .Of  course, this goes far beyond an argument against semantic 
naturalism. It argues against any semantic theory of ethics, whether 
naturalistic or not. For this reason, Sidgwick and others of this belief can be 
linked to the Plato of the Euthyphro, who argued against several proposed 
definitions of the term 'holiness'.^® Those definitions could not be seen as 
naturalistic (if this term can be anachronistically used here), since each 
definition involved 'the gods'.^^ For Sidgwick and others of his view, 
though, Plato's arguments in that dialogue are relevant to modem moral 
philosophy because modem definitions of moral terms can be scmtinised 
just as critically. In the years following Sidgwick's writings such scmtiny, 
especially of naturalistic définitions, became a large part of moral
67p. Simpson (1987), 125.
68sidgwick (1874), Preface to the 6th edition, explains his indebtedness to Kant among 
others.
69ibid., 32.
70piato, Euthyphro, 5c-6e. Plato's term, yH4@<, has the sense o f  sanctioned by divine or 
eternal law', as opposed to being sanctioned by human temporal law, so the discussion of 
this term's definition is more relevant to ethics than might appear from the translation 
'holiness'. Aside from this, the use of the word 'define' here is technically different from 
certain uses in modem semantics (see Allen (1984), 33-39), but it nevertheless bears 
enough similarity for the connection, which is often made (e.g. Pigden (1991), 426).
7 i Plato, Eutlyphro, 6e, 9c, 12e, 14b.
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philosophy. Sidgwick himself did not bring prominent criticism to semantic 
naturalism, however. Rather, it was a student ofhis^^ who did so, 
beginning the twentieth century with a work which has had a profound 
influence on the state of naturalism.
2. MOORE'S OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT
a. Principia Ethica
This was the name of the seminal work; its author was the 
Cambridge philosopher George Edward Moore7^ In the first chapter of this 
work, Moore credits Sidgwick (already having endorsed his general ethical 
approach, known as 'Intuitionism'^^) with being the 'only one ethical 
writer... who has clearly recognised and stated this fact', that 'good' is 
indefinable.^^ Here the emphasis will be to show how Moore argued 
against semantic naturalism in particular, not against all ethical defimtions. 
In fact, although Moore does devote a chapter in Principia Ethica to ethical 
theories which were semantic but not naturalistic, his primary negative 
intention in the book, by his own admission, is to refute those theories of 
ethics which confuse '"good", which is not... a natural object, with any 
natural object whatever'. To underscore this intention, he names the general 
confusion the 'naturalistic fallacy', though claiming the fallacy to affect
n /r
many more than just naturalistic theories.
G. E. Moore criticised naturalists for refusing to see that 'good' was 
one of those 'notions of that simple kind, out of which definitions are
72Albert et al, eds., (1988), 279.
73Among the works which appraise the profound influence of this work on the moral 
philosophy of this century are M. Wamock (1960); P. Levy (1979); Hudson (1980); T. 
Baldwin (1990); and Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992), 115-124. 
74Moore(1903),x.
7^ibid., 19. Moore was not in such admiration of Sidgwick in some other respects, 
however. The majority of the largest chapter of the book is devoted to arguing against 
Sidgwick's hedonistic ethical theory.
76ibid., 13.
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composed and with which the power of further defining ceases.'^^ As with 
Hume's Law, there is an oft-quoted passage (or a passage with oft-quoted 
portions) which roughly outlines his view on this issue:
'If I am asked "What is good?" my answer is that good is 
good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked 
'How is good to be defined?' my answer is that it cannot be 
defined, and that is all I have to say about it... if I am right, 
then nobody can foist upon us such an axiom as that 
"Pleasure, is the only good" or that "The good is the desired" 
on the pretence that this is "the very meaning of the 
word"...My point is that 'good' is a simple notion, just as 
'yellow* is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any 
matter of means, explain to anyone who does not already 
know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is. 
Definitions of the kind that I was asking for, definitions 
which describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted 
by a word, and which do not merely tell us what the word is 
used to mean, are only possible when the object or notion in 
question is something complex. You can give a defimtion of 
a horse, because a horse has many different properties and 
qualities, all of which you can enumerate. But when you 
have enumerated them all, when you have reduced a horse to 
his simplest terms, then you can no longer define those 
terms. They are simply something which you think of or 
perceive, and to anyone who cannot think of or perceive 
them, you can never, by any definition, make their nature 
known.'^^
Several writers have claimed that this argument 'does not impress me, 
because I do not find accounts of it coherent',^^ or have excused their 
neglecting it with an animadversion to the effect that it is 'entirely 
controversial!^^ or 'has lost a great deal of its force in the last few years' 
These comments exemplify the confusion that still sometimes surrounds this 
passage and others in Principia Ethica. Such confusion is understandable, 
for two elements of Moore's critique of naturalism are necessary to an
77ibid., 8.
78ibid., 6-7.
7^ Anscombe (1958), 27. 
80w. Fox (1990), 189. 
Slwilson (1980a), 431.
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understanding of this passage but are not thoroughly explained before this 
point in the book: the epistemological position from which he launches the 
criticism, and the semantic nature of both his argumentation and the position 
against which he argues. Both elements will be discussed here in turn.
b. The epistemology behind the argument ■ .
Perhaps the adjectives of Moore's notion of good that are most 
relevant to his critique of naturalism are 'simple', 'irreducible', 'indefinable', 
and 'nonnatural'— four words which certainly convey a general idea, but not 
necessarily a precise representation, of his view. The first three of these 
words are interconnected, and can be explained clearly with reference to the 
seventeenth century philosopher John Locke. Locke's idea of epistemology, 
as found in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, are paraphrased 
(without mention) in the first chapter o i Principia Ethica, where Moore's 
position is outlined. Moore's endorsement of Locke's epistemology is not 
a peculiar occurrence: at least one study supports 'the correctness of the 
statement that Locke changed man's way of thinking' with regard to 
knowledge.^^ The Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle wrote that 'one cannot 
pick up a sermon, a noel, a pamphlet, or a treatise and be in any doubt, after 
reading a few lines, whether it was published before or after the publication 
of Locke's Essaÿ^^  If there is any peculiarity in Moore's case, it is not that 
he held Locke's view of epistemology, but that he made certain 
idiosyncracies of it do so much work, as will be shown.^^
^2parallel passages include Moore (1903), 7-8,16 with Locke (1689), Ill.i-ii, IV.vii; and 
Moore p.6 with Locke Ill.iv. Others are cited hereafter.
^3 Schools (1980), 3.
84Ryle(1967),3.
^^Schouls (1980) has pointed out the significant correlations between Locke's 
epistemology and that of Descartes. Although the present discussion will be in terms of 
Locke, the possibility is open that Descartes had already proposed some or all of tlie 
relevant features of Lockean epistemology. In fact, some of the ideas have been found in 
some Italian thinkers of the previous (sixteenth) century, and perhaps even in embryonic 
form in ancient thought, as is also explained in Schouls's work.
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'Reason', according to Locke, deals with the 'certainty or probability' 
of that which the mind deduces 'from such Ideas, which it has got by the use 
of its natural faculties, viz. by sensation or reflection'.^^ Furthermore, 'one 
thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have; and that is, 
that some of them are simple, and some c o m p l e x Of these two categories 
of ideas, the latter are composed of the former. Two centuries later, G. E. 
Moore makes plain that his discussion is going to be centred on ideas, and in 
particular the idea of 'good'.^^ He shows his affinity with Locke by 
claiming that these ideas can be simple, which means they are 'just 
something you think or p e r c e i v e ' o r  else complex, which means they are 
composed of a bunch of simple ideas. Moore's example of a complex idea is 
a horse, which 'has many different properties and qualities, all of which you 
can enumerate... four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, etc.'.^^
Two logical corollaries of the Lockean simplicity of an idea are its 
irreducibility and indefinability?^ Irreducibility, or unanalysability, is the 
assertion that a simple idea cannot be broken into any further components, 
that 'it is not composed of any parts, which we can substitute for it in our 
minds when we are thinking about it'.^^ If something simple is, as both 
Locke and Moore say, an item of thought which is not composed of any 
parts, it follows that it is not reducible to anything else. However, it is 
precisely the reduction into parts that Locke calls a defimtion, which is why 
he says that 'The names of simple ideas are not capable of any defimtions'.^^ 
Moore entertains three understandings of 'definition':
S^Locke (1689), IV.xviii.2. 
®7ibid., n.ii.l.
*®ibid., Il.xxiii.l. 
89Moore(1903), 6.
90ibid., 7.
91 ibid., 7-8.
92Locke(1689), m.iv.4-8. 
93Moore(1903), 8. 
94Locke(1689), III.iv.4.
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1. - Definition = An approximation or indication of the idea I think 
you are referring to when you say a word (the 'arbitrary verbal définition').
2. Definition = An approximation or indication of the idea people in 
general would think you are referring to when you say a word (the 'verbal 
definition proper').
3. Definition = The substitution for a complex idea of all of its 
simple components.^^
Moore expresses his distaste for the first two, for such mundane definitions 
are the job of the lexicographer, not the philosopher.^^ The third, eminently 
Lockean, understanding of'definition' is that which Moore chooses; this, he 
says, is 'what I mean, when I say that good is indefinable'.^^ An indefinable 
term, for Moore, was a term which could not be substituted with any simple 
components. Considering that good, if simple, could not possibly have any 
components besides itself, it is perfectly understandable why Moore would 
call good indefinable. Thus, the indefinability of good follows directly from 
its irreducibility, which follows from its simplicity.
The fourth character of Moore's idea of good is 'nonnatural'. To 
understand this, one must look first to Moore's definition of the 'natural'. He 
defines this in three ways:
1. Natural = 'something of which the existence is admittedly an 
object of experience',^^
2. Natural = 'that which is the subject-matter of the natural sciences 
and also of psychology'
95Moore (1903), 8.
96ibid., 6. 
97ibid., 8.
9«ibid.,38.
99Note: those who have been cited (in section B.l, 2) as believing that contemplation of 
natural objects psychologically yields moral conclusions are not necessarily doing any 
defining of psychological states in moral terms.
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3. Natural = 'all that has existed, does exist, or will exist in time... 
by itself m time, and not merely as a property of some natural object'. ^
Moore's acceptance of all three of these definitions suggests his belief, at 
that time, that they are all equivalent, although there is evidence that the 
second of these was the primary. ^  However, some philosophers have 
chosen to centre their discussion on the third definition, since the 
assumption that terms have to refer to something that 'exists' (in some sense) 
was cited by Moore as a fundamental mistake which for all semantic ethical 
theorists, not just naturalists, 'leads them to commit the naturalistic 
fallacy'. Moore eventually discarded this third definition of'natural', 
though, realising that many natural properties cannot exist by themselves in 
time.^^^ In any case, 'nonnatural' describes something whose existence is 
determined by some other means than experience, and is not part of the 
subject-matter of science so understood, and does not exist apart Jfrom 
something natural with which it is associated. This 'nonnaturalness', as a 
fourth character of good, does not follow firom any of the previously stated 
characters; a simple idea can correspond to either a natural or a nonnatural 
object or property. 'Pleasure' is an example Moore provides of something 
that is simple, irreducible, indefinable, but n a t u r a l The number 'one' is 
an example besides 'good' of something Moore would call simple, 
irreducible, indefinable and nonnatural.
 ^®®The latter two definitions are found in ibid., 40-41.
^®^Kolnai (1980) and Wiggins (1993), 303, take this position, based on Principia Ethica as 
well as confirmation found in a new Preface for it which Moore never published (see C. 
lÆvy(1964)).
^02]) W ri^ t (1994) discusses the naturalistic fallacy in terms of the doctrine that 'all 
propositions assert a relation between existents'. This approach is also evident in this 
century's arguments against 'descriptivism' in ethics (on which see subsection 3b, below). 
103Moore(1903), 124-126.
104Moore (1942), 581.
10^Moore(1903), 13.
^^^Moore calls numbers nonnatural in (1903), 111-12; presumably the number 'one' is 
simple, and the other two adjectives follow.
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One more aspect of Moore's position is essential to an understanding 
of his critique of naturalism. Locke said that there can never be any dispute 
about which idea is in one's own mind, whether it be simple or complex, for 
ideas admit of no confusion or lack of understanding when there is any 
understanding of them at all. In his own words, 'Whoever reflects on what 
passes in his own mind, cannot miss it.'^^^ Again, 'For let any idea be as it 
will, it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be; and that very 
perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other ideas, which cannot be 
other, i.e. different, without being perceived to be so'.^^^ Moore concurs; 
if good is an idea, and ideas are in the mind, then 'Everyone does in fact 
understand the question "Is this good?". When he thinks of it, his state of 
mind is different from what it would be, were he asked "Is this pleasant, or 
desired, or approved?"'. Moreover, 'Everybody is constantly aware of this 
notion' of good.^^^ Moore does, however, allow for the possibility that one 
'may never become aware at all that it is different from other notions of 
which he is also aware'. ^  One knows exactly what the idea of'pleasure' 
is, and would never be in doubt as to whether it was pleasure or some other 
idea that was before his mind. One also knows precisely what 'good' is, and 
likewise could not second-guess himself and not be sure whether that simple 
idea he had in mind was 'good' or not. However, there is no saying that one 
will always realise that these two ideas, pleasure and good, are different 
ideas and not the same thing. The reason for this is that the person has not 
taken the two ideas into mind together, and strived to notice the difference in 
state of mind which they produce upon contemplation. To make an analogy, 
a certain person P might think two wines wl and w2 to be identical in taste, 
without ever having had a glass of each next to the other to compare
107Locke(1689), U.ix.2. 
^P^ibid., II.xxix.5. 
109Moore(1903), 16-17. 
llOibid., 17.
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directly. As soon as wl and w2 are tasted in succession, however, any . 
perceptible differences will immediately become apparent. Thus, Moore 
endeavours in Principia Ethica to provide a means by which people can 
assay 'good' alongside any other idea of which they are also aware but which 
is erroneously thought to be the same as 'good', and thereby distinguish one 
from the other. What is supposed by Locke and Moore to be impossible, 
however, is that one could believe that one has 'good' before his mind, and 
that he could in actuality be mistaken, and be thinking of'pleasure'.^ ^  ^  This 
is where the analogy with wine breaks down, for people might often believe 
that they are drinking one wine when they are actually drinking another. 
Lockean-Mooreaii ideas are the very elements of an individual's knowledge 
and thus do not admit of such ambiguity. There is no possibility whatsoever 
that an idea in one's awareness could be confused with another one at the 
very moment it is being thought. This would entail a contradiction: since 
ideas are by definition the components of knowledge, confusing one 
conscious idea for another would be saying that something was at the same 
time known and not known.
This is a rough outline of Moore's epistemological position, from 
which he launches his critique of naturalism. By its lights one can make 
much more sense of the renowned passage cited several pages above; for 
many terms featured there, such as 'simple', 'meaning', 'definition', and 
'notion' (a synonym for 'idea'), would otherwise be too vague for his position 
to be understood.
c. The argument
Moore's argument against naturalism in Principia Ethica is 
interwoven with his scant description of his own position, which is likely an
i i ilTiat Locke would share this belief is evident from (1689), Il.xxix.
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important reason why he has been misinterpreted or misunderstood. The 
crux of his complaint is that naturalists (and some others) define the term 
'good' with terms like 'pleasure' or 'approval' or some other concept other 
than good itself:
'...far too many philosophers have thought that when they 
named those other properties they were actually defining 
good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not "other", 
but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This 
view I propose to call the "naturalistic fallacy", and of it I 
shall now endeavour to dispose.' ^  ^  ^
According to Moore these philosophers have, like our wine-taster P, had 
something wl in mind, and supposed it to be no different from w2. Of 
course, in order to prove this, Moore had to develop a tool with which one 
could distinguish two ideas; otherwise his claim that they are different 
would be completely on a par with another's claim that they are the same. 
So, he developed the Open Question Argument. This involves first 
entertaining one idea before the mind, and then bringing another alongside 
it. If asking whether the one idea was fiie same as the second idea is 
immediately recognised as a tautology, then the ideas must be the same. 
However, if one could reasonably ask the question without incurring a 
tautology, i.e. if the question is open, then the two ideas must be different 
(because of the impossibility of being confused about one's own ideas while 
one is thinking them). ^  ^  ^  As with the epistemology behind the argument, 
Locke had actually already framed an embry onic version of the Open 
Question Argument, encouraging his readers to compare the idea of'the 
taste of a pine-apple' with any other idea to see that it is actually something 
distinct.^
1 i^Moore (1903), 10.
N3ibid., 15-16.
 ^I^Locke (1689), Ill.iv.l 1. This (original?) point is yet another illustration of the 
indebtedness of Moore to Locke.
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To illustrate the operation of the Open Question Argument, one may 
remove the area of breakdown of the wine example by supposing that P is 
such a perfect wine-taster that he can recognise a wine upon tasting it as 
perfectly as we (according to Locke and Moore) can recognise an idea when 
it comes into our heads. P may forget which wine is which if he doesn't 
have it there to taste, just as we can be at a loss to recall what a certain idea 
was once we are not thinking about it anymore; but while he is tasting, P 
can name the wine with no margin of error. Now let us suppose that this 
wine-taster is under the impression that two wines wl and w2 are the same 
wine, because he has tasted them both at different times, and does not 
remember the one he is not tasting enough to distinguish it from the one he 
is tasting. When another taster tells P that this is not at all the case, and that 
the two wines are different, P places them next to each other and tastes them 
in succession. Being able as he is to name perfectly a wine he is tasting, P is 
able to name one and then name the other. By doing so he leams whether 
the wines are indeed different or the same. ^  ^  ^
Moore chooses to make an analogy not with taste and wine, but with 
sight and colour.^ Either of these analogies might suggest various 
features which might be inconsistent with each other or even with Moore's 
idea of good. Moore does not claim goodness to be realised by a person in 
the same way that either tastes or sights are, however. The only suggestion
potential problem with this example is that P must taste the wines at different times, 
and could theoretically forget which wine wl was as soon as he tasted w2. This is not a 
point of breakdown for the analogy, however, because if it is a problem for the wine-taster, 
it is also likely to be a problem for Moore. Moore's discussion suggests that we cannot 
entertain two ideas before the mind at the exact same moment, for having an idea before the 
mind creates a unique 'state of mind', unlike that created by the presence of any other idea 
(Moore (1903), 16-17). If this is the case, one can theoretically bounce back and forth 
between 'good' and pleasure', repeatedly entertaining each before the mind and repeatedly 
forgetting the state of mind corresponding to one as soon as it is replaced in the mind by the 
other. A possible way out for a Lockean like Moore is to allow for a person to sense a . 
change in state of mind when a new idea replaces the old. In the wine-tasting example this 
could work as well, allowing P to sense a change in taste as a new wine replaces the old 
still on his tongue. (Admittedly this analogy shows little respect for the actual methods of 
wine-tasting...)
116ibid., 10,14-15.
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of similarity being made by either of the analogies is that one has immediate
recognition of one's own tastes and sights as well as one's own ideas, such as
goodness.^ If a person thinks 'good' to be the same thing as 'pleasure', the
Open Question Argument will help us solve the problem by having us first
conceptualise pleasure, and then good. By asking 'Is pleasure the same as
good?', or the adjectival form 'Is pleasure good?', we will realise whether we
are asking about two ideas, or only one. The former is the case if 'Is
pleasure good?' were seen to be an open question. The latter is the case if'Is
pleasure good?' obviously reduced to 'Is pleasure pleasant?', which is a
tautology. The reason this would be obvious is because Moore is talking
about ideas currently in one's consciousness, and for one to be in contusion
about them would be self-contradictory.
This argument, however, cannot rule out eve;y possible definition of
'good' at once, any more than our wine-taster can rule out any wine being the
same as that in the bottle he has in front of him, unless he compares all of
them. Thus, Moore says that
'if he will try this experiment with each suggested definition 
in succession, he may become expert enough to recognise 
that in every case he has before his mind a unique object, 
with regard to the connection of which with any other object, 
a distinct question may be asked.' ^  ^  ^
By 'connection' Moore means a semantic connection, or a connection having 
to do with defining one object in the mind in terms of another. Moore 
himself encounters a few alleged definitions of'good' over the course of 
about a hundred pages, but leaves to us the continuation of this analytical 
process which the Open Question Argument has facilitated.
 ^ here is Moore's belief that the idea o f  good' will be the same for everyone,
which may be seen as a belief in a certain kind of'objectivity' in ethics (see Moore (1903), 
xi; (1922), 254-59).
1 16. See also S. Ball (1988), 209, who calls us to realise that induction in this
matter may be fallible.
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Being concerned as it is with definitions and identities based solely 
on the meanings of words, Moore's argument only attacks semantic theories. 
This point may not be clear in certain passages, but this is at least partly due 
to the fact that 'In those days, the philosophy of language was not very far 
advanced',^ and so some distinctions might have gone unnoticed. For 
example, as Hilary Putnam has noted, Moore 'conflated properties and 
concepts' T h r o u g h o u t  Principia Ethica, but especially in the first 
chapter, Moore sometimes calls 'good' an idea or concept, and other times 
calls it a nonnatural property. That the two notions are distinct is accepted 
by many, perhaps most, philosophers of language today. Although
Moore might have blurred some distinctions that in his day had not yet been 
clearly established, it is evident fi-om his writing that he was arguing against 
forms of naturalism which attempt to identify good with another idea 'on the 
pretence that this is the very meaning of the word'.^^^ If goodness and 
pleasure were actually a single property that is being referred to with two 
different terms, with different meanings and therefore associated with 
different ideas in the mind, Moore's argument as he presents it would not be 
able to dispute this. The Open Question Argument operates entirely in terms 
of ideas in the mind, which for Moore are what we consult when we wish to 
use language. How the words are properly used in language depends on 
their meanings, which depend in turn on the nature of our ideas or concepts. 
For Moore and for others in the analytical tradition of semantics, the 
organisation of these ideas or concepts is an entirely a priori affair. We may 
very well have learned about properties through sense experience; for 
example, it is difficult to imagine how we could have known about redness 
if we had no eyes. However, the term 'a priorf has nothing to do with how.
119Rachels(1990), 70.
120putnam (1981), 207.
^21 ibid.; see also Wiggins (1984). 
122Moore (1903), 7.
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an idea is a c q u i r e d , b u t  how it is justified to be the way it is. To justify 
the distinctiveness of the idea of'good', which is the aim of the Open 
Question Argument, Moore does not tell us to appeal to an experience of 
things with the property of goodness. This would be a posteriori. Rather, 
he tells us to appeal to our idea of good— to think about good, apart from 
any particular experienced good things. This is a priori. Moore, like the 
semantic naturalists he criticises, believes the meaning of'good' to be the 
kind of thing that is not justified on the basis of experience. On the contrary, 
it is fimdamentally an a priori matter. Therefore his argument belongs 
squarely within the fraditional analytical programme, and thus is an 
argument particularly against the Semantic Justification.
One interesting consequence of his emphasis on the meanings of 
words, as with Hume's emphasis on logical validity, is that Moore's 
argument can be shown to be a particular application of a general rule 
believed to be applicable to any use of language, whether in ethics or outside 
of it. Hume's Law was shown earlier to be interpretable as a specific 
instance of the general law of the 'conservation of logic'. Analogously, 
Moore's Open Question Argument against what he called the 'naturalistic 
fallacy' can be seen to be equally applicable to any definition of one term in 
terms of another.
'If anybody tried to define pleasure for us as being any other 
natural object; if anybody were to say, for instance, that 
pleasure means the sensation of red, and were to proceed to 
deduce from that tliat pleasure is a colour, wc should be 
entitled to laugh at him and distrust his future statements 
about colour. Well, that would be the same fallacy which I 
have called the naturalistic fallacy.' ^
^23lowc (1995a), 43.
^^^Broad (1942), 64ff. further describes Moore's apriority. 
^25see section B.la, 2.
126Moore(1903), 13.
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From this humorous quotation Moore's argument can clearly be seen not to 
rest on a truth peculiar to ethics, although it can certainly be applied to 
ethics. His argument rests, rather, on what he takes to be truths about 
meanings of words in general. Neither colours nor pleasure are ethical 
terms, and yet the defining of one in terms of the other falls foul of the 
naturalistic fallacy. Nevertheless, Moore's Principia Ethica being an ethical 
work, he makes plain in the next sentence that he wishes to restrict his 
criticism there to the definition of ethical words in nonethical terms.
To sum up, what has been described here of Moore's argument in 
Principia Ethica can be distilled to two points. First, according to Moore, 
'good' as a concept is fundamental in the discipline of ethics, and cannot be 
broken down into simpler parts, nor can it be substituted by any other 
notion. Any theory of ethics that attempts to do either is refuted a priori on 
the basis of the meaning of the word 'good'. Second, goodness as à property 
or quality is not one which is discoverable by the means employed in the 
natural sciences or psychology, i.e. it is a 'non-natural' property. The first of 
these assertions contradicts the Semantic Justification, and the second of 
them contradicts the definition of naturalism. If the first assertion is correct, 
semantic naturalism is confuted. If the second is correct, then any type of 
naturalism is confuted. But since Moore does not provide direct 
argumentation for the non-naturalness of good,^^^ but does give us an Open 
Question Argument to support the indefinability of'good', it is his argument 
against semantic naturalism which is being elaborated and assessed in this 
section.
d. Qualification in later works
14. An argument against the naturalness of good is not an argument for its 
non-naturalness; after Moore an entire tradition has emerged whereon good is not a 
property at all, natural or non-natural, and yet our moral judgments still serve a purpose- 
for example, to coordinate our lives with our feelings and the feelings of others (Gibbard 
(1990), 64-80,239-300).
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Before examining this argument too closely, one must recognise 
Moore's philosophical career to have extended for a half a century beyond 
the Principia Ethica of his youth (he was thirty when it was published). 
Throughout his life, Moore attempted to get to the root of the matter of the 
nature of goodness and the prospect of defining ethical terms with 
nonethical terms. He expressed a wish either to justify or to move beyond 
the dogmatic conceptual claims he had made early in his career. 
Unfortunately from the perspective of a critique of naturalism, he never 
approached the surety of his early years. This excerpt from 1922 serves as 
an example of Moore's grappling with the subject:
'[A good question is] whether when we judge (whether truly 
or falsely) that an action is a duty or a state of things good, 
all that we are thinking about the action or the state of things 
in question, is simply and solely that we ourselves or others . 
have or tend to have a certain feeling towards it when we 
contemplate or think of it... I feel some doubts myself 
whether they are or not: it . does not seem to me to be a 
matter to dogmatise upon. But I am strongly inclined to 
think that they are not merely psychological; that Moral 
Philosophy and Ethics are not mere departments of 
Psychology.'
Another way Moore attempted to speak of the nature of good and morality 
was to explain what he thought good was describing about x when one says 
'x is good'. Here too, he was far from a solid answer to the question. He was 
convinced that it was of a different sort than most, if not all, other kinds of 
description; but, in his own words,
'...I can't see what it is. It seems to me quite obvious that if 
you assert of a given state of things that it contains a balance 
of pleasure over pain, you are asserting of it not only a 
different predicate, from what you would be asserting of it if 
you said it was "good"- but a predicate which is of a 
different kind... And of course the mere fact that many 
people have thought that goodness and beauty were 
subjective is evidence that there is some great difference of
128Moore (1922), 330.
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kind between them and such predicates as being yellow or 
containing a balance of pleasure. But what the difference is, 
if we suppose, as I suppose, that goodness and beauty are not 
subjective, and that they do share with "yellowness" and 
"containing pleasure" the property of depending solely on the 
intrinsic nature of what possesses them, I confess I cannot 
say.'^ ^^
In a reply to those who criticised his vagueness as to how moral terms do 
and don't describe things, he admitted twenty years later that 'To make it 
clear it would be necessary to specify the sense of "describe" in question; 
and I am no more able to do this now than I was then.'^^^ His inability to 
deal with these fundamental notions ultimately led him to question even 
those decrees he had made so confidently in the beginning of his career. In a 
paper entitled 'Is goodness a quality?', the aged Moore wrote,
'In Principia I asserted and proposed to prove that 'good'... 
was indefinable. But all the supposed proofs were certainly 
fallacious; they entirely failed to prove that [good] is
indefinable. And I think perhaps it is definable: I do not 
know. But I also still think that very likely it is 
indefinable.'^^ ^
Moore certainly wished to go the full distance, and explain exactly why 
naturalism would not work; and the answer, he suspected, had something to 
do with the unique nature of goodness, something about it which set it apart 
firom the type of information one receives firom the natural sciences and 
psychology. But Moore never rewrote Principia Ethica, altiiough he 
recognised that he should have.^^^ Consequently, his argument there 
received significant criticism to which he never adequately responded. His 
argument ultimately was modified in response to these criticisms, though 
not by him.
129Moore(1922), 274. 
130Moore(1942), 591. 
13lMoore(1959), 98. 
^32Moore 0922a), xii.
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3. AFTER MOORE
a. The fall and rise o f the Open Question Argument
At least some of the shortcomings G. E. Moore saw with his 
argumentation were those that others, such as W. K. Frankena and C. D, 
Broad, were seeing, since he made many of his admissions in replies to their 
arguments. Many of them call into question aspects of his work that do not 
directly affect his criticism of naturalism (e.g. Broad's arguments against the 
equivalence of Moore's three definitions of'natural', and his discussion of 
the status of the 'nonnaturdl'^^^). Others, though, such as Frankciia's 
arguments in his paper on 'The Naturalistic Fallacy', are very relevant. 
This paper, Frankena's first publ icat ion,presents a criticism which has 
since become the 'standard objection to Moore's a rgumen t ' , t h a t  the Open 
Question Argument is question-begging if interpreted as a decisive 
refutation of semantic (or, as Frankena calls it, 'definitional') naturalism as a 
whole. Moore had adopted a quip by Bishop Joseph Butler as his motto: 
'Everything is what it is, and not another thing'. This is the essence of 
the Open Question Argument, which is at root an appeal to ideas supposedly 
held in common by everyone. To this, however, naturalists can add a clause, 
thereby yielding the following: 'Everything is what it is, and not another 
thing, unless it is another thing, and even then it is what it is'.^^^ The point 
of this is that to Moore's claim that 'Is pleasure good?' is an open question, 
there is, at least prima facie, no reason why someone cannot say, 'But it is 
not an open question in my mind. To me it is a tautology, for I think 
pleasure and goodness are indistinguishable.' If the Open Question
133Broad (1942). 
^^^Frankena (1939). 
^^^Sankowski (1995), 289. 
136s. Ball (1988), 198. 
l^^Moore (1903), title page. 
138prankena (1939), 472.
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Argument rests on ideas supposedly held in common by everyone, it is 
vulnerable to someone claiming that the idea they hold is different. To 
ignore this possibility is to rule out real differences in people's conception of 
good; but it seems possible that people may indeed have such differences.
This and many other criticisms of the Open Question Argument can 
be understood in the context of two general blows which have been dealt to 
those aspects of Moore's ethical philosophy which have been described here. 
First, although philosophers like W. D. Ross and H. A. Prichard produced 
early twentieth century philosophies which were in the Sidgwick-Moore 
'intuitionist' t radi t ion,^this Platonic-styled intimate (some would say 
esoteric) awareness of ethical principles has according to John Mackie 'long 
been out of favour, and it is indeed easy to point out its implausibilities'. 
Bernard Williams writes that it 'has been demolished by a succession of 
critics, and the ruins of it that remain above ground are not impressive 
enough to invite much history of what happened to it.'^^^ The cogent 
arguments which were offered against it between the 1950's and 1980's are 
indeed many.^^^ Since Moore was one of those philosophers whose 
intuitionism was so harshly criticised, his argument against naturalism 
suffered insofar as it could be seen to be rooted in this untenable intuitionist 
perspective. For example, if it was Moore's intention in Principia Ethica
139see Prichard (1912); (1937); and Ross (1930).
^^®Mackie (1977), 39. That Moore had an affinity to Plato on this matter, see S. Clark
Williams (1985), 94.
1^^Among them are Toulmin (1950); Hare (1952); Nowell-Smith (1954); MacIntyre 
(1966), 252ff, which specifically deals with Moore's version; G. Wamock (1967), ch. 2; 
Frankena (1973), 102-105; Mackie (1977), 36-41; Blackburn (1985); B. Williams (1985), 
93-95; and Mayo (1986), 43-48. Hare continues to restate his arguments, e.g. (1981) and 
(1989a). Some current moral philosophers, like those of Thomas Nagel (1970); (1986); 
and John McDowell (1979); (1985); (1995), are sometimes characterised as 'writers in the 
intuitionist tradition' (Dancy (1991), 417-8), but these theories are different in important 
ways; for example, they include diligent explanations of their moral epistemology, or how 
we come to know good from bad. The alleged inadequacy of earlier philosophers' attempts 
at such explanation was the basis for most of the criticisms cited above. Robert Audi 
(1996) is perhaps closer to the 'old-line' intuitionists, but he too realises the importance of 
explaining the means by which a claim is justified.
^^3por examples of philosophers who criticise Moore's intuitionism in order to discredit
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to show that good was a non-natural property, and yet he did not explain 
how we come to be aware of non-natural properties, one could interpret his 
argument as an indirect argument for intuitionism. Insofar as intuitionism 
was seen to be a weak ethical position, Moore's work would be undermined.
The second general blow was to the Lockean atomist epistemology 
which enabled Moore to assert the indefinability of good. The later 
Wittgenstein, for one, argued against the notion of 'absolute simplicity' or 
'absolute exactness' with regard to our ideas. According to one study of 
Locke's epistemology, this element of it at least has been 'by and large 
rejected by contemporary philosophers'. A recent review of this 
century's meta-ethics, entitled 'Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics', opens with a 
statement that touches on both of these blows to Moore's ethical philosophy, 
citing as its fatal flaws the 'appeal to a now defunct intuitionistic Platonism' 
and 'assumptions about the transparency of concepts and obviousness of 
analytic truth'.
Before one concludes at this point that Moore's naturalistic fallacy is 
'a stuffed dragon', a second look may be required. The first section of 
that review paper cited at the end of the last paragraph is entitled 'Principia's 
Revenge' . A recurring theme of the paper's seventy-five pages is the 
continued prevalence of issues that were raised, if vaguely, by Moore, and 
which in all likelihood will continue to dog naturalists into the next century. 
The answer to a question raised in the first page of that review, 'Why, then, 
isn't Moore's argument a mere period piece?', is answered there with the 
assertion that the Open Question Argument can still be posed intelligently
Moore's argumentation against naturalism, see MacIntyre (1966), 252ff, and Midgley 
(1980).
144 Wittgenstein (1953), 1.46-7, 88f. Other criticisms of Lockean epistemology are 
Midgley (1980); Schouls (1980); and P. Simpson (1987), ch. 1,6,7. Of these, Midgley 
and Simpson apply their criticisms to Moore.
145schouls (1980), 37.
146Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), 115.
147Midgley (1980), 207.
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and cogently, apart from Moore's particular way of seeing meta-ethics, 
epistemology, or semantics. Divorcing the Open Question Argument 
from the less savoury aspects of Moore's philosophy is what contemporary 
philosophers mean when they claim that it is possible to put 'Moore's 
objections... on to a proper basis'. The Michigan philosophers Darwall, 
Gibbard and Railton explain two requirements for such modification:
'First, one should not claim utter conviction, but merely 
observe that the open question argument is compelling for 
otherwise competent, reflective speakers of English, who 
appear to have no difficulty im%ining what it would be like 
to dispute whether P is good/l^O
So, a critic must recognise that the Open Question Argument does not rule 
out semantic naturalism decisively. Rather, it shows that there is 
controversy as to whether a certain term actually means the same thing as a 
moral term. This casts some doubt on the semantic naturalist's claim that the 
identity of meaning between two terms is inherent in ordinary language. It 
does not yet refute anything, however, for it is also possible that the critic 
has a lack of information or an inability to use his language properly. Such 
might be difficult to determine, but nevertheless being confident that such 
incompetence is not present remains a proviso for the validity of the Open 
Question Argument.
The second requirement for the modification of Moore's Open 
Question Argument, and perhaps more weighty for the would-be critic of 
naturalism, is that 'one should articulate a philosophical explanation of why 
this might be so,'^^^ i.e., why a certain definition of good results in an open 
question and is thus dubious. Saying that 'good is good, and that is the end 
of the m a t t e r ' w i l l  do little but attract the retort that one is advocating the
l^Soarwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), 115-17. 
149wiggins (1993a), 330. See also S. Ball (1988), 207-9. 
ISO^arwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), 117.
^^^ibid. This is also asserted by Wiggins (1993), 304. 
152Moore (1903), 6.
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end of moral philosophy and moral discussion altogether. Since this is not
usually the objective of the critic of naturalism, ^  one must provide a
reason why the question is open. Usually this will be in the form of a
distinction between the meanings of the two terms postulated by the
naturalist as equivalent. To return to the wine example, the wine-taster, to
be believable, must not simply state T  and Z taste or otherwise affect me
differently, and so they must be different wines', but must say something
about the tastes or other effects of each that sets them apart from each other.
The reason for this specific modification of the Open Question argument is
the fact that even if two terms are equivalent by their very meanings, this is
not always obvious:
'It is a familiar fact about analyses that a concept C* may 
constitute a correct analysis of concept C despite the fact that 
it is possible to think that x falls under C* and also, 
apparently coherently, entertain the possibility that x does not 
fall under
Two expressions can be semantically equivalent without this equivalence 
being immediately recognisable to anyone who looks at the two together. 
Some thought might be necessary. To illustrate, a definition can be 
provided of a 'diagonally bisected square' that is semantically equivalent to 
that term. That this definition is true may not be obvious, or immediately 
recognisable by all competent speakers of the language. One can ask, 'Is a 
diagonally bisected square equivalent to two isoceles right triangles in a 
plane sharing their hypotenuses?', and many who are not experts in 
geometry could see this to be very much an open question at first glance.
We cannot conclude from our initial wonderment, however, that they must 
be two different things. It takes time and imagination to process the
^^^Altliough it is not unheard o f-  see Prichard (1912).
^^^Smith (1994a), 36. On pp.35-38 he explains why this must be the case, on pain of a 
paradox. Harman (1977), 19-20; and Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), 115,165, 177, 
make this point as well.
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information provided in the definition and to 'see' that in fact the two 
expressions represent the very same figure. The role of a geometry teacher 
is to make students realise that such nonobvious equivalence relations are 
nevertheless true. They are true by virtue of the very concepts used, i.e. 
analytically. Moore's formulation of the argument, on the other hand,
assumes that these types of truths are obvious, for he expects the mind to be 
an automatic and more or less immediate distinguisher of concepts, as long 
as they are both entertained together. In actuality, 'It might... take time 
and thought to see whether or not C* constitutes an analysis of Yet,
in fairness to the critic of naturalism, 'time and thought' does not give a 
licence to the naturalist, but rather a responsibility. It is just as incumbent 
upon any naturalistic theory as upon a critique of it, to thoroughly explain 
and facilitate an understanding of the semantic equivalence relation that is 
supposed to (or not to) hold. If a naturalist cannot get someone to 'see' a 
semantic equivalence supposedly inherent in our language, and if there is no 
other reason to suspect that person of linguistic incompetence, then there is 
no reason to believe that such an equivalence is inherent in our language. 
This is the sense of Moore's claim that naturalism 'offers no reason at all, far 
less any valid reason, for any ethical principle whatevef.^^^
Thus, the Open Question Argument is vindicated from the 
(perceived) mistakes of Moore's philosophy if a user adheres to these two 
stipulations: that it be regarded as providing evidence against naturalism 
rather than immediate incontrovertible disproof, and that it be buttressed 
with some kind of explanation. Indeed, adhering to these stipulations 
renders irrelevant some of the most longstanding strategies for undermining
the sake of argument in the context of semantic naturalism, the synthetic-analytic 
distinction is being upheld here. Although some would say that any definition, including 
geometric ones, are subject to revision in the light of experience, a semantic naturalist as 
defined here, appealing to dcflnilions as tlie last word, would not be among them. 
156Moore (1903), 16-17.
157smith (1994a), 38.
158Moore(1903), 20.
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the 'naturalistic fallacy', inasmuch as they target those areas which have been 
corrected: The improvement also disables those criticisms which target
not the Open Question Argument itself, but Moore's way of doing ethics and 
semantics which surrounded the argument as he presented it. If the 
argument can, albeit in a modified form, be removed from the unwanted 
aspects of Moore's philosophy, a refutation of those aspects will leave the 
argument unharmed. This has led contemporary philosophers to say that 
'Moore's argument rests on a secure foundation which Moore himself did not 
see clearly'.
Recent years have witnessed restatement and defence of the Open 
Question Argument in terms which are intended to avoid the problems that 
plagued Moore's original formulation. The diverse approaches of those who 
have attempted to take advantage of this invigorated form of the Open 
Question Argument have perhaps only one thing in common: they criticise 
naturalist theories for their (alleged) inability to incorporate all of the 
meaning which resides in the concept of morality into a naturalistic concept 
or set of concepts. Many have concluded from this that the argument does 
not affect those naturalist theories which claim to dig deeper than the 
concepts we have at our disposal in conventional linguistic usage (i.e. those 
which allow us to change our existing concepts in light of experiential 
evidence). One contemporary naturalist emphasises this point:
'But the open question argument engages directly only those 
substantive naturalists who defend their accounts of moral 
discourse as a "philosophical analysis", since the open 
question test applies only to (purported) analytical truths.' ^
I^^For example, at least some of the five arguments listed In Frankena (1973), 98-100, are 
rendered irrelevant by the acceptance of these stipulations.
160E.g. MacIntyre (1966), 252-53; and Midgley (1980). 
l^lMackie (1977), 60-62.
l^^Railton (1993), 316. Harman (1977), 18-20, also makes this point.
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'Analytical', again, is used in opposition to 'synthetic', and therefore may be 
seen to include both the 'logical' and 'semantic' (in the a priori sense), as 
they have been presented in this thesis. If theories of ethics claim an {a 
priori) semantic basis, they can be criticised tor neglecting in the course of 
their naturalistic definition any aspect of morality which features in the 
conceptual framework of competent users of our language, whatever the 
criteria may be for the status of competency. Whether the Open Question 
Argument can be adapted to another level, and employed against theories 
other than analytically semantic ones, is an issue which will be presented in 
the next section; the peremptory answer provided in the last quote will not 
be the last word on this point. Less controversial, even among naturalists as 
the foregoing quote shows, is the claim that those who utilise the Open 
Question Argument on the semantic level do have a strong Case against 
semantic naturalism. Of course, users of the Open Question Argument in 
this context are showing that they too hold a priori beliefs about morality, 
for the argument is at bottom an accusation that something within the a 
priori meaning of moral terms has been neglected by the naturalist. 
Therefore the Open Question Argument is not an argument against the 
possibility of a priori truths, for it operates within the realm of the a priori 
itself. Arguments against the possibility of a priori truths, although they 
will not be discussed here, would also, if true, refute semantic naturalism, 
since it relies on such truths. This discussion will continue to consider 
semantic naturalists from their own perspective on this issue, which is to 
assume that a priori truths are possible.
163 As has been said earlier (ch.I.l, 2), whether and to what extent truths can be called a . 
priori is hotly contested. For argumentation against the a priori see the works of Quine, 
e.g. (1951); (1969); (1990); the debate is also represented by the series of essays in Moser, 
ed. (1987).
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Several parameters have been discussed so far, within which the 
Open Question Argument (OQA) must operate in order to be valid when 
used on the a priori level. The following is a summary of them.
1. That one theory has been cast into doubt by the OQA does not 
mean that another will. Theories must be tested one at a time, unless a new 
theory can be shown to be relevantly similar to those already having failed 
the test.
2. To avoid dogmatism that can arise when people disagree on an 
allegedly a priori matter, the OQA can not be said to. disprove a theory 
automatically and absolutely. Rather, a semantic naturalist theory is 
doubtfiil in proportion to the significance of the dissidence to the semantic 
equivalence relation involved; for a semantic theory depends on features of 
shared language, and to the extent that a feature is not shared by competent 
speakers (however that might be determined), it is doubtful that such a 
feature really is inherent in the language.
3. Because of the nonobviousness of some analytical definitions, 
reasoning must support the use of the OQA to insure that it is not succeeding 
because of a lack of information or understanding.
4. Because of the a priori nature of the test, the OQA is valid only 
against theories which claim an a priori basis; namely, in the context of 
naturalism, those that appeal to the Semantic Justification.
b. Contemporary reformulations
There are many who have wielded the Open Question Argument 
within the above constraints. Even Moore, though he predated the 
explication of these constraints, occasionally operated within them. In a 
paper entitled 'The Nature of Moral Philosophy', he cautiously confronts the 
belief that 'good' is definable as a psychological state. The Open Question
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Argument is there buttressed by certain distinguishing features of morality 
which would be compromised by such a definition: first, the possibility of 
disagreement among people on moral questions, and second, the assumption 
of an objective standard by which our moral positions are judged.
Alasdair MacIntyre too has argued against theories which sacrifice these 
same two features, claiming that the possibility for moral disagreement and 
the use of impersonal standards of judgment are inherent in morality. 
Bernard Mayo, another in this particular line of argument, claims that the 
Open Question Argument can be used against any theory which neglects the 
possibility that people can be wrong about their ethical judgments. ^
Other philosophers do not explicitly claim to be using the Open 
Question Argument, but their arguments can nevertheless be worded in that 
form. These arguments are designed to distinguish between the semantic 
features of the concept of morality, and the features that would be required 
by a certain semantic naturalist theory. MacIntyre, for example, makes a 
semantic distinction between the concept of morality and the concept of 
human needs, effectively saying that one can talk of having any kinds of 
needs, but it is still an open question whether or not I have a moral right to 
have these needs fulfilled, or whether others are obliged to help me secure 
them.^^^ Michael Smith uses the 'commonsense distinction between 
justified and unjustified use of coercive p o w e r ' t o  support a refutation of 
two types of naturalistic theories: according to the first, is good" means 
"jc is highly evaluated by the standards of system M," where M is filled in by 
looking at the affective or motivational states of the speaker and 
constructing firom them a practical system'; according to the second, the
164Moore(1922),ch. 10.
^^^Maclntyre (1981), ch. 2.
166Mayo (1986), 42.
^^^Maclntyre (1981), 64-65.
168smith(1995), 286.
169Dreier (1990), 9. This is argued against in Smith (1995), 282-287.
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right course of action proceeds from having appropriate motivating attitudes, 
which are 'intentions to adhere to a particular agreement on the 
understanding that others also intend to do so'.^^® Smith's point is that if 
these theories cannot distinguish between justified and unjustified uses of 
coercive power, which seems to be very much a part of the concept of 
morality, we have a good reason for seeing these theories not to be accurate 
definitions of fundamental moral terms.
Some philosophers have turned the Open Question Argument against 
those who throughout this century have been among its most ardent 
devotees: those who believe that moral judgements cannot be true or 
f a l s e . O n e  can, in opposition to such writers, say that since such an 
account of morality does not allow for 'truth-aptness', or the quality of being 
able to be judged true or false, whereas moral language does seem to entail 
such truth-aptness, it must be an open question whether or not that 
expression of emotion is necessarily moralX^'^
Another feature of morality whose use in criticising semantic 
naturalism goes back at least to H. A. Prichard, is its categorical or binding 
nature. According to Prichard and others, any proposed definition which 
is only hypothetical in meaning— one which makes moral obligation 
something we act upon solely 'for the sake of the ends which we apply 
ourselves to'^^^— is not the same concept as that of morality. Stephen Clark
^^^Harman (1975), 13. This argued against in Smith (1995), 287-293.
^^^The classic defence of the Open Question Argument by someone of this persuasion is 
Ayer (1946).
1 Arguments to this effect have been made by several philosophers, going back to Brandt 
(1946), 106-21; and Ewing (1947), 167-9. Recent examples of such arguments against 
expressivism, as well as discussions about the strength of such arguments, include Brink 
(1986), 36; Divers and Miller (1994); Jackson, Oppy and Smith (1994); Smith (1994a); 
(1994b); (1995), 278-282; and, to a weaker extent, C. Wright (1992); (1995), esp.
209-216. Disagreement arises not only from differing conceptions of what moral language 
involves, but also from differing conceptions of what the notion of'truth' involves. Tfie 
papers in Hooker, ed. (1996) are devoted to this cluster of issues.
I73prichard (1937), 94-95.
I^^Foot (1972), 313. Foot, at the time of writing this paper, believed that morality was a 
system of hypothetical imperatives.
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uses an Open Question Argument in this way as well, asking 'ought we to 
abide by nature', if nature merely provides a set of principles for the taking 
or leaving, rather than 'things decreed to all of us and binding on us all'?^^^ 
This notion is similar if not identical to John Mackie's notion of'objectivity', 
which he takes to be 'incorporated in the basic, conventional, meanings of 
moral terms'. In his influential book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, he 
states that 'Any analysis of the meanings of moral terms which omits this 
claim to objective, intrinsic, prescriptivity is to that extent incomplete'.
This talk of'binding' and 'prescriptivity' brings one to a related, and 
probably the most common, objection to naturalistic theories. This 
objection is to theories which contend 'that an ethical judgment simply is an 
assertion of a fact', without any 'pro or con attitude toward what we are 
talking about; we are not recommending it, prescribing it, or anything of the 
sort'. Frankena suggests that perhaps existing moral usage should be 
changed to be more like this; but since arguments on the semantic level are 
based on linguistic usage as it is, a problem presents itself. It seems 
'paradoxical if one were to say "X is good" or " Y is right" but be absolutely 
indifferent to its being sought or done by himself or anyone else.'^^^ This 
idea has been called the 'action-guidingness' or the 'practicality requirement' 
of morality. Many philosophers have employed this aspect of morality 
against semantically naturalistic theories in the context of an Open Question 
Argument, or a variation of it. Wittgenstein did so when he wrote, 'no
175s. Clark (1980), 233-240.
176Mackie(1977),35.
l^^Frankena (1973), 100. For a more detailed look at Frankena's moral philosophy in the 
context of Sidgwick and Moore see Darwall (1997).
17?Mackie (1977), 52, calls it 'action-guidingness'; Smith (1995), 277, calls it the 
'practicality requirement". An influential work on this issue is McNaughton (1988).
Wallace (1990) is a review of the ways of dealing with it. This is related to the debate over 
irUernalism vs. externalism in ethics, or the question of whether motivation or reason for 
action is inherent in moral considerations, or comes from outside those considerations. To 
an externalist, the 'action-guiding' argument against semantic naturalism may be 
unconvincing. But as it is, the most outspoken externalist naturalists today are not semantic 
naturalists anyway; see, e.g. Brink (1986); Railton (1986).
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description that I can think of would do to describe what I mean by absolute 
value, [and] I would reject every significant description anybody could 
suggest, ab initio' T h i s  argument is also made by G. J. Wamock. 
'Description' is the key word here, for it is descriptive language which to 
Wittgenstein and others has seemed incapable of encompassing the concept 
of morality or, in Wittgenstein's terms, 'absolute value'. Peter Simpson 
writes that no matter how many facts one adds up in description of 
something, one will never get to the conclusion that it is good,^^^ because 
goodness always requires a 'something more', which for Simpson is 'a 
certain respect or consideration' for that which is considered good. Also 
from the perspective of action-guidingness both Gilbert Harman and Mark 
Johnston argue against naturalist theories of the form ' j c  is morally valuable 
if it is valued by a person under condition K'. ^  Harman modifies the 
wording of the Open Question Argument, stating that a person could look at 
this picture of morality and say, 'So what?'; but since that same person 
would not say 'So what?' to a truly moral claim, this raises doubt about the 
naturalist's ethical theory. To sum up the basis for the many arguments 
firom the action-guiding element of morality, T. L. Carson writes:
'In order to succeed in justifying a moral judgment to 
someone it is necessary that he acknowledge that moral 
considerations have some legitimate claim on his actions and 
attitudes. A person who denies that moral considerations 
give him any reasons for viewing things with either favor or 
disfavor cannot be said to accept any moral judgments.'
It is important to note that if these arguments (of Frankena, Wittgenstein, 
Wamock, Simpson, Harman, Johnston, and Carson) are correct, not only
179 Wittgenstein (1965), 11. 
Wamock (1967), 15-16. 
Simpson (1987), 162-66, 
IS^ibid., 152.
^^3jbhnston (1989). 156-157.
^^^Harman (1983). This was done before by Hare, as will be shown in the next subsection, 
l^^carson (1984), 26.
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must a person not deny that moral considerations give a person a guide for 
action, but any ethical theory which purports to provide a nonmoral 
definition of fundamental moral terms must incorporate this element.
Two critics of certain areas of semantic naturalism who have 
provided arguments in the spirit of the Open Question Argument, but in 
some ways have departed from it into other more original means of critique, 
will be described in more detail. These are Richard M. Hare and Simon 
Blackburn.
c. Arguments o f R. M. Hare
For decades, he who has been dubbed 'probably the most influential 
moral philosopher of his gene ra t i on ' ha s  criticised naturalists for their 
characterisation of moral judgments primarily as descriptions. In this, R. M. 
Hare is firmly in the tradition of the Open Question Argument, and in the 
spirit of Moore's own beliefs in the matter as well. Moore states that natural 
properties (which, again, are properties which are 'the subject-matter of the 
natural sciences and also of p s y c h o l o g y ' ' s e e m  to describe the intrinsic 
nature of what possesses them in a sense in which predicates of value never 
do'.^^^ Elsewhere he attempts to clarify this statement:
'...there is a sense of the word 'describe'— one of the senses in 
which that word is ordinarily used— such that, in ascribing to 
a thing a property which is not a natural intrinsic property, 
you are not describing it at all, whereas, if you ascribe to a 
thing a natural intrinsic property, you always are describing it 
to some extent... To make it clear it would be necessary to 
specify the sense of "describe" in question; and I am no 
more able to do this now than I was then.'^^^
186Dent(1995), 333.
 ^^ ^Moore (1903), 40. 
188Moore(1922), 274. 
189Moore(1942), 590-91.
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Ten years after this, in his 1952 book The Language o f Morals, R. M. Hare 
made plain his position on the matter, saying that the predicate 'good' is not 
primarily a description at all, but is 'the most general adjective of 
commendation'.^^® Over the nexl Ihrcc decades. Hare developed three 
specific arguments against naturalism. 'Naturalism' is defined by Hare as 
'any theory which is refutable by the argument which Moore used, or a 
recognizable formulation of that argument, that is, roughly, any theory 
which treats an evaluative expression as equivalent to a descriptive 
expression'. ^  ^  ^  Since 'naturalism' is defined by Hare in terms of the 
equivalence of expressions, it is a semantic type of naturalism that he is 
describing. He also recognises the restraint that the naturalist label 
places on the types of properties one can discuss with moral terms: for him, 
they must be 'empirically observable'. Significantly, he does not argue 
against all who define moral terms in nonmoral terms— for he does this 
himself. Rather, he argues against the main tradition among semantic 
naturalists: those who have used descriptive terms to represent moral 
claims.
The probable reason why descriptivism is the main tradition, and 
why his alternative, prescriptivism, has been less enticing to naturalists, is 
that the more one places emphasis on prescription, the less basis there seems 
to be on which to call one moral view 'right' and another 'wrong'. The 
necessity for such a distinction, moreover, seems to many to be another 
aspect which is inherent a priori in the very concept of morality. As such, 
prescriptivism itself is liable to an Open Question Argument; as Hare's most 
enduring critic, Philippa Foot, has said, according to prescriptivism
l^OHare (1952).
Hare (1971). 4.
192see also Hare (1981), 2-4, where he says that logical considerations exhaust the 
meaning of die term 'good'.
193Hare(1981), 68.
194ibid., 3-4.
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One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact 
about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any 
evidence at all, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 
"good" [its being commendatory] which connects it with one 
piece of "evidence" rather than another. It follows that a 
moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite 
idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man 
was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands, 
and never turned N. N. E. after turning S. S.
Hare has attempted to distinguish right from wrong with the help of what he 
sees as further inherent {a priori) aspects of morality: the universality and 
rationality of moral judgment. But, as debate over Hare's moral
philosophy continues, semantic naturalists have for the most part 
remained descriptivist rather than prescriptivist. This situation means that 
Hare's arguments against descriptivism, if sound, affect the vast majority of 
semantic naturalists.
Of Hare's three main arguments against naturalism, the first is that 
naturalism ties 'moral reasoning to the received opinions of our society.'
It does this by claiming that the meanings of moral terms in a certain 
language actually determine what is morally right and wrong. What is held 
to be right and wrong because of a linguistic convention, according to 
semantic naturalists really is right and wrong. If this were true, then 
everyone who knew their own language, and the meanings of its words, 
would necessarily agree on their moral opinions. Perhaps even more 
jcx)ntrQversially^e_reGeived_opmions_ofthe_language-group of which one is 
a member would be the last word on moral issues, which amounts to cultural 
relativism. Hare finds this idea to be inconsistent with the way we use moral 
language:
195Foot(1958),83.
^96Hare (1981), esp. ch. 3,6; and (1989).
^97 A collection of critical essays on Hare's philosophy is Seanor and Potion (1988). 
198Hare (1981), 69; see also Hare (1989), 102-104; and Hare (1993).
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'It is an important feature of moral language, neglected by 
naturalists, that we can go on using the moral words with 
their same meanings to express moral opinions at variance 
with the received ones, as moral reformers do. This would 
be impossible if the moral words were tied by virtue of their 
very meanings to fixed properties of actions, etc.' ^
Cultural relativism, according to Hare, is entailed by semantic naturalism, 
but is contrary to the meanings ordinarily ascribed to moral words. Hare 
does believe that 'by investigating the meanings of the moral words we shall 
manage to generate logical canons which will govern our moral 
thinking.'^®® Therefore Hare does believe in a semantic approach to 
morality as we have defined that term. But for the reason stated above, it is 
'too short a cut', or too simplistic, to say that the meaning of a moral word 
describes something about an object; and that is precisely what semantic 
naturalists generally attempt to do. Hare's alternative is essentially that the 
moral word is primarily a prescription offered by the speaker rather than a 
description of a property. The linguistic usage in this case does not actually 
determine what is right or wrong, and so cultural relativism is not entailed. 
But, if this argument is correct, insofar as semantic naturalists are 
descriptivists they cannot propose a theory without contradiction. Such 
theories are supposed to be grounded in moral language, but moral language 
operates as if cultural relativism, which is implied by semantic forms of 
descriptivism, were false.
Hare's second criticism of naturalism expounds upon the objection 
that has already been mentioned, that naturalists ignore the fact that 'moral 
words have... a commendatory or condemnatory or in general prescriptive 
force which ordinary descriptive words lack'.^®  ^ Stating an empirical fact 
about an object is simply a declarative statement, and could never function
^99Hare (1981), 69. Hare's famous illustration of the missionary landing on a cannibal 
island ((1952), 148-49) was used to explain this argument.
200Hare (1981), 20; see also p. 3-4; and Hare (1989a); (1996).
20lHare(1981),71; see also Hare (1989), 107-112.
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as an imperative one. Ordinary factual statements do not, according to Hare, 
provide the type of explicit évaluation or endorsement they must if they are 
to stand for everything that the words 'right', 'ought', and 'good' signify in 
their moral senses. Thus, naturalist theories which attempt to define moral 
terms in nonmoral descriptive terms are destined either to reject this 
prescriptive aspect of moral language, or else to fall prey to Hare's criticism 
that they are ignoring it. If saying a certain action is good is equivalent to 
m aking  certain factual statements about it, this means that there is no 
explicit positive evaluation inherent in that word 'good'. If there is no 
prescriptive force in an expression, that expression does not convey the same 
meaning that 'good', 'right' and 'ought' conveys.^®^
Hare's third argument against naturalism is a response to a proposed 
tertium quid between descriptivism and prescriptivism: the view that some 
statements can be simultaneously descriptive of a natural quality and 
prescriptive of an attitude towards that quality. Here he is closest to the 
Open Question Argument. No matter what type of property we are talking 
about. Hare says, we have to ask two different questions: whether an action 
has that property, and whether an action with that property is wrong. 
Property-attributing language and commendatory language are different. 
Nelson Goodman would say that they were different 'versions' of 
speaking.^®^ To answer a question of the first type still leaves a question in 
the second open. To think that these are the same question is a mistake. 
Moore called it the naturalistic fallacy; Hare simply says that it is 'mistaken, 
as anybody will recognise who has done some critical thinking and seen it 
for what it was.'^®^ This critical thinking entails the realisation that 
whatever concept we choose to entertain, we can always utilise the concept
^O^Hare (1971), 113. Hare (1996) argues the converse, that where the prescriptive force in 
moral language is recognised, moral beliefs are Justified.
Goodman (1955).
204nare (1981), 73.
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without adding on to it the evaluation which some say always (by its nature) 
accompanies it. In fact, we can even reverse the evaluation if we wish, 
without compromising the nature of that property being discussed. Hare 
provides an example: contrary to the belief that 'suffering' simultaneously 
describes actions and commits us to an evaluation, one could say of an 
incident at West Point Military Academy, "'He was caused to suffer deeply", 
but add, "All the same, there was nothing wrong in it; it happens all the 
time in good military academies, and that's the way to produce officers with 
moral fibre'".^®^ In other words, 'He suffered, and it was not wrong'. The 
term 'suffering' is not being misused in this sentence, although the expected 
evaluation ('suffering is wrong') has been reversed; so the evaluation cannot 
be inherent in the concept. Hare goes on to say that this type of 
argumentation works with any concept that has ever been presented to him.
In addition to making these arguments, and variations of them. Hare 
has more recently proposed an explanation of the linguistic roots of our 
mistake in this matter. He claims that our distrust of abandoning descriptive 
talk in morality can be traced to idiosyncrasies of our own language, and 
even more importantly those of ancient Greek. Our philosophical tradition 
relies heavily on its beginnings in Plato, but since the Greek language, or at 
least most of Plato's use of it, 'did not clearly distinguish between what 
exists and what is true', and tended to treat all nouns and even some 
adjectives (such as 'good') as existent objects, we tend to do so as well.^®^
205ibid., 74.
206jjare (1991). The quote is from p.36.
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Whether or not this explanation is accura t e ,Hare ' s  criticism of semantic 
naturalists of the descriptivist sort still stands.
Unfortunately for semantic naturalists, many philosophers have sided 
with Hare on the matters discussed in the last few paragraphs. Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong has described a 'Regress Argument', which hinges on the 
truth of Hare's second argument that moral judgments are inherently 
prescriptive,^®^ and which threatens to refute any naturalist theory. Hilary 
Putnam has implicitly endorsed Hare's third argument by stating that to 
whatever extent naturalists are physicalists (or believe that what is real must 
in some sense be physical), and since 'moral-descriptive language and 
physicalistic language are extremely different "versions", in Goodman's 
sense', it is likely that 'the concept "good" may not be synonymous with any 
physicalistic concept', and this erects a difficult barrier for semantic 
naturalism to overcome.^®^ Whether or not Hare's three arguments and 
related ones by other philosophers are conclusive refutations of semantic 
naturalism, at least of the descriptivist sort, they certainly provide obstacles 
to such a view.
207Note that to claim that Plato does assume that objects of knowledge exist, and on the 
other hand to claim that this reification is to any extent a result of his ignorance of 
peculiarities of the Greek language, are two different points, which must be supported by 
two different kinds of evidence. To determine whether the former claim represents the full 
extent of Plato's understanding one might look at Timaeus 27d-29c, where it seems that 
some distinction is made between truth and existence. Regarding the latter a starting point 
is Phaedrus, esp. 277-9, where Plato does show some awareness of the idiosyncracy of 
language and the necessity of being aware of its effect on one's beliefs. Perhaps more 
useful than eitlier of these, though, for both issues, is the Sophist, much of which is 
dedicated to the relationship between language and metaphysical questions. See, e.g., 
237-40 for a discussion of the ways in which 'is' can be understood, and 262-4 for a 
description of the uses and significance of nouns. An inconsistency to avoid, which may or 
may not be a problem in Hare, is the criticism of Plato's treatment of objects of knowledge 
and the use of nouns in terms of our understanding of'existence'.
208sinnott-Armstrong (1996), 9-14. Premise #5 (out of 10) of his argument depends on 
the truth of Hare's claim, which he links to Hume's Law. Interestingly, Sinnott-Armstrong 
believes (p. 1 In) that Hare is himself susceptible to the argument as well, since Hare 
believes moral prescriptions can be derived from nonmoral prescriptions, which is also 
(according to Sinnott-Armstrong) a leap that cannot be justified. Sinnott-Armstrong claims 
to find such an unjustifiable leap in Hare (1996).
209putnam (198Î), 207. An explanation of'versions' in language, again, can be found in 
Goodman (1955). On the general assumption of physicalism on both sides of debates 
about naturalism, see S. Ball (1991), esp. p. 10.
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d. Arguments o f  Simon Blackburn
Another philosopher of language who has criticised semantic 
naturalism is Simon Blackburn. He, like Hare, has remained close to the 
Open Question Argument in some respects, but has produced an original 
approach to the matter which has received significant attention from 
meta-ethicists in the last two decades.^ Partly, this attention is due to the 
particular area of his emphasis. Unlike Hare, who has centred his arguments 
on the conceptual distinction between ethical descriptivism and 
nondescriptivism,^^  ^Blackburn has chosen to argue not primarily in those 
terms, but in terms of ethical realism vs. antirealism. Ethical realism is 
defined in various ways, but is roughly the view 'that there are moral facts 
and true moral propositions whose existence and nature are independent of 
our beliefs about what is right and wrong'.^^^ Another definition is that 
'moral qualities such as wrongness, and likewise moral facts such as the fact 
that an act was wrong, exist in rerum naturd?'^^ This definition clarifies 
the connection that realism can have with naturalism. Qualities and facts 
are, for a naturalist, subject to the requirement that they be accessible to 
science. Moral qualities and facts therefore must be, for a naturalistic 
realist, qualities and facts that can be described from a scientific point of 
view. Since realism has been a prominent focus of discussion in moral
71®For instance, the Introduction to Smith, ed. (1995) interprets all of the papers in the 
collection as various attempts to overcome arguments presented by Blackburn.
21 lHare defends this approach in (1989a).
212Brink(1986), 402.
213Bare (1989a), 84. Hare makes plain that he is not a moral realist there and in Hare 
(1993).
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philosophy in recent years,^^^ Blackburn's criticism of it, and his proposal 
of a gap-bridging 'quasi-realism', has been very relevant.
In arguing against realism, Simon Blackburn has produced 
arguments which are forceful against a great deal of naturalist theories, since 
the realism that has been gaining in popularity in recent years is largely a 
naturalist realism.^ A prominent and recurring argument of his is based 
on the familiar action-guiding element to morality, which he, in a similar 
way to several other philosophers already discussed, accuses naturalistic 
realists of neglecting.^ Another of his arguments, also very influential, is 
different from those that have been described so far, and will be briefly 
summarised. Blackburn claims that as a philosopher of language he has 
come to recognise two things as conceptual truths; but that when taken 
together, they prohibit a naturalist fi-om being a realist. First,
'It seems conceptually impossible to suppose that if two 
things are identical in every other respect, one is [morally] 
better than the other... [so] it seems conceptually or logically 
necessary that if two things share a total basis of natural 
properties, then they have the same moral qualities.'^
This is claimed as an a priori truth based on an analysis of the concept of 
morality. Blackburn nicknames this the 'supervenience' of the moral on the 
natural, after Hare's use of the term in the same way.^^^ His other claim is 
the following:
Railton (1986); the collection of papers delivered at the Spindel Conference 1986: 
Moral Realism, in The Soutt^rn Journal o f  Philosophy 2A{\9%6), supplement, which 
contains an extensive bibliography to that date; the collection of papers in Sayre-McCord, 
ed. (1988), esp. Boyd (1988); Brink (1984); (1986); (1989); Gibbard (1990); Morgan and 
Timmons (1991); Smith (1991); Timmons (1993); Blackburn (1993); the articles in 
Analysis 54(1994); Smith, ed. (1995); and Railton (1996), which contains a 'taxonomy of 
realism' in general, and then relates the general idea to morality specifically.
and Timmons (1991), 447-457.
^l^Biackbum (1984), 187-9; (1988); (1995). For the 'action-guidingness' argument see the 
citations of Frankena, Wittgenstein, Wamock, Simpson, Harman, Johnston, and Carson in 
subsection b, and Hare's second argument in subsection c.
217Blackbum(1984), 183-4.
2 l W e  (1952), 80-1.
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'But it does not seem a matter of conceptual or logical 
necessity that any given total natural state of a thing gives it 
some particular moral quality. For to tell which moral 
quality results from a given natural state means using 
standards whose correctness cannot be shown by conceptual 
means alone.'^^^
Blackburn is pointing out here that if one enumerated all of the natural 
properties of a thing, one would not find any moral qualities, such as 
rightness or wrongness, among them. Perhaps a more precise way of saying 
this is that if all a thing's natural properties were described verbally, one 
would not yet have said 'it is right' or 'it is wrong', or anything else which 
means the same as these statements. If one were to provide a complete 
analysis of the natural property-terms that can be used in relation to that 
thing, no moral conclusions would be among the results. It is therefore not, 
according to Blackburn, by conceptual means, in other words by 
philosophical analysis of concepts, that one arrives at moral conclusions. If 
two people disagree as to whether lying has the property of wrongness, for 
instance, this does not necessitate that at least one of these people is 
incapable of providing a correct natural explanation of 'lying'. This is why 
Blackburn says the standards by which we judge the moral quality of 
something like lying are not solely conceptual in nature. It is not 
conceptually impossible for two people to have the same concept of'lying' 
in mind, and to have an equal conceptual understanding of all other relevant 
natural properties, but nevertheless to disagree about whether a moral 
property attaches to lying.
These two claims, taken together, create a dilemma for a semantic 
naturalist who wishes moral qualities to be factual matters. The first claim 
finds a conceptual link between moral qualities and natural properties, such 
that the first cannot vary without the second varying. The second claim
^I^Blackbum (1984), 184.
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discards such a link, for there is nothing about natural properties that 
conceptually requires us to accept the moral quality as supervenient. V^ere 
B* is a complete natural description of a thing, and A is its supposedly 
supervenient moral quality, Blackburn asks, 'Why does one B* having A 
suddenly necessitate that all other B*'s also have A, when otherwise they 
would not have to?!'^^® It seems that a semantic naturalist must discard 
either one or the other of the conceptual truths in order to avoid the 
dilemma; but these have been claimed by Blackburn as a priori truths, 
inherent in the very meanings of the words used. A semantic naturalist must 
either show there to be an error somewhere in Blackburn's account, or else 
submit to the dilemma imposed by ordinary language, the very source from 
which semantic naturalists claim to derive support for their style of ethical 
theory.
4. RESULTS: THE PRESENT STATE OF SEMANTIC NATURALISM
a. Civil war
Nearly two dozen philosophers, most significantly Moore, Hare and 
Blackburn, have been cited in this section as arguing against certain theories 
or ranges of theories within semantic naturalism. Some of these 
philosophers are semantic naturalists themselves, of course, and are arguing 
against specific groups within that category (e.g. groups of semantic 
naturalists who also happen to be realists, or descriptivists, or expressivists). 
Thus, many of these arguments may be seen as representing a 'civil war' 
among semantic naturalists, where different variations of the same general
220ibid. TTie foregoing argument is also found in Blackburn (1971). It is not clear from 
either of these papers, however, whether Blackburn includes contextual information as part 
of the natural description of a thing. If he does not, this puts an additional constraint on his 
first conceptual truth above: context doesn't matter. If he thinks it could matter (as is 
perhaps more likely), then in the statement just quoted 'all other B""s' includes a 
requirement that the context be identical in any relevant way.
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argument are tossed back and forth among camps within semantic 
naturalism. One group of semantic naturalists may use one concept 
supposedly inherent in moral language, such as truth-aptness,^^ ^  to refute 
the theories of another group, who are meanwhile using another concept, 
such as action-guidingness,^^^ to refute the first group. For another 
example of this situation, Michael Smith claims Gilbert Harman's semantic 
theory to be false because it cannot distinguish between justified and 
unjustified uses of power,^^^ whilst Harman criticises any theory where 
moral terms are defined as the evaluation or desire of a person in a specific 
ideal state, of wliich Smith's theory is an example.^^^ Smith's and Harman's 
arguments each depend on a specific feature which is claimed by its 
proponent to be revealed by an analysis of the concept of morality.
The commonality among all of the arguments offered thus far against 
semantic naturalism, whether the critics are themselves semantic naturalists 
or not, is that they claim their opponents' nonmoral definitions to have failed 
to incorporate all of the features which an a priori analysis of a moral 
concept reveals as inherent in its meaning. Those who adapt the Open 
Question Argument claim that an a priori consideration of a moral concept 
involves the recognition of a feature which is not found upon such analysis 
of another, non-moral, concept. Hare's arguments assert that an analysis of 
moral language leads one to the conclusion that there is an element of 
prescriptivity to moral judgement which cannot be comprehended by any 
descriptivist theory: Blackburn's argument basically states that an analysis 
of moral language reveals two conceptual truths that, if both are true, 
prohibit naturalistic realism. These philosophers, therefore, are all arguing 
against semantic naturalism from a position within traditional (i.e.
221e.g. Ewing (1947), 167-9; and Smith (1994); (1994b).
222e.g. Hare (1952); and Harman (1983).
223smith (1995), 287-93.
224narman (1983). For a description of Smith's theory, see l.B.2b.
Chapter II 110
analytical) semantics. Their arguments give semantic naturalism the benefit 
of any doubts that the analytic/synthetic distinction is workable and relevant 
to morality, and that a study of the meanings of moral terms in ordinary 
language is worthy of being treated as the foundation for debate on 
meta-ethical issues, such as whether naturalism is true. However, as the 
'civil war* among semantic naturalists shows, analytical philosophers have 
not reached a consensus as to the features that constitute the 'ordinary 
language concept' of morality; or, at least, they have not reached a 
consensus as to the requirements that such features place on ethical theory. 
This predicament provides prima facie evidence for entertaining one or the 
other of the doubts of which semantic naturalists have thus far been given 
the benefit. To this situation in moral semantics, naturalists have cultivated 
at least two general schemes of response in recent years.
b. Response: platitude systématisation
One response to the internal disarray among semantic naturalists as 
well as the attacks that have come fi-om outside, is an attempt to increase the 
care that is taken in the analysis of moral concepts. David Lewis has been 
an advocate of this response for nearly three decades. In a paper entitled 
'How to Define Theoretical Terms' he introduces a complex process by 
which all the imaginable platitudes regarding a certain concept, or truths that 
demonstrate our knowledge of that concept, can be systematised into a 
definition.^^^ Michael Smith provides several examples of such platitudes 
with regard to morality, and finds that many of them fit into five general 
categories:
1. practicality of moral judgment
2. objectivity of moral judgment
Lewis (1970); see also (1972).
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3. supervenience of the moral on the natural
4. substance of moral claims
5. epistemic procedures^^^
For example, one among several platitudes offered by Smith in the 
'objectivity' category is: 'When A says that N-ing is right, and B says that 
N-ing is not right, then at most one of A and B is c o r r e c t ' T h i s  general 
scheme of platitude systématisation has recently been defended by a few 
semantic naturalists. Some of these are closer to Lewis's original approach 
(as well as that of his predecessors Ramsey and Carnap) by attempting an 
explicit and reductive analysis.^^^ Such an analysis is explicit if it works by 
stringing all of the platitudes in a line and incorporating all of them into one 
definitive statement, which is then simplified. Simplification is made 
possible early in the process by wording the platitudes in as many of the 
same terms as possible. Such an analysis is reductive if the term to be 
defined is not allowed to be present in the platitudes. Other semantic 
naturalists have chosen an implicit and nonreductive route.^^^ Such an 
analysis is implicit if it attempts to summarise rather than enumerate all of 
the platitudes; and it is nonreductive if it allows the term to be defined to 
feature in the platitudes.
There are at least five problems for this response, however:
1. A practical problem is that there is still substantial 'civil waf
even among users of such sophisticated analytical techniques, which seems 
to indicate either widespread lack of mastery of language, or else the failure 
of analysis. Michael Smith argues against David Lewis's conclusion that
226smith (1994a), 39-40.
227ibid., 39.
228e.g. D. Lewis (1989); and Jackson (1992). The other works referred to are Ramsey 
0931) and Carnap (1963).
2^9@ g Smith (1994a), ch. 2.
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valuing is 'desiring to desire',^^^ whilst Lewis specifically criticises any 
theory which primarily involves a belief, which Smith's theory does.^^ ^  
Furthermore, Smith and Lewis profoundly disagree on the platitudes that 
inform their definitions: one of Smith's platitudes under the category of 
'objectivity' is 'Whether or not N-ing is right can be discovered by engaging 
in rational argument'.^^^ Lewis, on the other hand, proposes a 
'conditionally relativist' theory on which there is no guarantee that there is 
any prospect for an objective moral decision procedure, much less one based 
on reason; and his ideal conditions include reference only to imagination, 
not to rationality.^^ ^  The point here is that the response of platitude 
systématisation has not achieved its goal, which was to alleviate the internal 
difficulties within semantic naturalists analysing moral language. Among 
those who have chosen this sophisticated analytical technique, there are still 
just as great differences of opinion as to what features are inherent in the 
ordinary language concept of morality. One is forced by situations like this 
to conclude that what are called 'platitudes' are not so platitudinous as they 
are sometimes represented, which brings us to the second problem.
2. The statements which form the groundwork for this type of 
analysis are called 'platitudes'. However, as evidenced by difference of 
opinion among semantic naturalists, these statements themselves are often 
very controversial (representing specific positions on various types of 
objectivity-subjectivity issues, action-guiding issues, epistemological issues, 
etc.). Therefore their status as platitudes is highly dubious, and their
230ibid., 146-7.
231[) Lewis (1989), 115. Smith's theory involves a belief about a desire', but, by Lewis's 
account it is still conceptually possible to be indifferent about what we believe that we 
might desire in a certain condition.
23^m ith (1994a), 39-40.
233d . Lewis (1989), 114,121.
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representation as such may even be question-begging.^^^ For someone who 
disagrees with a certain 'platitude', there seems no reply save that the person 
does not have mastery of the concept; but such remarks can (as in the case 
of Lewis and Smith) be just as easily delivered in both directions.
3. The Open Question Argument, within the parameters already 
mentioned, is no less operable against such a theory. Regardless of the level 
of sophistication at which analysis proceeds, if the fundamental 'platitudes' 
are opposed by other philosophers, this provides leverage for an Open 
Question Argument. For instance, there is nothing about the new analytical 
method which makes the action-guidingness of morality any less 
problematic for a descriptivist, or the supervenience relation any less 
problematic for a realist. This is especially the case because the platitudes 
provide the raw materials for, and are not the result of, the analytical 
method; and so many questions and controversies can arise regarding those 
platitudes regardless of what method is employed afterwards.
4. The fourth problem that faces these new-styled analytical 
theories affects particularly those of the explicit, reductive type. This type, 
according to Smith who for this reason abandons it, is affected by an 
analytical defect known as the 'permutation problem': the platitudes 
available are so few and vague that 'when we strip out all mention of the 
terms that we want analysed fi'om a statement of the relevant platitudes', 
then there does not seem to be 'enough left in the way of relational 
information to guarantee that there is a unique realization of the network of 
relations just in case the concepts we are analysing really are 
instantiated'.^^^ It seems that reducing moral language in this type of 
analysis tends to reduce the definition to something which is grossly
234stephen Ball (1991) develops (pp. 15-21) and defends (pp.22-30) a test for analyticity 
designed in order not to beg the question in this way. However, his conclusion is tiiat such 
a test does not end up supporting semantic naturalism, but rather shows it to be 
fundamentally flawed.
235Smith (1994a), 48, discussed to p.53.
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imderdeterminate, as the definition 'a fleshy, red, sweet finit found on trees' 
undetermines whatever ('apple', 'cherry', 'plum', etc.) is the term to be 
defined. There just do not seem to be enough platitudes, and informative 
enough ones, to provide a definition from them. If Smith is right, and this is 
the case, this problem together with problem #2 seems to create a dilemma 
for the explicit, reductive route. The more specific and numerous the 
platitudes are in order to combat this problem, the more controversial they 
become and therefore dubious as platitudes. The less of a problem #4 
becomes, the more of a problem #2 is likely to be, and vice versa.
5. Lastly, any theory of the implicit, nonreductive type may
need to deal with a specific problem of its own: that of explanatory 
insufficiency. If the definition of x is constructed by summarising platitudes 
that themselves contain the term x, one may not be sufficiently explaining 
what it is to be x. The definition has succeeded in placing the term to be 
defined in a context among other terms, but by doing so may have done little 
to explain what that term really means. In some cases this is acceptable, for 
instance when there is a more or less obvious and noncontroversial 
phenomenological or experiential basis underlying whatever the term 
represents. Colour-terms, for example, might be defined by a nonreductive 
analysis such that 'red' means 'that which causes users of such a term to 
experience the visual sensation of redness'. 'Red' is used in the defimtion, 
and there is therefore a lack of a full explanation of what redness really is. 
This is perhaps acceptable in analyses of colours, however, because there is 
good reason to believe (based on empirical considerations of the 
undergirding physics of colours and the biology of sight, as well as the lack 
of controversy with regard to the nature of eolours), that there is an 
underlying experiential or phenomenological basis for redness which need 
not be explained. With regard to morality, however, one does meet with 
controversy at even the most basic level (as these analytical philosophers
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would call it, the 'platitudinous' level). Moreover, no one appeals to a 
noncontroversial undergirding physicality of all our moral judgments. The 
result of this is that there is not a general consensus as to what morality is 
like in the same way as there is with colours. In the words of some 
philosophers, we lack a 'robust phenomenology' arid 'a dispositional 
grounding' for morality like we have for.colours,^^^ and so a naturalistic 
definition must explain morality, rather than leave to be assumed what it is 
all about. When one allows the term to be analysed to be retained in the 
platitudes that are summarised in order to provide the defimtion, it seems 
that this requirement for explanation is being neglected.^^^
Whether or not these five problems with the analytical approach of 
platitude systématisation can in any way be circumvented, they are at least 
very problematic. Not surprisingly, given this situation, another response to 
the problems that have beset semantic naturalists has become popular.
c. Response: abqftdonment o f Semantic Justification
If, as the foregoing discussion suggests, the type of analytical 
method opted for by Lewis and Jackson, and somewhat differently by Smith, 
is still open to the objections which have plagued prior attempts at providing 
a semantically naturalistic theory of ethics, and is beset with further 
problems germane to the application of the particular method, then one may 
understand why this 'old line naturalism', in the words of one contemporary 
naturalist, has largely d is appeared 'Ano the r  admits that it seems 
impossible to settle the difficult issues surrounding such ideas as moral 
realism and the possibility of settling moral disagreement 'in any a priori 
way'.^^^ With regard to meta-ethics in general, many are now of the
236Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), 162-3.
237For more discussion on this subject see Boghossian and Velleman (1989), esp. 89-90; 
and Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), 152-64.
238Brandt (1996), 200.
239gturgeon (1988), 230. He argues more thoroughly for this position in (1982).
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conviction that 'Recent philosophy has misrepresented these questions by 
discussing them in terms of questions about the definitions of words.'^^^ 
Despite the attempts of some philosophers to keep this semantic approach to 
morality alive, most philosophers— even naturalists— wish to hasten its 
demise. Richard Boyd, for example, specifically argues against analytical 
semantics with respect to moral terms.^^^ Some papers were confident 
enough in the early part of this decade already to discuss semantic 
naturalism in the past tense.^^2 p^ter Railton, another naturalist, describes 
in this passage one of the motivations for this abandonment of the Semantic 
Justification:
'...philosophers increasingly are clear that questions about 
meaning are intimately bound up with questions of 
metaphysics, epistemology, mind, empirical science, and 
even rationality and evaluation. Rather than saying that 
contemporary philosophy sees all of these deep questions 
from the flattening perspective of language, it would be more 
accurate to say that contemporary philosophy is suffused 
with an awareness that any intelligible answer to these 
profound questions must reflect the potentialities and 
limitations of language and thought.'^"^^
The question that naturally arises here is this: If logical naturalism is viewed 
as having failed because of its simplistic hope that moral conclusions might 
be validly derived from nonmoral premises without so much as a 
justification or explanatory definition, and if semantic naturalism is in 
widespread disfavour for several reasons, among which is the inability of 
competent users of a language to agree upon the meanings of moral terms 
and incorporate all aspects of moral practice in their definitions, then what is 
the alternative? As will be shown, the naturalists who have abandoned or
240b . Williams (1985), 121. (emphasis added).
241j8oyd (1988), 194-1!^5,199.
242e.g, Morgan and Timmons (1991) discuss semantic naturalism (which they call 'analytic 
ethical naturalism') under the heading 'Remembrance oflhings Pasf (p.449).
243Railton (1996), 51.
Chapter II 117
avoided the analytic means of justifying their naturalistic view of moral 
principles, properties and terms, have opted for a synthetic means instead.
5. AN ESCAPE ROUTE FOR NATURALISM: APPEAL TO THE 
SYNTHETIC
Rather than attempt to overturn all of the mounting criticisms of 
semantic naturalism that are relevant to one's specific theory, as well as any 
criticisms of the analytical approach to semantics in general, a philosopher 
who is convinced that moral principles, properties and terms are accessible 
to science may choose instead to abandon the Semantic Justification for this 
position. Just as a logical naturalist could evade the strict force of Hume's 
Law by attempting to justify one's naturalism on the basis of the meanings 
of words rather than proposing an exception to the 'conservation of logic', a 
disillusioned semantic naturalist might attempt to evade the criticisms of 
Moore, Hare, Blackburn and others by justifying one's naturalism on some 
synthetic ground; namely, the a posteriori conclusions of science. For 
example, Richard Boyd has argued for synthetic naturalism by defending the 
possibility that one 'may choose to agree that goodness is probably a 
physical property but deny that it has any analytic definition 
whatsoever'.^^ Perhaps an analysis of language will not support 
naturalism; but an analysis of language is not the only tool a naturalist can 
use for such support. Science provides information which many naturalists 
claim is very relevant to morality, even to the extent of justifying a view of 
moral judgment and discourse as comprehensible using only principles, 
properties and terms that are acceptable for use in scientific enquiry.
244Boyd(1988), 199.
Chapter II 118
To illustrate this shift of the burden of proof from the semantic level 
to the synthetic, such a move may be phrased as a response to the arguments 
of Moore, Hare, and Blackburn respectively.
a. Beyond Moore
In the presence of any semantic formulation of Moore's Open 
Question Argument, including those which reside within the parameters 
which have been set forth in the last subsection, a naturalist may state that he 
is not making a semantic claim, and thereby evade the argument. The critic 
argues in the following form: By the analysis of the meanings of moral 
words in ordinary language, it is an open question whetiier x, which is 
advocated by a naturalist theory, is good.' To this argument the naturalist 
can respond: 'I agree, but my theory does not operate by an analysis of the 
meanings of moral words in ordinary language.' It may be an open question 
whether x is good when one's ultimate appeal is to the semantics of ordinary 
language; but when one allows science to modify or correct aspects of that 
basis, this open question might become closed.
Even when the Open Question Argument, as it has been presented so 
far, is buttressed by an explanation, the naturalist encounters no difficulty in 
evading its force if an appeal is made to synthetic truths gained through 
scientific enquiry. Each of the following features has been said by one or 
another of the critics of semantic naturalism cited here to be inherent in the 
semantics of morality, i.e. to have a priori status as a feature of our ordinary 
language when we use moral terms:
1. The possibility of people disagreeing on moral issues
2. An objective or impersonal standard for moral judgment
3. The possibility of people being wrong in their moral judgments
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4. The possibility of distinguishing between just and unjust use of
power
5. Moral claims being either true or false
6. Categoricalness- the impossibility of opting out of moral 
decisions
7. An attitudinal or action-guiding element to judgments
To any of these, or any other aspect a of moral language which is said to be
inherent in the very moral terms we utilise, a naturalist can respond in the
following fashion:
Whether or not a is inherent in the concepts used in ordinary 
language when moral issues are raised is not the last word in 
my ethical theory. Whether a is so inherent in ordinary 
moral language or not, I am not prepared to take a to be a 
necessary part of -moralitv' as I define it. I find good reason, 
based on scientific enquiry, to define moral terms in a way 
which does not admit of a.
Further, the naturalist may provide an explanation of why we have come to 
erroneously speak as thou^  a were actually an indispensable part of making 
moral judgments. Alternatively, the naturalist may show how, even though 
a is not actually an aspect of morality, it often or even always accompanies 
the operation of morality, for instance because of the nature of human 
psychology.
When the appeal to ordinary language for justification is withdrawn, 
the main argument of Moore, together with the many later adaptations of it, 
become red herrings. The real issue for such a naturalist is not whether one 
can close a meta-ethical question by the lights of the analytical approach to 
the semantics of ordinary language, for this very well may be impossible. In 
that case it could still be possible to establish a naturalist ethical theory 
which gains its justification firom a synthetic source instead: particularly, 
facts about the world as are gained fi*om scientific enquiry. In arguing
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against naturalism, Moore said that 'propositions about the good are all of 
them synthetic and never analytic'.^^^ Although it is not clear that anyone 
made this explicit before Moore, someone could accept this statement while 
remaining a naturalist. Moore does not confront this possibility because all 
of his opponents seemed to offer analytical definitions, or definitions based 
on the concepts inherent in ordinary language, for moral terms.
b. Beyond Hare
Each of Hare's three arguments can theoretically be surmounted by 
appealing to synthetic truths instead of the semantics of ordinary language. 
First is his charge that naturalism entails cultural relativism because it 
assumes that moral beliefs are a fimction of the language within which they 
figure, whereas ordinary moral language is not relativistic. Simply, the 
naturalist who abandons the Semantic Justification will no longer seek to 
root moral beliefs in language, and so whether or not morality is relativistic 
in ordinary language ydll not by itself be of the utmost importance. If the 
synthetic facts of the matter as science finds them justify relativism, or on 
the other hand if they do not, our ordinary language conception of the matter 
will itself be susceptible to judgement, rather than being the arbiter. 
Furthermore, if moral beliefs are no longer being seen as a function of the 
language in which they figure, there is no reason to think that they are 
necessarily relativistic anyway, by Hare's account; for it was precisely their 
adherence to ordinary language which led him to make the claim to cultural 
relativism in the first place.
Hare's second and third arguments rely on the notion that moral 
judgments are inherently prescriptive in nature. These criticisms of 
naturalism can be circumvented, if a naturalist proposes that whether or not 
ordinary moral language is prescriptive, ordinary language is not the last
245Moore (1903), 7.
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word on moral issues. To either account for or dispense with prescriptivity 
in morality is a challenging project for the naturalist, but it is one which, if 
moral language is not the uttermost basis for the ethical theory, can be 
accomplished in various ways. For one instance, prescriptions could be seen 
as incidental to the making of moral judgements, which are in themselves 
primarily descriptive. The naturalist could explain prescriptivity as a natural 
psychological phenomenon arising from the recognition of a certain kind of 
descriptive feature. A revision, or at least reinterpretation, of conventional 
moral language might therefore be justified on the basis of synthetic truths 
as concluded by science. Therefore, according to synthetic naturalism, if 
scientific facts are invoked to participate in justifying a claim about the 
nature of morality, such may properly be done despite restrictions placed on 
moral terms by their meanings in ordinary language.
c. Beyond Blackburn
Simon Blackburn's argument is that the supervenience of the moral 
on the natural is incompatible with the fact that moral property-terms never 
arise in a complete analysis of natural property-terms. One may overcome 
this objection to naturalism as well by appealing to the synthetic level. This 
has been done explicitly by James Klagge. It may be the case, Klagge says, 
that moral properties do indeed always accompany natural properties, but 
that by analysis, or 'the laws of logic and the meanings of words',^^^ one 
may not be able to derive the moral from the natural. Blackburn assumed 
that the relation between moral and natural properties (supervenience) has to 
be a matter which is justified 'solely by appeal to the laws of logic and the 
meanings of moral terms';^^^ in other words, he assumed that 
supervenience has to be analytical. Klagge raises the possibility that we
246Klagge (1984), 374. 
247ibid.
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may represent the supervenience of the moral on the natural synthetically. 
Klagge's particular proposal for how we come to know such a synthetic truth 
may or may not be natura l i s t ic ,but  a naturalist can evade Blackburn's 
argument by Klagge's route as long as adoption of the synthetic truths 
necessary to establish supervenience is warranted by science.
D. Final Court of Appeal: Naturalism on the Synthetic Level
The final conclusion of the last chapter^^^ was that synthetic 
naturalism could still be true if both logical and semantic naturalism were 
false. Therefore, any of the arguments leveled at either logical or semantic 
naturalism are to that extent ineffectual against the synthetic. This does not 
mean that such arguments might not be reinterpreted in order to affect the 
synthetic level; but rather, a refutation of semantic naturalism has thus far 
said nothing of the prospect for a workable synthetic naturalism. One goal 
of the present chapter has been to present the two most significant strategies 
for critique of naturalism, and by so doing highlight an area that is neglected 
by such strategies. The synthetic level of understanding the naturalist claim, 
as evidenced from the independence which exists between it and the 
semantic and logical levels, is indeed neglected by these two strategies of 
critique. Neither Hume's restriction on the derivation of 'ought' from 'is', nor 
the several variations on the 'naturalistic fallacy' (or, more precisely, the 
'naturalistic error in analysis') speaks directly to synthetic claims about 
morality. The means of justifying such a claim is fundamentally different. 
Both logical and semantic naturalisms depended crucially on the a priori.
248iQagge calls his brand of supervenience a metaphysical type of supervenience (p.377), 
and does not attempt to support it with scientific considerations.
249I.C.4.
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whereas synthetic naturalism seeks to achieve the same results by an a 
posteriori means.
Another goal of this chapter was to describe what such a view might 
look like and outline possible problems with it. As synthetic naturalism is 
very much a going concern in philosophy, the field is very broad and recent 
work is abundant. What will be presented in this section is a brief 
description of the nature of the approach, an outline of some prominent ideas 
and players, and documentation to support the claim that these ideas and 
players have recently begun to receive significant attention by critics. When 
this is completed, the foundation will be laid for the next two chapters by a 
suggestion as to a potential programme of critique of synthetically . 
naturalistic theories.
1. THE NATURE OF THE APPEAL
Proponents of Hume's Law have endeavoured to force logical 
naturalists to define in premises the moral terms of their conclusions.
Nearly impossible stipulations for semantic naturalists have been set in place 
by G. E. Moore and later analytical philosophers, producing a situation 
exacerbated by arguments against dependence on the analytic/synthetic 
distinction and appeal to a priori truths. This state of affairs has forced 
semantic naturalists either to consider more closely the method of analysis 
or (more commonly) to abandon it altogether in favour of a more directly 
scientific approach to morality. This scientific approach may be represented 
by the Synthetic Justification: The results o f enquiry into facts or actual 
states o f affairs are necessary and sufficient to explain the principles, 
properties and terms used in moral experience and moral discourse. The 
phrase 'facts or actual states of affairs' has a specific meaning to a naturalist, 
who places a particular constraint on the types of facts that are admissable.
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To the extent that one is a naturalist about ethics, the facts or states of affairs 
that are obtained as the raw materials for an ethical theory must be 
acceptable for use within scientific explanations.
In this light, the Synthetic Justification can be seen to place a heavier 
burden on science than either of the other two levels of naturalism do. Much 
of the explanation in semantic naturalism, for instance, comes fi-om an 
analysis of the meanings of words in ordinary language. These meanings 
have an a priori basis, and as such they do not require scientific support. To 
those who appeal to the Synthetic Justification, many or all claims that had 
an a priori basis under the Semantic Justification are now admitted to be in 
need of an a posteriori one.^^^ Since, for a naturalist, all a posteriori 
claims must be accessible to science,^^^ such an admission places much of 
an ethical theory's burden of proof on science.
Analytical philosophy may have had a great deal to say about the 
prospects and problems of logical and semantic naturalism, because the 
Logical and Semantic Justifications are fundamentally analytical 
justifications. They appeal to a priori considerations of logic and the 
meanings of words. Considering the nature of synthetic naturalism, it seems 
likely that this critical role will not be played by the same area of 
philosophy. The synthetic naturalist operates by taking tasks which for the 
analytical philosopher are the domain of semantics of ordinary language, 
and transferring them to the domain of science and philosophy of science. It 
follows firom this that philosophy must significantly familiarise itself with 
science in order to properly play the critical role in assessing naturalism that 
it did in the case of the analytical levels of naturalism. For instance, the
250There is a possibility that one might choose to defend a naturalistic theory which has a 
hybrid epistemology, where morality depends on both a priori and a posteriori truths. In 
diis case a theory will be prone to criticism as a semantic theory insofar as it claims are 
semantic (o priori), and as a synthetic theory insofar as its claims are synthetic {a 
posteriori). Again, synthetic a priori truths cannot be invoked by naturalists as defined 
here.
251 See I.A.
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nineteenth century philosopher Herbert Spencer developed a naturalistic 
ethical theory inspired by the new mechanism for evolutionary change 
proposed by Charles Darwin.^^^ Since Spencer framed his argument in 
terms of the meanings of words, G. E. Moore, in arguing against his view, 
needed to know little or nothing about Darwin's theory of natural selection. 
Moore could appropriately criticise Spencer using the newly blossoming 
philosophy of language. He did not need to investigate any alleged 
scientific underpinning of Spencer's ethic in order to find a fatal problem 
with it, and so he did not investigate it.^^^ In the context of synthetic 
naturalism, however, things are different. If Spencer's theory were restated 
so as to be a synthetic rather than an analytical claim— a matter of fact rather 
than a matter of the meanings of words in ordinary language— Moore's 
criticisms would be ineffectual. James Rachels explains this possibility:
'Spencer had phrased his thesis as a thesis about words: he 
said, "The conduct to which we apply the name good, is the 
relatively more evolved conduct; and bad is the name we 
apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved." It is 
possible, however, to construe Spencer's view differently, as 
a claim about what is in fact good conduct. On this 
alternative reading, Spencer was offering a criterion, not a 
definition, of good conduct. If so, the open question 
argument would not work against it... Spencer left himself 
open to Moore's criticism because he did not distinguish 
definitions from criteria— it is a distinction that apparently he 
did not notice.'^^^
This new reading of Spencer would put an extra burden both on the theorist 
and on thé critic. The theorist would have to provide scientifically 
acceptable evidence that being highly evolved is worth being considered as a 
criterion for goodness. The critic, in turn, would have to find fault with any 
supposed evidence, or with the link between the evidence and the ethical 
point. Therefore, in addition to philosophical considerations which continue
252spencer (1879); (1892). Darwin's theory was introduced in (1859). 
253His critique of Spencer is Moore (1903), 46-58.
254Rachels(1990), 69-70.
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to remain important, the synthetic naturalist's extra burden is a thorough 
scientific justification of factual claims, and the critic's extra burden is a 
thorough knowledge of the science involved. In short, the decline of 
analytical forms of naturalism has brought with it a practical necessity that 
moral philosophers interested in proposing or examining such views be well 
acquainted with science.
2. THE POPULARITY OF THE APPEAL
It is possible that moral philusuphers could, upon being presented 
with the several problems that confront a semantic construction of the 
naturalist claim, reject naturalism in ethics altogether. However, the 
literature indicates the presence of a strong trend towards the continued 
endorsement of the naturalist claim, but in the context of the Synthetic 
Justification. The literature can be categorised in various ways. In this 
thesis distinctions have already been mentioned regarding cognitivism vs. 
noncognitivism, descriptivism vs. nondescriptivism, realism vs. antirealism, 
theories of belief vs. theories of sentiment, and reductive theories vs. 
nonreductive theories. The parties on either side of each distinction can 
claim that proposed features of moral discourse and practice are of a kind 
that can be countenanced by science; and insofar they do this, they are 
naturalists. Likewise, it is possible for a naturalist of any of these 
persuasions to opt for a thoroughly synthetic, a posteriori approach to 
ethical theorising. Other distinctions among ethical theories may also be 
described which do not exclude the synthetic naturalist from either camp.
For example, there is a distinction between those who believe that 'moral 
judgments are factual in the paradigm sense afforded by empirical or 
theoretical judgments in the natural sciences', and those who believe that this 
attempt to make scientifie judgment a model for ethical judgment is
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misplaced. This distinction has been described as the trend towards 
continuity of ethics with science versus the trend Xovidnds discontinuity?-^^ 
Synthetic naturalists can exist oh both sides of this divide. Some can believe 
that a naturalistic enquiry into morality justifies science-like conclusions in 
ethics, whilst others believe that such an enquiry yields more convincing 
evidence against the similarity of ethical conclusions to scientific 
conclusions. A related but more general statement is that synthetic 
naturalism in itself does not presuppose any particular position on the matter 
of how one 'knows' in the context of morality. Synthetic naturalists can hold 
a variety of positions regarding moral cpistcmology.^^^ All of these 
divisions cut across naturalism, and the synthetic level of understanding it in 
particular.
There is much evidence for the popularity of various synthetic 
approaches to naturalism. One type of approach could be broadly classified 
non-cognitivist, and is endorsed naturalistically in different ways by Simon 
Blackburn, Allan Gibbard, and Gilbert Harman.^^^ For instance, Blackburn 
claims that his theory 'intends to ask no more firom the world than what we 
know is there... It asks no more than this: a natural world, and patterns of 
reaction to it'.^^^ Furthermore, 'In the case of moralizing, nothing stands in 
the way of a complete naturalistic story of what it is, why we do it, and, 
quasi-realistically, why we are right to do it.'^^^ As was shown in the last 
section, Blackburn often argues fi-om the standpoint of the meanings of 
words in ordinary language; however, he also avails himself of synthetic 
means of defending his naturalistic ethic, with a scientifically acceptable
255Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), 126-130.
256£)iscussions of these epistemological approaches in relation to morality can be found in 
Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, ed. (1996), which also contains a bibliography of recent 
material (Haney (1996)).
257Blackbum (1984), 164-5,181-6; Gibbard (1990), 107
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picture as to what the world is like. His approach is to argue against 
semantic naturalism with semantic arguments, but then to articulate his own 
position by means of a largely synthetic argument, based upon an a 
posteriori understanding of the naturalistically explicable reactions of 
human beings to the naturalistically explicable world.^^^
A more traditional naturalist approach is the neo-Aristotelian one, 
where a scientific enquiry into the psychological (and in some cases 
sociological) fimctioning of humans are found to reveal foundations for 
ethics. Philippa Foot is the exemplar of this route. Others such as G. E. M. 
Anscombe, Peter Geach and Mary Midgley have contributed as well, tlic 
latter most recently. Although their commitment to naturalism as defined 
here may be questioned (and certainly it is only the secular writings of 
Anscombe and Geach that can be considered naturalistic at all^^^), they do
sometimes claim their ethical theories to arise fi-om empirical or scientific
. 262 enqmry.-^ -^^
Another route is tiie straightforward reductivism which sees morality 
as redefinable or otherwise reducible to facts that fall squarely within the 
confines of science. Richard Brandt has been called 'a leading proponent of 
this p o s i t i o n ' A n o t h e r  prominent writer in this tradition is Peter Railton, 
whose belief is that 'We are natural and social creatures, and I know of 
nowhere else to look for ethics than in this rich conjunction of facts'.^^^ So, 
he develops an ethic based on the view that 'moral facts are identical with­
er otherwise reducible to -  natural f a c t s ' . O t h e r  writers abound who
260Biackbum (1996) clarifies his position in this area.
261 viz., Anscombe (1958); (1981); and Geach (1956).
262por Poofs view see Foot (1978a); although Foot (1994), (1995), and Hursthouse, 
Lawrence and Quinn, ed. (1995) show how her thought has evolved. For Midgley's theory 
see ch.LB.3b, and the references cited there.
263Haney (1996), 330. See Brandt (1979) and (1996) for his view.
264Railton (1986), 207.
265Railton (1993a), 280.
Chapter II 129
attempt to find an appropriate reduction of moral facts to scientific (usually 
psychological or sociological) facts.^^^
None of these trends are what recent critics have been calling 'Ethical 
Naturalism Revived' ,however .  The most significant recovery from 
'blows that decked' analytical forms of naturalism is a nonreductivist moral 
realism which has 're-entered the philosophical ring in powerful-looking 
naturalistic form' and 'has come to dominate recent work in metaethics'
These philosophers, the most notable of whom are Richard Boyd, David 
Brink and Nicholas Sturgeon, have attempted to provide an ethic which does 
not involve reductivism; instead they propose another type of connection of 
moral facts to natural facts. In Brink's words,
'moral properties are functional properties... moral properties 
are those which bear upon the maintenance and flourishing of 
human organisms... The physical states which contribute to 
or interfere with these needs, wants, and capacities are the 
physical states upon which, on this functionalistic theory, 
moral properties ultimately supervene'.^^^
On this view moral properties are functions of physical properties in an 
analogous way to one view of the relationship between mental properties 
and physical properties in the philosophy of mind.^^® Richard Boyd 
elaborates the contributions of recent findings in philosophy of science to 
this kind of position,^^^ and Nicholas Sturgeon emphasises the difference 
between this nonreductivist view and reductivist views of both semantic and 
synthetic varieties.^^^ Other writers have produced variations on this theme
266E.g. Churchland(1979); Kohlberg (1981); Flanagan (1991); Rottschaefer ( 1991 ); 
Shibles (1992); and A. Clark (1995).
and Timmons (1991), 453.
268ibid., 447.
269Brink (1984), 121-2. See also (1989), 177-80.
270see, e.g. Putnam (1967); (1967a); and especially Davidson (1970).
27 iBoyd (1988). These md other contributions are concisely summarised and updated (the 
bulk of Boyd's paper was written in 1982) in Morgan and Timmons (1991). Boyd's paper is 
arranged in such a way as to exhibit synthetic naturalism's success at meeting objections to 
analytical naturalism.
272sturgeon (1982); (1988).
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as welL^^^ With such an array of moral philosophers currently proposing 
theories which rely on the Synthetic Justification for naturalism, there is 
certainly sufficient evidence that what Philip Kitcher said of epistemology is 
true of ethics as well: 'The Naturalists Retum'.^^^
3. CRITIQUE OF THE APPEAL
Along with synthetic naturalist theories has come trenchant critique. 
Several philosophers have noticed the fact that, even though a synthetic 
naturalist claims to be to some extent bypassing ordinary language, the Open 
Question Argument can be restated in such a way as to raise doubts about 
even these theories. Numerous papers have been written recently in the 
attempt to reformulate the Open Question Argument in this way.^^^ Some 
of these are linked with a priori considerations of morality to various 
extents; to the extent such an argument is so linked, the synthetic naturalist 
may possibly have leverage against them,^^^ However, on the level of the 
individual moral agent, the further a synthetic naturalist description of 
morality veers fi-om the morality that agent actually experiences (in a broad 
sense), the less reason that agent has for accepting the view as a moral view 
rather than some invented 'shmorat view. For example, if someone 
proposed that morality should be so grossly revised that there would be no 
action-guiding element, no truth-aptness, no objectivity, and no possibility 
for moral disagreement, the natural question to be raised is 'What makes you 
think that what you are describing is morality?'.^^^ A synthetic picture of
273E.g. Miller (1985); Lycan(1986); Post (1987); Copp (1990); (1991); (1995). 
274Kitcher (1992), title.
275E.g. S. Ball (1988); (1991); Morgan and Timmons (1991), 461f; (1992); Smith 
(1994a), 29-35; Rosati (1995); Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), 177-8; Wiggins 
(1993a).
2?6"Leverage' meaning that the synthetic naturalist might be able to claim that the alleged a 
priori truth about morality should be revised in light of scientific evidence. This is the 
essence of what some (e.g. Brandt (1979), ch.l) call 'reforming definitions'.
277This argument is developed further in ch. IV.
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morality may not have to adhere closely to ordinary language, but it has to 
be distinguished as morality somehow. Michael Smith depends heavily on 
this requirement when he criticises synthetic naturalists for their disregard 
for the 'platitudes' of morality His general point is that when one 
attempts to provide an ethical theory using solely the findings of science 
apart fi-om a priori considerations, there is no guarantee (in fact, it seems 
unlikely) that the result is going to look very much like what many consider 
morality to be all about. His reason for this is that an a posteriori approach 
to morality is blind to elements of moral discourse and practice which are 
thought rather than empirically discovered. Several other philosophers also 
critique synthetic naturalist theories with the general approach of finding 
fault with the abandonment of certain features without which morality loses 
its distinctiveness.^^^ Smith makes a more specific point as well. He 
defends the possibility that Hare's first argument against semantic naturalism 
described earlier^^^ can be altered so that it will affect synthetic, or what 
Smith calls 'metaphysical-but-not-definitional', naturalism.^^ ^
Stephen Ball, Terence Horgan and Mark Tinunons utilise a slightly 
different approach to criticising synthetic naturalism, and do not speak of the 
à priori. Like Smith, however, they still operate by pointing out elements of 
what might broadly be termed 'moral experience'^ that are neglected or 
insufficiently considered by synthetic naturalist theories. They speak in 
terms of'prephilosophical intuitions' and experience of'hermeneutic 
pressure' to see morality in a certain way.^^^ Horgan and Timmons's 
argument is based on a thought experiment invented by Hilary Putnam,
278smith (1994a), 29-35.
279g g H olm gren (1990); Rosati (1995); Sencera (1995).
280section C.3c.
281 Smith (1994a), 33-35.
282if this term is used, it must be seen in a broad (not strictly empirical) sense, such that it 
includes anything on the indvidual level (sense experience, thought processes, states of 
mind) that is considered fundamental to morality.
283s. Ball (1988); (1991); Timmons (1990); Horgan and Timmons (1991); (1992a); and 
esp. (1992), which is written specifically in terms of the Open Question Argument.
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where a planet just like Earth in every respect save the moral is imagined in 
order to tease out features of the nature of morality that might not be 
obvious in everyday experience. They utilise this argument primarily 
against the new nonreductivist naturalisms of Boyd, Brink, Sturgeon and 
others.
David Wiggins is another critic of synthetic naturalism, who explains 
how the Open Question Argument reveals a difficulty for any naturalist who 
claims that a certain value V is identical with certain natural property. He 
finds reason to 'doubt whether anything in moral philosophy had better 
depend on such an identity's obtaining'.^^*^ Wiggins shows that in order for 
such a naturalist to accomplish this identity, it is not sufficient to show 'item 
X to have value V. Rather, the naturalist must also show three things which 
according to Wiggins are much more difficult, if not impossible. The first is 
that within the naturalistic understanding of x, V must be shown to 
necessarily be present. In other words, a naturalist must succeed in finding 
V in x'- Second, one must not merely show that people do react in 
such-and-such a way 'to item x qua possessed of V, but one must answer the 
question of 'whether one is oneself to concur in this reaction'. Third, 'if a 
value has qua moral or aesthetic to have some connection with feeling (the 
particular feeling depending on the particular value), then, in the cases 
where feeling connects with the will, finding the value in x must have some 
however indirect connection with the will'.^^^ These three stipulations pose 
significant obstacles for a naturalist theory that proposes an identity between 
moral and natural properties.
Other criticisms focus on other aspects of synthetic naturalism 
besides the general difficulties they face in providing a description of 
morality that is at once naturalistic and complete. One focus of such
284Wiggins (1993a), 334. See also (1993). 
285Wiggins (1993a), 331.
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criticism is on the kinds of analogies which are used to defend the 
plausibility of both nonreductivist and reductivist theories. Synthetic 
naturalists often utilise analogies, either to support supervenience relations 
(in nonreductive theories) or property identities (in reductive theories). Both 
types of analogy have been tested and found wanting by several critics.^^^ 
The supervenience issue is possibly the most significant source of criticism 
if the amount of literature is a reliable indicator. The major argument 
leveled in this area is the old argument that a supervenience relation in this 
area cannot but be 'an opaque, isolated, logical fact, for which no 
explanation can be profferred'.^^^ This argument, later dubbed an 
'Argument firom Queemess' by John Mackie, is still current and widely 
recognised as problematic for nonreductive naturalists.^^^ There is prolific 
critical notice of the more prominent of the particular theories as well, such 
as that of David Brink (in addition to Horgan and Timmons's critiques cited 
above).^^^ Simon Blackburn has criticised Nicholas Sturgeon's account of 
moral explanations,^^^ and there has been a fi-uitfiil exchange published 
between David Wiggins and Peter Railton on the subject of the latter's 
naturalism.^^^
With respect to the non-cognitivist forms, a summary of the situation 
has stated that 'new problems beset old noncognitivisms, and so 
noncognitivism has had to develop or die'.^^^ At least three problems face 
non-cognitivist naturalists. First, non-cognitivism as a position is obsolete 
on many philosophers' views, since it is essentially a negative position and
286e.g. Hare (1984); Schiffer, S. (1987), 153-4; Blackburn (1985a); (1993); Horgan and 
Timmons (1991); (1992a); Horgan (1993); and Gampel (1996).
287Blackbum(1971), 111.
288Mackie (1977), 39-41. Gamer (1990) and Horgan and Timmons (1992a) are adaptation 
of Mackie's argument in the context of synthetic naturalist theories.
289e.g. Gamer (1990); Copp (1991); and Yasenchuk (1995).
290Biackbum (1991).
291 In order, these are Railton (1993a); Wiggins (1993); Railton (1993); and Wiggins 
(1993a).
292Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), 145.
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the positive positions it once fiercely railed against have largely either 
disappeared or changed. There are so many types of cognitivism current, 
including ones with only a minimal claim to moral truth, that many have 
questioned whether non-cognitivists can both argue against all of their 
claims and keep their own positions distinctive.^^^ Second, there is 
continued pressure for non-cognitivists to recognise some level of 
truth-aptness in moral judgments. Crispin Wright's idea of minimalism with 
regard to moral truth, for example, has in his estimation dispensed with the 
problems that non-cognitivists have seen in cognitivism, whilst avoiding the 
pitfalls germane to non-cognitivist v i e w s . A  flourish of literature has 
grown out of consideration of this issue.^^^ Third, non-cognitivists have 
historically been staunchly in the analytical tradition, and there is doubt as to 
whether they can successfully reinterpret their perspective so as not to make 
the analytic-synthetic distinction do too much work.^^^ As for criticism of 
specific theories, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has discussed problems with 
Allan Gibbard's theory, Bob Hale has done the same with that of Simon 
Blackburn, and Nicholas Sturgeon with both of these as well as that of 
Gilbert Harman.^^^
Neo-Aristotelian moral philosophy has been criticised for not having 
developed much since its inception over thirty years ago. According to a 
brief survey of naturalism by C. R. Pigden, 'the writings of Geach, Midgley 
and their allies are "suggestive" but nothing more'.^^^ Perhaps the reason 
for this is that it is too difficult to resurrect a significant Aristotelian sense of 
human purpose or function within a modem scientifically naturalistic
293ibid., 184-5. Kailton examines this issue in (1993a).
294c. Wright (1988).
295geg Brink 0986), 36; Divers and Miller (1994); Jackson, Oppy and Smith (1994); 
Smith (1994a); (1994b); (1995), 278-282; C. Wright (1992); (1995), esp. 209-216; and 
Hooker, ed. (1996).
296Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), 145.
297ginnott-Armstrong (1993); Hale (1986); Sturgeon (1985); (1986); (1991). 
298pigden (1991), 430.
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worldview. Elsewhere Pigden concludes after a more thorough treatment 
that the 'neo-Aristotelian programme... has conspicuously failed to deliver.
Its adherents have either lapsed into theology (Geach), provided nothing 
concrete (Midgley), or left us with promissory notes (Anscombe and 
FooQ/299 Whether or not Pigden's examination represents the whole truth 
of the matter, it seems that the crucial issue for neo-Aristotelian naturalists is 
the question of whether increased clarity and more specific defence of such a 
view will only be possible by abandoning the the naturalist claim as it is 
represented in this thesis. In fact, this is an issue for all synthetic naturalists. 
The critique summarised in this section shows that an important question to 
be explored is whether the goal of providing a complete description and 
explanation of morality can be achieved without inadequately representing 
morality on the one hand, or else breaching the boundaries of naturalism on 
the other.
E. Towards an Examination of a Particular Synthetic Naturalist 
Theory
One of the significant lessons which has been learned since the days 
when the 'naturalistic fallacy' was seen to be a once-for-all refutation of 
naturalism^^^ is that each naturalistic theory must be examined for its own 
sake. N o inductive leap is warranted fium the refutation of cruder 
naturalisms such as the identification of'good' with 'pleasure', for instance, 
to a claim about one that identifies 'good' with 'human well-being' with all 
that notion can possibly import fi"om human psychology. There is even less
^^^Pigden (1990), 152. Other discussion of its problems are Darwall, Gibbàrd and Railton 
(1992), 166-69; and Williams (1985), ch.3, and pp.l52ff.
^O^According to Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (116-120), this was roughly the early to 
middle portion of this century, the 'heyday of analytic metaethics'.
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potential for a leap on the synthetic level, since whereas semantic truths are 
often expected to be readily forthcoming in an analysis of ordinary language, 
the possibility for the discovery of radically novel, even paradigm-altering, 
scientific facts is well-precedented. If one allows for language that suggests 
that science is in some sense progressive, modem physics might be said to 
have 'outgrown' some assumptions of the Newtonian paradigm, and modem 
cognitive psychology arguably to have 'outgrown' some of the assumptions 
of both the psychoanalytical and behaviourist traditions. Likewise, since 
synthetic ethical naturalism claims to proceed with aid fi*om scientific 
enquiry, one must leave open die possibility that moral philosophy will 
similarly outgrow past or present 'cmder' states in the light of new scientific 
findings. Given this possibility, an examination of naturdism is not likely, 
especially at the synthetic level, to provide sufficient critical examination of 
synthetic naturalism unless it encounters particular theories directly.
This is not to say that general applications are impossible. Certain 
background assumptions are likely to arise in several theories, and if these 
have been problematic in the context of one theory there is good reason to 
believe that they will be problematic in others. Certain threads of argument 
(like fallacious moves fi-om 'is' to 'ought' and dubious analytical definitions 
of moral terms in non-moral terms) can be examined in their own right and 
the results applied as tools to a range of theories. In fact, it is presumably a 
major point of any examination of a theory to find a general application, 
such that the entire process may be employed in the future with much less 
effort and similar success. The point, however, is that the range of the 
application must be precisely specified and the generalisation itself 
supported with argiunentation. In contrast, an unacceptable method would 
be to take an argument's success against one theory in a certain category as a 
licence to claim that any theory in that category is refuted.
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1. CONTEMPORARY META-ETHICS AND CONTEMPORARY 
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY
Any synthetically naturalistic theory of ethics could be chosen for 
consideration in order to provide a contribution to contemporary 
meta-ethics. However, a second purpose could also be served if a particular 
theory were chosen which represented an area that has received recent 
emphasis in contemporary science, and whose proponents claim a relevance 
to ethics, but has not received similar emphasis in mainstream meta-ethics. 
This second purpose would be the establishment of closer ties between a 
meta-ethical view which purports to be eminently scientific, and science 
itself. Synthetic naturalism represents a reversal of direction of earlier 
twentieth-century claims such as:
'4.111 Philosophy is not one of the natural 
sciences.
4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification 
of thoughts...
4.1121 Psychology is no more closely related to 
philosophy than any other natural science...
4.1122 Darwin's theory has no more to do with 
philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural 
science'.^^^
Every synthetically naturalistic theory, on the other hand, by definition 
depends on the conclusions of science for its factual support. One might 
expect science, then, to have been intimately connected with the conclusions 
of the synthetic naturalists who were mentioned in the last section. Virtually 
all do make reference to human psychology, and many take human social 
behavior and socid ti'cnds into consideration. Some kind of psychology and 
sociology, then, are fimdamental to many contemporary theories of ethics. 
But, as Darwall, Gibbard and Railton's review article of current moral
Wittgenstein (1921).
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philosophy notes as a final conclusion, there is, generally speaking, a lack of 
truly empirically informed work even in these areas, and in particular on the 
'nature or history or function of morality'.
'Too many moral philosophers and commentators on moral 
philosophy— we do not exempt ourselves— have been content 
to invent their psychology or anthropology firom scratch and 
do their history on the strength of selective reading of texts 
rather than more comprehensive research into contexts... any 
real revolution in ethics stemming firom the infusion of a 
more empirically informed understanding of psychology, 
anthropology, or history must hurry if it is to arrive in time to 
be part offin de siècle ethics.'^^^
The possibility that synthetic naturalists are not in sufficient communication 
with developments in the sciences is perhaps very surprising, considering 
the fact that such writers claim the support of science for their ethical 
theories. Moreover, even a casual reading of the more scientifically relevant 
of recent work in ethical naturalism seems to support the conclusion of that 
review. Centuries after David Hume, what has been called 'The Moral 
Problem' in today's meta-ethics is the prospect of reconciling his theory of 
human psychology with our view of morality.^®^ Much has been 
accomplished in science with relevance to human psychology since Hume, 
which may have philosophical, including ethical, re levance .^O ne  field in 
particular has experienced relatively recent developments which are thought 
by many to have important bearing on human psychology as regards 
morality: evolutionary biology.
Earlier it was said that G. E. Moore criticised the evolutionary ethic 
of Herbert Spencer solely for its linguistic rather than scientific content.^®^ 
With respect to the consideration of science he exhibits in his published
302£)arvvall  ^Gibbard and Railton (1992), 188-9.
3 03 Smith (1994a); emphasis added.
304An example of a cognitive psychologist today who touches on what he sees as 
philosophical implications of his work is Daniel Dennett (1991).
^OSgection D.l.
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writings, Moore has by some been criticised as 'passionately parochial and 
blinkered.' Antony Flew expounds upon this accusation:
'In that most curious volume, Principia Ethica, for instance, 
the whole discussion both of ethics and of meta-ethics 
proceeds as if outside time and space... Moore might as well 
have been writing not merely before Darwin but before 
Newton'.^^^
If the naturalist references cited in the last two chapters are a sufficient 
reflection of the mainstream of naturalistic meta-ethics, then one may at 
least tentatively propose that little has changed since Moore's day in this 
regard. Darwall, Gibbard and Railton may he correct in their indictment of 
the empirically ill-informed nature of much of contemporary meta-ethics. 
Evolutionist Julian Huxley, grandson of Darwin's chief defender T. H. 
Huxley, writes:
'It makes a great difference whether we think of the history of 
mankind as wholly apart from the rest of life, or as a 
continuation of the general evolutionary process, though with 
special characteristics of its own'.^^^
A reasonable question to ask is whether the significance of viewing man in 
an evolutionary context is so great as to be able to provide a naturalistic 
understanding of morality. Although there is a recent empirically-informed 
renewal of attempts to accomplish just this, the most prominent naturalistic 
meta-ethical writers do not consider the prospect very seriously. By far 
most of the naturalistic meta-ethical literature contains either insignificant or 
no reference to evolutionary theory.^^^ To the extent that this is the case, 
and if the recent implications for the human sciences that have been drawn 
from evolutionary biology do have credibility, then any discussion of human 
moral psychology which neglects tliis information may soon be seen in
306f 1gw (1984), 131.
Huxley (1953), vii.
^®*E.g. Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992); Smith, ed. (1995); and the dozens of 
references within these two overviews, most of which have been cited in this chapter.
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scientific circles as an obsolete vestige of the pre-Darwinian anthropological 
paradigm.^
The low level of communication between evolutionary theory and 
naturalistic meta-ethics goes both ways, however. Work on ethical matters 
within the evolutionary literature contains numerous references to the 
'naturalistic fallacy' without much consideration of what that claim really 
means or in what contexts and to what extent it is applicable.^ Also, 
many evolution-based ethics or evolutionary approaches to ethics are 
proposed with little concern for philosophical respectability. E. O. Wilson, 
for example, makes revolutionary meta-ethical claims, such as that a 'simple 
biological statement must be pursued to explain ethics and ethical 
philosophers... at all depths'.^^ ^  However, the only ethical philosopher 
Wilson cites is John Rawls, who for his part had admitted to having no real 
position on traditional meta-ethical issues, and was of the opinion that other 
more practical questions should be dealt with in the meantime.^^^ If 
evolutionary theorists who attempt to produce naturalistic ethical theories 
are to some extent unacquainted with recent discussions and developments 
in naturalistic meta-ethics proper, these attempts will most likely be of 
substandard rigour and cogency to the expectations of meta-ethically 
educated moral philosophers.
It is, of course, not a necessary thing that moral philosophy be either 
empirically ill-informed on the one hand or meta-ethically ill-informed on 
the other. Particularly with regard to naturalistic moral philosophy, which 
depends explicitly on support from science, such must be viewed as a 
situation to be avoided strenuously. To this end, the next chapter will
309^^ Wright (1995), Introduction.
3^®An example of this is the discussion of Robert Richards' evolutionaiy ethic in the 
journal Biology and Philosophy. See, for instance, Richards (1986); Hughes (1986); and 
P. Williams (1990).
3Hwilson(1975),3.
312Rawls (1971), 51-2.
Chapter II 141
consider a synthetically naturalistic theory which is claimed by its 
proponents to be supported by the facts of evolutionary biology. This will 
involve a thorough explanation and examination of both the science and the 
meta-ethics involved. In doing so, a way of assessing naturalistic moral 
theories will be proposed which takes into account both empirical and 
meta-ethical respectability. Thus communication will be promoted between 
scientists and moral philosophers, especially those of the latter who claim 
science as a source of support.
2. CONCLUSIONS
Naturalism as a meta-ethical idea has been criticised in so many 
forms and from so many perspectives in the twentieth century that 
oversimplification and confusion are perhaps inevitable. Naturalism has 
commonly been assumed to be cognitivist, to be semantic, to violate Hume's 
Law, to be reductive, and to be refuted by G. E. Moore. Discussions of 
naturalism often raise difficult issues such as the truth-aptness of moral 
judgments, the descriptivism/nondescriptivism debate, the role of the a 
priori in morality, the utility of reductionism, the relevance of reason and 
sentiment to morality, the usefulness of the analytic/synthetic distinction, the 
explainability of supervenience relations, the action-guiding element in 
morality, the possibility of synthetic identity without semantic equivalence, 
and the scope of scientific enquiry.
The main objective of the first two chapters has been to organise the 
concept of naturalism in such a way that the nature and scope of this 
century's criticism of it could be understood, highlighting any area which 
has not been the object of strenuous critique. The compartmentalisation of 
naturalism into logical, semantic and synthetic levels in the first chapter has 
facilitated this categorisation of the critique, because of the distinctiveness
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of the justification to which each level appeals. Logical naturalism can be 
seen to appeal to a distinctive Logical Justification based on the logical 
validity of a certain type of progression; semantic naturalism appeals to a 
Semantic Justification based on the capability of defining certain words in 
certain ways; and synthetic naturalism appeals to a Synthetic Justification 
based on the obtaining of certain facts or states of affairs. With respect to 
critical discussion, as discussed in this second chapter, certain prominent 
arguments of this century have concentrated on the logical progression 
undergirding the Logical Justification. Another significant trend has 
focused on the feasibility of the type of definition that the Semantic. 
Justification upholds. These critiques have been very thorough and popular, 
and have experienced several decades of continued clarification, explanation 
and testing. Obviously highlighted, then, and having only recently begun to 
be criticised, is the Synthetic Justification, which understandably contains 
most of the notable naturalistic meta-ethicists today. Even those few 
naturalists who have remained on the semantic level have paid much closer 
attention to their analytical technique, and have put forward their views with 
precision and caution rather than the vagueness and dogmatism which 
arguably characterised moral semantics before this century of sustained 
examination. The main surge forward, though, has come fi-om the synthetic 
camp. Here moral philosophers, newly invigorated by recent developments 
in the philosophy of science and language, have sought to find the answers 
to longstanding ethical questions in the most solidly naturalistic of ways: 
through facts that are accessible to scientific enquiry.
Synthetic theories have been proposed of both reductivist and 
non-reductivist varieties, and critics have begun to examine them, present 
objections and request clarifications. Since these theories are so novel and 
variable, they must be examined on their own merits at this point rather than 
being discussed en masse, and so the next chapter is dedicated to the
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examination of a particular theory as a case study in light of the work of the 
first two chapters. An additional benefit to be gained from such a case study 
is a facilitation of increased communication between those who are 
primarily moral philosophers and those who are primarily scientists.
Reviewers of twentieth-century meta-ethics Darwall, Gibbard and 
Railton had hoped that a 'more empirically informed understanding'^ ^  ^  
would surface in meta-ethics before the end of the twentieth century.
Perhaps it is too late for this now, but if enough communication lines are 
soon established between moral philosophy and natural science, there may 
be enough time for the meta-ethics of the hew milleiuum to begin on an 
improved footing in this respect. As philosophers develop a clearer notion 
of what science does and does not permit one to say, and conversely as 
scientists grow in philosophical sophistication, an answer might be 
approached to the question of whether naturalism on the synthetic level is 
the proper way to view morality, or whether a different approach is in order. 
The next two chapters will contribute to an exploration of this issue, first 
with regard to a particular theory, and then more generally.
Gibbard and Railton (1992), 189.
Chapter ffl: EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM IN ETHICS: 
AN APPROACH DESCRIBED AND CRITICISED
Paul Feyerabend recently claimed that in light of twentieth century 
philosophy of science, 'the problem is no longer how to articulate the 
monolith SCIENCE, but what to do with the scattered collection of efforts 
that has replaced it.'^ Although many do not uphold the particulars of this 
philosopher's view of science,^ few if any would disagree that, at least on 
the level of everyday practice, science does function as a 'collection of 
efforts' rather than a single discipline with a homogeneous methodology and 
subject matter. The naming and function of university departments, 
academic journals, and textbooks in the realm of 'the sciences' suggest that 
science more closely resembles a mosaic than a single brushstroke. Whether 
or not these subdisciplines could theoretically be united is an interesting 
issue, but a different one.^ The present, and less controversial, point is that 
scientists in practice do speak in particular jargons, investigate specific 
objects, converse within roughly distinguishable communities, and call their 
disciplines by names which delineate their fields fi-om others. If this is the 
case, then a meta-ethical theory which purports to be naturalistic, might 
depend on facts germane to any subset of these disciplines— perhaps even to
i Feyerabend (1995), 809.
^Papineau (1995), 810.
3 Actually, it is at least two: the simpler question is whether or not all of the sciences 
contribute to a single consistent body of knowledge. To deny this is to espouse a sort of 
epistemological relativism (discussed in ibid.). The other question is whether the concepts 
used in one discipline are theoretically reducible to terms used in other disciplines. Some 
(e.g. Carnap (1934); and Crick (1966)) believe this to be possible, whereas others believe 
that any particular science 'employs concepts which are peculiar to it and indeed have little 
meaning' in the contexts of others (Medawar (1974), 61 ; see also Beckner (1974)).
Chapter III 146
only one discipline. For instance, there could be 'psychological meta-ethics' 
or 'sociological meta-ethics' (if sociology is counted as a science). Thomas 
Nagel, in his discussion of the idea that modem scientific disciplines can 
provide answers to philosophical issues, claims that physics and 
evolutionary biology are presently the most popular disciplines for this use.^ 
Presumably none would dispute that evolutionary biology outstrips physics 
in the extent to which a science has been used to provide support for a 
naturalistic meta-ethic.^
This chapter is a description and critique of just one of the ways in 
which evolutionary biology has been the ethical naturalist's tool. This 
case-study approach is necessary because certain popular blanket arguments, 
based on the laws of logic and analysis of the meanings of words, leave a 
significant area of naturalism untouched— that of synthetic naturalism.^ 
Although similarly broad arguments are currently being developed in 
critique of synthetic naturalism as well, one of the significant features of this 
level of naturalism is that ethical principles, properties and terms are 
understandable with reference to the findings of science, which are not 
predictable^ and continue to accme through time. Therefore, it would seem 
premature for a critic to claim to sweep synthetic naturalism away with a 
single stroke, without dealing with relevant scientific theories. Once a 
particular naturalist theory has been examined, however, it is possible that 
certain errors may be discovered that could be common, even ubiquitous, 
among synthetically naturalistic theories. In this way, a case-study approach 
can contribute to a critique of synthetic naturalism phrased in broader terms.
The decision to examine evolutionary biology as a source of a 
naturalist meta ethic is understandable, given its prominence (as Thomas
4t . Nagel (1986), 9.
3por examples see the introduction to section C of this chapter.
^See ch.n.
^On this point see Medawar (1984), essay #2, entitled 'Can Scientific Discovery Be 
Praneditated?'.
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Nagel indicated) in today's scientific writing on philosophical topics. It is 
also potentially helpful because it fulfils a need for the encouragement of 
scientific respectability in the work of naturalistic meta-ethicists, and 
conversely philosophical respectability in the work of those writing on the 
implications of evolutionary biology.
This examination of an evolutionary naturalist approach to 
meta-ethics will be preceded by a brief summary of the most relevant tenets 
of evolutionary biology, and a more substantial summary of the 
subdiscipline of that science which is claimed to provide the support for the 
naturalist approach— sociobiology. This will provide the basis for a 
discussion of a currently influential view of the relationship between 
evolutionary biology and meta-ethics.
A. Evolutionary Biology: A Brief Overview of the Science
1. PHASE 1 : EVOLUTION AS A BIOLOGICAL PROCESS
Since ancient times, writers in a vaguely scientific vein have 
postulated some sort of continuity among living things. Aristotle noticed 
with regard to living things that 'the system is not such that there is no 
relation between one thing and another'.^ On the contrary, with respect to 
classifications of organisms 'because of the continuity, we fail to see to 
which side the boundary and the middle between them belongs'.^ Not until 
the eighteenth century, however, did European scientists begin to consider 
seriously the idea that the continuity in life was a temporal phenomenon; 
and more specifically, that some living things could arise in time whilst
^Metaphysics XII.x.3.
^History o f Animals VII (Vni).1.588b.
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others go extinct. Kant endorsed this idea, which he called the 'cosmic 
spectacle of ever-lapsing change'.^  ^ Scientists began to question the view, 
previously assumed in the Plato-influenced world, that significant change 
was impossible in the history of life. As one writer of the previous 
century had presaged, 'A Musician strikes not all strings at once; neither is 
it to be expected that everything in Nature at every time should act'.^^
The French biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, with his Philosophie 
Zoologique, together with an anonymous work called The Vestiges o f the 
Natural History o f Creation (later found to be written by Robert Chambers), 
brought scientific discussion of change in life through time— evolution— 
into the nineteenth century. Especially through the work of Lamarck, the 
question of how evolution worked became a focal point for scientific 
discussion. Ari evolutionary theory would have to provide an answer to this 
question in order to be scientifically respectable. Lamarck's own answer to 
the question was that a creature can transform itself to some extent during its 
lifetime by its own actions, and these acquired changes automatically pass to 
its children. This view gained popularity for a time, but is now defunct. ^  ^  
The question as to how evolution worked, or the mechanism for evolution, 
was not answered satisfactorily until the late 1850's, when Charles Darwin 
and Alfi-ed Russel Wallace independently came to the same conclusion.
2. PHASE 2: NATURAL SELECTION AS EVOLUTIONARY 
MECHANISM
^^Lovejoy (1936), 244. 
llKant(1755),84.
^^Lovejoy (1936), ch.lO.
^^Henry More (1659), II.ch.l7.vii.
 ^^ Lamarck (1809); Chambers (1844).
a criticism of his view in light of current scientific understanding, see Cronin (1991), 
30-42. This is not to say, of course, that knowledge and abilities cannot be passed from 
generation to generation; for this is certainly the case, especially in humans. See section 
B.la.
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Darwin had understood the central mechanism of evolution before 
Wallace made the. same discovery, and Darwin's book. The Origin o f Species 
by Means o f Natural Selection, or the Preservation o f Favoured Races in the 
Struggle for Life}^  explains the fundamental idea more fully than Wallace 
did. Part of the object of the book was to defend evolution itself, but as was 
shown in the last section, this was nothing new. Darwin's status as the father 
of modem evolutionary biology is rather due to his having discovered and 
supported a principle underlying evolutionary change: natural selection}'^ 
The principle follows from the following three premises:
1. More organisms are bom than the environment can support 
(Principle of Limited Resources).
2. Organisms differ from each other in ways that are relevant to their 
chances of survival and reproduction (Principle of Variation).
3. The probability is good that characteristics of an organism will 
also be characteristics of its offspring (Principle of Inheritance).
To the extent that these premises are tme, some characteristics of organisms 
will tend to increase in prevalence in a population over several generations, 
whereas other characteristics will tend to decrease in prevalence. The 
stipulations are that those characteristics be relevant to an organism's 
chances of survival and reproduction, that they be exhibited to differing 
extents in different organisms, and that they be heritable. To illustrate, let us 
suppose that the following are tme:
^^Darwin (1859).
U in addition to Darwin's own explanation of this idea, which is still valid today, this 
concept can be found described in dozens of works in recent decades, such as S. Gould 
(1978), Prologue and ch.4; Flew (1984), ch.l; Maynard Smith (1988), part III; and Cronin 
(1991), ch.3.
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1. The environment cannot support all of the robins that are bom. 
(This exhibits the Principle of Limited Resources).
2. Robins vary in the number of eggs they lay. The fewer eggs are 
laid, the fewer there will be to survive to reproductive age. The more eggs 
are laid, the less care each chick will receive and so the less healthy each 
will be. (This exhibits the Principle of Variation).
3. The characteristic of laying a certain number of eggs is a trait 
which tends to be inherited by robins' offspring. (This exhibits the Principle 
of hiheritahce).
All other things being equal, as the generations pass, robins who lay the 
right number of eggs succeed optimally in raising chicks. Since those chicks 
in tum tend to lay the right number of eggs as well, such robins should 
increase in commonality in the population. The characteristic of laying a 
certain number of eggs is therefore 'naturally selected' in robins. ^  ^  The term 
'selection' should not be seen as a positive choice, but rather as a result of a 
process of elimination or 'selection against' those individuals that have 
deleterious characteristics.
Natural selection showed how change could occur in organisms and 
be perpetuated. As long as variation was significant and diverse enough and 
traits could be inherited, there seemed to Darwin no end to the power of the 
mechanism. Over enough time (and geologists were saying that plenty of 
time had elapsed on this planet^ ^ ), perhaps a great deal of the variation 
evident in nature today arose by the mechanism of natural selection. Darwm 
provided hundreds of pages' worth of evidence to support this idea in The 
Origin o f Species, and added to it throughout the rest of his life.^^*^ ^
1 ^ This example is taken from the work of David Lack (1954). See also Lack (1966). 
^^The most prominent was Lyell (1830).
2®See, e.g., Darwin's longer work The Descent o f Man and Selection In Relation to Sex 
(1871).
^^This summary is incomplete even as an introduction of the most basic tenets of
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3. PHASE 3: THE GENE AS A KEY TO INHERITANCE
Although Darwin's theory gained immediate support from some 
scientists, and eventual support from virtually all, one of the ways his 
explanation fell short was in his understanding of the basis for inheritance. 
He could not explain how it was that offspring tend to share their parents' 
characteristics. Through rediscoveries and new developments in genetics 
and molecular biology during this century, an explanation of the basis for 
inheritance has been furnished in terms of the geneP-^
By far most physical structures that make up any living thing do not 
persist after the organism dies. Whether a structure persists throughout the 
life of an individual (like a brain) or whether it is continually replaced by 
similar or identical structures throughout the course of an organism's 
existence (like the cells of skin, muscle, bone, etc.), the persistence or 
replacement is halted at death, if not before. Genes, however, are 
exceptions. These physical structures are regions of chromosomes, which 
are found in the nuclei of most kinds of cells, in most living things.^^ 
Chromosomes are able to duplicate themselves (replicate), which they do on 
a regular basis. Under normal circumstances, whenever an organism 
reproduces, either sexually or asexually, parental genes become those of the
evolutionary biology; for example, it does not describe the relationship between change in 
populations, just described, and the evolution of different kinds of creatures, from the level 
of species to kingdom. Such explanation is omitted here because it is not immediately 
relevant.
^^The relevance of the gene to evolution is roughly introduced by the classic works Fisher 
(1930) and Haldane (1932); but is more explicit in such works as Haldane (1955); 
Waddington (1957); Hamilton (1964); and ü . Williams (1966). Later works on the 
subject are Hull (1981); R. Dawkins (1976); (1982); and Maynard Smith (1988), ch.7,13. 
There is debate over whether the gene is the only basis for natural selection (for other ideas 
see Wynne-Edwards (1962); and the very different R. Dawkins (1976), ch.l 1. Brandon 
and Burian, eds. (1987) is a collection of essays regarding this controversy). However, 
there is widespread agreement that the gene is generally the most significant basis in nature. 
23£xceptions are bacteria, who do not have nuclei; and viruses, (to those who consider 
them living).
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offspring. In this way, as long as reproduction continues successfully and 
without any interference or mistakes (which do sometimes happen), an 
organism's genes will exist forever; or, more accurately, exact copies will 
continually be produced of each gene transmitted to offspring.
Genes function in an organism by specifying the nature of traits, or 
characteristics of organisms. In some cases, these traits are specified by the 
genes in such a way that little variation is allowed in the outcome. For 
instance, genes specify the structure of certain chemical substances like 
hormones with such exactitude that in every member of a given species the 
structure of the hormone is identical. More obviously, normal humans are 
bom with two eyes and two lungs; these traits are specified by genes with 
great rigidity. In other cases, the genes specify traits which are more 
variable. For instance, an organism's genes may specify a certain tendency 
towards aggression.^^ Throughout the course of life, however, aggression 
will be variable because of other considerations, including those particular to 
the situation and to the individual organism. So, although the content of a 
badger's genes will cause it to be generally more aggressive than a sheep, 
there is variability in this disposition. Any given badger is not always 
aggressive. When it does display aggression, it will not always be to the 
same extent. Two badgers in the same situation may react with differing 
levels of aggression. This does not mean that there is no genetic basis for a 
badger's aggression. Rather, it shows that there is no guarantee that all traits 
specified by genes will be immune to a range of masking, distorting, 
encouraging or discouraging influences perhaps related, but veg  often 
completely unrelated, to the specific gene(s) that are specifying the 
particular trait.
When offspring have only one parent, that parent ideally gives an 
exact copy of all of its own genes to the offspring. The only way in which
24wilson(1975),ch.ll.
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the genes of the offspring could be different than that of the parent is for 
there to be mistakes (mutations) in the replication. However, it is, of course, 
very common for organisms to reproduce in such a way that two parents, 
with différent genes, are involved. In this situation, an offspring's set of 
genes (genome) is composed of a combination of that of each parent, barring 
mutations. The assortment of the parental chromosomes in the formation of 
an offspring's genome is such that no complete prediction of an offspring's 
genome is possible. In addition, there are so many ways in which the 
parental chromosomes can combine, including the occasional exchange of 
parts of chromosomes, that in the vast majority of creatures the probability 
of going through the reproductive process twice and producing two 
offspring with identical genomes is so low as to be practically non-existent. 
So, genetics provides a mechanism for the inheritance of trmts and explains 
why offspring exhibit variation.
When discussing matters not in terms of individual offspring, but in 
terms of a group of individuals of a species that live in the same general area 
(viz., population), this genetic mechanism fills in the gap in Darwin's 
understanding of how certain traits increase in fi-equency in a population 
whereas others decrease in fi-equency. Such a change in gene fi-equency in a 
population is basically evolution, translated into genetic terms. It so 
happens that no such change would occur were populations always large, 
mates always chosen at random, mutations very rare, and all individuals 
regardless of genetic variation equally likely to survive and breed. Nature is 
not like this, however, and any of these conditions not being met is enough 
to make gene fi-equency change, and thus evolution, likely. The robin 
example cited earlier as an example of natural selection, is an instance of the 
fourth condition not being met. To restate that example in genetic terms: 
Robins whose genetic makeup specifies a tendency to lay either too few or 
too many eggs will tend to die out more quickly than robins whose genetic
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makeup specifies a tendency to lay the right number of eggs. As the 
disadvantaged robins die out, their genetic information dies with them. As 
the advantaged robins survive, their genetic information is perpetuated. In 
this way, the portion of a robin's genome which specifies the laying of the 
right number of eggs will tend to persist in a population of robins.^^
Some have nicknamed this aspect of nature the 'survival of the 
fittest'. In the context of genetically updated evolutionary theory, this term 
simply refers to the fact that genetic information which specifies a trait 
harmful to itself tends to decrease in abundance in a population, whereas 
genetic information which specifies a trait beneficial to itself tends to 
persist, all other things being equal. Whether a trait is harmful or beneficial 
will depend on the nature of the organism that bears the genetic information, 
as well as the nature of the environment, including other organisms and 
nonliving things. Genetic information persists only in individual organisms; 
but since what are inherited are the genes, they are the ultimate drivers of 
evolution. The explanatory power of this idea has prompted the 
evolutionary biologist John Maynard Smith to claim of his field that 'the 
most exciting thing to have emerged is what might be called a 
"gene-centred" view of evolution'.^^ This 'gene's-eye view of Darwinism'^^ 
has facilitated an understanding of many previously confusing situations in 
nature, including the resolution of the so-called 'paradox of altruism', which 
has led to the particular naturalist meta-ethic which will be discussed in this 
chapter. First, however, the subdiscipline of evolutionary biology within 
which the paradox of altruism was encountered will be introduced.
^^This assumes that differences in genetic makeup are generally responsible for differences 
in the numbers of eggs robins lay. David Lack's work does clearly establish this ((1954); 
0966)).
^"Maynard Smith (1988), 59.
27r . Dawkins (1989a), ix.
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B. Sociobiology and the Biological Basis for Altruism
In 1975, Harvard biologist E. O. Wilson wrote Sociobiology: The 
New Synthesis, in which he defined the new field as ’the systematic study of 
the biological basis of all social behavior'.Ironically, whilst a 1989 poll 
of the international Animal Behaviour Society rated the book the single 
most important work on animal behaviour of all time, dethroning even 
Darwin's contributions to the subject, the book also incited what may be 'the 
only occasion in recent American history on which a scientist was physically 
attacked, however mildly, simply for the expression of an idea.'^^ Some 
have believed this widely varying but thoroughly zealous reaction to 
sociobiology to be the inevitable reaction to a current 'paradigm shift' in 
scientific thought of the sort that Thomas Kuhn spoke about.^^ Richard 
Dawkins, however, who wrote The Selfish Gene— the other of the 'two 
epoch-marking books that synthesized and publicized' sociobiology^ 
stressed the scientific precedent for his claims. He expressed his belief that 
although sociobiology may revolutionise the humanities, its scientific basis 
had been long understood. In fact, in a significant sense it simply extended 
themes present in Darwin's own work.^^ Whether a paradigm shift in 
progress or just an overdue realisation of the implications of scientific 
advancements made long ago, the science of sociobiology is rooted in the 
concept which was seen to be fundamental to the modem understanding of 
biological evolution in general: the gene.
28wilson (1975), 4.
^^Wilson (1994), 330,307-8. At an American Association for the Advancement of 
Science event in Washington, D.C. in 1978, a group of demonstrators stormed the stage and 
poured a pitcher of ice water on Wilson's head.
^^Kuhn (1962). R. Wright (1994), 6 invokes the Kuhnian phrase in his description of 
sociobiology, in a section entitled 'A Quiet Revolution'. Wilson (1994), 319-20 says that a 
'paradigm shiff was an appropriate description of his own experience as well.
31r . Dawkins (1976). Hereafter citations will be fi'om the second edition, (1989a). The 
quote is from R. Wright (1994), 4.
32r . Dawkins (1989a), Preface to the 1989 Edition, and p.l.
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I. GENES AND BEHAVIOURAL TENDENCIES: CENTRAL ISSUES
Explanation of the science of sociobiology is perhaps best 
accomplished in the context of four issues, characterised by various extents 
of controversy, which are an integral part of the science. These issues are 
the biological continuity between animals and humans, the innate versus the 
acquired, free will versus determinism, and the adaptationism debate. With 
respect to each issue sociobiology is predicated on the truth of a certain 
range of positions, and in each issue the gene plays a central role.
a. The animal heritage o/Homo sapiens
94% of the text of Wilson's Sociobiology deals with the nonhuman 
animal world.^^ However, his last chapter opens with 'Let us now consider 
man in the free spirit of natural history...', and proceeds to explain human 
behaviour in the same terms that were used to explain that of ants, lions, and 
chimpanzees.^^ An argument can be made that this continuity is reasonable 
from two related perspectives. First, as far as our genes are concerned, there 
seems no reason to believe that humans should be treated differently in a 
scientific treatise than any other animal. As the physiologist Jared Diamond 
points out:
'The genetic distance (1.6%) separating us from pygmy or 
common chimps is... less than that between two species of 
gibbons (2.2%), or between such closely related North 
American bird species as red-eyed vireos and white-eyed 
vireos (2.9%), or between such closely related and 
hard-to-distinguish European bird species as willow warblers 
and chiffchaffs (2.6%). The remaining 98.4% of our genes 
are just normal chimp genes.'^^
33wilson (1994), 332.
34wilson(1975),ch.26.
^^Diamond (1991), 19. He then argues that we would be classified by a nonhuman
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Genes are the subject matter of sociobio logyso it is understandable that 
Wilson would have stressed a continuity between the sociobiology of 
humans and that of other animals. The second perspective from which it 
may be sensible to stress a continuity between humans and other animals is 
that of evolution. Darwin said 'Man in his arrogance thinks himself a great 
work... More humble and I think truer to consider him created from 
animals'.^? Seeing humans as a result of an evolutionary process which also 
produced many other creatures may be used as a defence of sociobiology's 
assumption that humans can be understood by the same methods that are 
used with other animals.
In order for sociobiology to produce accurate results regarding 
humans, the arguments from these two perspectives (the genetic and the 
evolutionary) must be valid. To what extent this is the case is a matter for 
debate,^ ^  but hereafter in this thesis they will be accepted as necessary 
working assumptions in human sociobiology, and so the basis of the 
discipline will not be challenged. In the minds of many, this is a too 
generous allowance,^^ but without it any discussion of a sociobiology-based 
meta-ethic would halt before it had begun. A related issue, which provides 
just as significant a stipulation for human sociobiology, is the matter of the 
extent to which the genes are responsible for variation in humans. In the 
views of some, scientists operating from the genetic perspective have often 
encroached on the domain of the environmental, or the acquired. This is the 
second of the issues discussed here as central to sociobiology.
zoologist as a third species of chimpanzee, rather than in a completely different genus. Our 
close biochemical relationship to the chimps is also described in Pilbeam (1984). Others 
who stress our kinship with animals include Gould (1980a); Flew (1984); Rachels (1990); 
Leakey and Lewin (1992); R. Wright (1994); Dennett (1995); and Matt Ridley (1996). 
3^Wilson (1975), ch.l; and R. Dawkins (1989a), esp. ch.l,4.
^^Darwin (1836-44), 300. This quote is from 1838.
3^Two ways into the issue are M. Dawkins (1986), ch. 10; and Symons (1992). 
39e.g.Sahlins(1976).
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b. Innate versus acquired and the significance o f culture
As long as evolutionary biologists confined their talk to anatomical 
structures such as fins, thumbs or brains, there was little opposition to the 
idea that the genes played a crucial role in their evolution.^^ Since 
sociobiology deals with social behaviour, a novel issue arises: the 
tendencies towards specific behaviours might also be rooted in 
environmental influences. In fact, what has been called the 'standard social 
science model' involves the belief that environmental considerations 
outweigh innate ones to such a degree as to render the latter insignificant.^^ 
Moreover, even if an evolutionary origin is postulated for certain 
behaviours, the means for such an origin does not have to be at all genetic. 
The role of culture has long been recognised as a nongenetic agent of 
evolutionary change, by a sort of Lamarckian 'inheritance of acquired 
characteristics' through such things as oral tradition.^^ Despite the 
prominence of this view, E. O. Wilson describes the work of sociobiology as 
follows:
'...each phenomenon is weighed for its adaptive significance 
and then related to the basic principles of population 
genetics... The principal goal of a general theory of 
sociobiology should be an ability to predict features of social 
organization fi-om a knowledge of these population 
parameters combined with information on the behavioral
40§ Gould (1981), 328-9. By 'brains' is meant here the general size and gross structures; 
it is realised that on a finer level, one's occupation, for example, may result in actual 
anatomical changes in the brain (e.g. linguists may develop larger Wernicke's (#44) and 
Broca's (#22) areas, which are involved in language comprehension and speech 
respectively).
^Ixooby and Cosmides (1992).
42t . H. Huxley believed that cultural transmission, facilitated by language, was what has 
made us so different behaviourally from other animals ((1863), 132). This view was also 
held by Asa Gray ((1880), 103-6). Among the vast literature on the subject of cultural 
'inheritance' are James (1890), vol.2,633-40; J. Baldwin (1897); J. Huxley (1942); 
Waddington (1960a), 381-402; (1961); Dobzhansky (1963); Cloak (1975); Medawar 
(1977); Piaget (1978), ch.2; Gould (1978), ch.32; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981); J. 
Ball (1984); Boyd and Richerson (1985); R. Dawkins (1989a), ch.l 1; Durham (1991); 
Sober (1991); Dennett (1991), ch.7; (1995).
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constraints imposed by the genetic constitution of the 
species.'^^
So, sociobiology's success as a science depends on the significance of those 
constraints which the genes place on behaviour. The more behaviour tends 
to be constrained by genetic information, the more sociobiology will be able 
to explain that behaviour. The less genetically constrained behaviour tends 
to be, the less explanatory power sociobiology will have. Wilson, realising 
this, has attempted with C. J. Lumsden to incorporate cultural influences in 
the sociobiological view of human nature, still asserting the primacy of the 
genes.^^ The efficacy of their attempt has been questioned by many,^^ but 
regardless of the truth of their claims it remains the case that it is only to the 
extent that cultural influences by themselves are not the basis for the 
evolution of social behaviour, that sociobiology can be successful.
This stipulation holds true for human nature as well. It is only to 
whatever extent human psychology is not governed by cultural or other 
experiences that human sociobiology is a viable discipline. If flexibility, as 
Wilson's critical colleague Stephen Jay Gould believes, is 'the most 
important determinant of human consciousness', and if biologically speaking 
'We are, as Simone de Beauvoir said, "l'être dont l'être est de n'être pas"— 
the being whose essence lies in having no essence,'^^ then sociobiology of 
humans is fundamentally wrongheaded. On the other hand, if'the orgamsm 
is only DNA's way of making more DNA',^^ if we are 'survival machines- 
robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known
43wilson (1975), 4-5. See also p.21-22, 67.
44Lumsden and Wilson (1981); (1983).
4^In Wilson's own terms, those in several key journals were unfavourable: Edmund Leach 
was enraged in Nature', Peter Medawar was contemptuous in the New York Review o f 
Books', Richard Lewontin, by his own later description, was nasty in The Sciences. The 
subject of gene-culture coevolution simply languished, mostly ignored by biologists and 
social scientists alike.' (1994), 352-3. See also Kitcher (1985); S. Gould (1988), ch.7; 
Maynard Smith (1988), ch.8.
46s. Gould (1978), 257,259.
47wilson(1975), 4.
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as g enes ' , th en  human sociobiology is the only legitimate science of 
human nature.
There are many intermediate positions available, and all three of the 
scientists quoted in the last paragraph have at times endorsed or at least 
opened the way for a more moderate view of the relationship between innate 
and acquired behavioural traits than may be evident in the quotes above. 
Wilson in On Human Nature does make room for a significant degree of 
learning within the range of effects specified by the genes.^^ Dawkins is 
more accommodating of acquired characteristics, suggesting that learning is 
so prominent in human culture relative to genetic specification that when 
speaking of human social behaviour 'we must begin by throwing out the 
gene as the sole basis of our ideas on evolution'.^^ From the other direction, 
Gould, in a (rare) move towards reconciliation with sociobiologists, writes 
that 'I am willing to admit... our selfish and aggressive urges may have 
evolved by the Darwinian route of individual advantage' and our 'altruistic 
tendencies... may have arisen by the same Darwinian route'.^^ Whatever the 
balance between our experience and our genetic heritage, the stipulation 
remains that sociobiology's success as a science depends on the degree of 
significance of the latter factor. That it is significant at all is thus another 
working assumption of sociobiology that will not be challenged in the 
examination to follow, although others have seen it as a fatal fiaw.^^
As a final remark, recent work in genetics and developmental 
biology shows that the innate/acquired balance is not sufficiently described
e g
in terms of opposing percentages of each, as is often popularly believed. 
Sociobiologists talk of genetically-based 'channels of human mental
48r . Dawkins (1989a), v.
49wilson(1978),ch.2-3.
50r . Dawkins (1989a), 191.
51s. Gould (1978), 265-6.
52e.g. Sahlins (1976); S. Gould (1981); Lewontin, Rose and Kamin (1984).
53Actually, this was realised by some scientists decades ago: e.g. Lehrman (1953); • 
Schneirla(1956); and Mailman (1967).
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development' where 'genes prescribe the capacity to develop a certain array 
of traits', and that array can be narrow or vast.^^ Learning operates within 
the bounds instituted by that array, and so on a different level from the 
function of the genes. Furthermore, studies have shown that during 
development, information from the environment is intimately related with 
gene function: 'Each developmental change is influenced by the interaction 
of genes and environment, and also affects the next stage of this 
interaction'.^^ From this perspective, 100% of human behaviour is 
genetically based (since our channels or capacities for learning are functions 
of our genes), and 100% is environmentally based (since without any 
experience those channels or capacities would remain unexploited). This is 
why such scientists believe the 'acquired' not to be in opposition to the 
'innate'; rather, they are 'cooperating partners'.^^ If this is the correct way 
of looking at the situation, the innate/acquired balance is not adequately 
explained simply by attaching percentages to each element. Indispensable to 
the explanation is the issue of the relative broadness or narrowness of the 
channels and capacities specified by the genes, and thus the range over 
which learning can effectively operate. This in turn must be taken together 
with the intricate interactions which occur during development.^^ This 
understanding of the relationship between the innate and the acquired should 
therefore be understood as sociobiology is presented with the stipulation that 
genetic considerations be significant in the explanation of behavioural 
variation in humans.
Wilson (1978), 56. See also Waddington (1957); R. Dawkins (1982), ch.2; and 
Maynard Smith (1988), ch.9.
^^Bamett (1988), 114. See also Barnett and Dickson (1984) and references therein.
Gould and Marier (1987). See also Bateson (1976); R. Dawkins (1981); M. Dawkins 
(1986), ch.4; and Ruse (1989), 164-6.
^^Many works still do use percentages, i.e. Plomin, et al (1990); and Loehlin (1992). 
However, most of them use wording that allows them to accept the co-operation of the 
innate and acquired described above. Plomin et al find that certain bchaviuural traits will 
appear in offspring of parents with those traits 40-60% of the time. Loehlin believes that 
certain behavioural differences between individuals can be traced to genetic differences 
30-40% of the time.
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c. Free will vs. determinism
Regardless of where the balance lies regarding the importance of the 
environment and the genes to human psychology, one must still deal with 
the issue of whether and to what extent both of these considerations together 
constrain our behaviour. Sociobiologists are far from unified, or clear, in 
their explanation of their positions on this perennial issue, although 
opponents to sociobiology often characterise them uniformly as 'biological 
determinists'.^^ The two most prominent popularisers of sociobiology, 
Wilson and Dawkins, both vary when describing their positions on this 
issue, but neither of them can be branded as a strict determinist except on a 
very selective reading. It is true that both Wilson and Dawkins use 
metaphorical language that neglects the capacity for individual 
decisionmaking and leaves no room for opposition to genetically based 
tendencies. Wilson says of genes that 'the individual organism is only their 
vehicle, part of an elaborate device to preserve and spread them with the 
least possible biochemical perturbation'.^^ Dawkins in the same spirit calls 
us 'survival machines' and 'robots' .Vehicles, devices, machines and 
robots obviously do not have any power to act against the purpose for which 
they were built by deciding to do so. Nor can they act for ends which they 
have chosen regardless of their predispositions. These metaphors, therefore, 
must be seen to have very limited applicability, for both Wilson and 
Dawkins believe that human beings can do those things. Wilson says 
plainly that 'people have free will and the choice to turn in many 
directions',^^ and that in cases where we 'are forced to choose among the 
elements of human nature' but find them irrelevant in today's world, we can
58Allen, E., et al. (1976); S. Gould (1978), ch. 30, 32; Lewontin, Rose and Kamin (1984). 
59wilson(1975),3.
^®R. Dawkins (1989a), v, 19-20.
^Iwilson (1994), 332.
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break away from them 'through an exercise of will'.^^ Because of this 
phenomenon, he is led to postulate that 'individual free will probably will 
remain forever invulnerable'.^^ These statements may be less deterministic 
than usual for Wilson,^^ but they exemplify the fact that a variety of 
■positions regarding this issue are possible among sociobiologists. Dawkins 
uses less deterministic language than Wilson on the whole, repeatedly 
urging us to rebel against our genetic tendencies: 'We have the power to 
defy the selfish genes of our birth... we have the power to turn against our 
creators. We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish 
replicators.'^^ Although some have found in this a blatant contradiction,^^ 
the sociobiologists disagree:
'I think that Rose and his colleagues are accusing us of eating 
our cake and having it. Either we must be "genetic 
determinists" or we believe in "free will"; we cannot have it 
both ways. But- and here I presume to speak to Professor 
Wilson as well as for myself— it is only in the eyes of Rose 
and his colleagues that we are "genetic determinists". What 
they don't understand (apparently, though it is hard to credit) 
is that it is perfectly possible to hold that genes exert a 
statistical influence on human behaviour while at the same 
time believing that this influence can be modified, overriden 
or reversed by other influences... We, that is our brains, are 
separate and independent enough from our genes to rebel 
against them. As already noted, we do so in a small way 
every time we use contraception. There is no reason why we 
should not rebel in a large way, too.'^^
With this moderate position allowable within sociobiology, there is no need 
to discuss the free will/determinism issue any further in this context. 
Sociobiologists need not be, and the most prominent are not, opposed to the 
concept of free will. The only stipulation for the operation of sociobiology
62wilson (1978), 196.
63wilson (1980), 28.
^M ore deterministic passages are (1975), 3-4; (1978), 167; and (1990), 253.
Dawkins (1989a), 201.
^^Stent (1979); Flew (1984), 118-9; Lewontin, Rose and Kamin (1984). 
67r . Dawkins (1989a), 331-2.
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is that 'free will' cannot be taken to mean the absence of any involuntary 
tendencies towards certain behaviours. For sociobiology to be a legitimate 
discipline, there must be predisposition. Free will, when postulated at all, 
cannot be represented as the abolishment of predisposition, but rather as the 
possibility that predispositions can be overruled.
d. Addptationism
A fourth issue, and the last to be discussed here, that looms large in 
discussions of sociobiology, is to what extent psychological/behavioural 
traits are relevant to survival, such that genetic information specifying a 
given trait will tend either to proliferate or to decline in a population because 
o f that relevance. As this is sometimes phrased, to what extent are these 
traits 'targets of natural selection'? In Stephen Jay Gould's words, 'Must all 
features of organisms be viewed as adaptations?'^^ Darwin realised that he 
may have begged this question in The Origin o f Species:
'I had not formerly sufficiently considered the existence of 
many structures which appear to be, as far as we can judge, 
neither beneficial nor injurious; and this I believe to be one 
of the greatest oversights as yet detected in my work.'
Insofar as one believes that features must be viewed as adaptations, one 
adheres to adaptationism.
It has been established, however, that there are other ways in which 
traits proliferate in a population. One is 'genetic dr if t ' ,where the (usually 
geographic) isolation of a small group can result in a straying of genetic 
information away from that which was the average in the larger parent 
population. For instance, if a group of turtles which happened to have a 
relatively high incidence of a certain heritable feature floated on rafts of
Gould (1980a), 16.
69Darwin (1871), 152.
?0s. Wright (1932); (1959); Mayr (1942), 237. Mayr warns against an overuse of this 
idea, however, in (1982), 555.
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debris to an island previously unpopulated with turtles from which they 
could not escape, over the generations the turtles on that island would 
continue to have that feature more often than turtles on the mainland, unless 
of course the feature was harmful to them.
Inbreeding, and breeding in populations where individuals generally 
breed with close neighbours and rarely move far away, will also cause 
certain traits to become common in a population without their being 
adaptive. Another commonly discussed way is by what Darwin called the 
'principle of correlation',^^ and what is now split into two variants. 
Chromosomal linkage describes the relationship between genes on a 
chromosome whereby they tend to be inherited together.^^ Pleiotropy 
describes the situation where one gene or gene complex affects more than 
one trait. The commonality between these two concepts is that one trait will 
regularly accompany another. Darwin noticed 'quite whimsical' examples of 
this: 'cats with blue eyes are invariably deaf... hairless dogs have imperfect 
teeth... pigeons with feathered feet have skin between their outer toes'.^^ In 
a case where two traits are specified by a pleiotropic gene, for example, and 
one is beneficial whereas the other is neutral or even slightly harmful 
('slightly' relative to the benefit of the other trait), the latter trait will still 
tend to proliferate in a population over the generations, because it has 
'hitch-hiked' on the advantage bestowed by the former trait.
A concept which, if appropriate to social behaviour, could function 
as an alternative to adaptationism is what might be called 'multifunctional 
traits'. Screwdrivers were invented for a particular purpose, but are often 
used to do such varied tasks as opening paint cans, removing bicycle tyres 
and bypassing ignition switches. Likewise, some features of organisms
?lDarwin(1871), 130-1, 151.
^^Note: This is not always the case; a phenomenon known as crossing over* results in 
chromosomes being split into portions.
73Darwin(1859), 11-12.
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which were initially adaptive in one capacity may be exploited in ways 
completely unrelated to their initial advantage. This is not necessarily a 
departure from adaptationism, but in the realm of behaviour it often is. One 
writer has proposed that
'Man's large brain was doubtless developed originally 
because it was an advantage to him to make and use tools, to 
reason about environmental conditions, and so on. But the 
mental capacities that were developed for these purposes 
could then be used in other way s'.
Social behaviours could be traits which are capable of being exhibited by a 
brain which had evolved to its present level of complexity on other bases. In 
this way, social behaviours would be common without being adaptive. On 
the other hand, both sociobiologists and their critics agree that 
sociobiological explanations are explanations in terms of a social 
behaviour's adaptiveness.^^ Since there are other ways in which these traits 
may become established in a population besides their being beneficial to 
survival, the sociobiologist is not immune to scrutiny on this point. No 
assumption is possible here without begging the question. Each time a 
sociobiologist claims a social behaviour to have arisen because of its 
adaptive value, that claim must be accompanied by evidence of that value. 
Hereafter, this issue will not be raised as long as this stipulation is 
respected.^^
Sociobiology, then, is the study of the biological basis of social 
behaviours, where that basis is explained in terms of the genetic 
specification of those behaviours. Two working assumptions in the field are
^^Rachels (1990), 59. This point is often made; e.g. Ayala (1987) and S. Gould (1988), 
122.
75Wilson (1975), 4,21-2; Alexander (1979); S. Gould and Lewontin (1979); Trivers
(1985); S. Gould (1988), 30-31; Ruse (1989), 161-2
'^A general discussion about adaptation is M. Dawkins (1986), ch.l. Critical assessment 
of alternatives to adaptationism is provided more fully in Dobzhansky et al. (1977); 
Lewontin (1978); S. Gould (1980a); Prov ine  (1985); and Cronin (1991), ch.4. Criticism 
of sociobiological adaptationism can be found in S. Gould and Lewontin (1979); and S. 
Gould (1988), ch.2,7.
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the continuity between humans and other animals by virtue of our common 
evolutionary history and genetic makeup; and the significance of the role of 
genetic makeup relative to that of the environment in shaping social 
behaviour. Furthermore, sociobiology does not necessitate any kind of 
determinism of human behaviour. Lastly, although sociobiology is not 
theoretically constrained to adaptationism, the discipline most often 
proceeds by explaining traits in terms of their adaptive value.
2. SURVIVAL OF THE ALTRLfiST
a. The paradox o f altruism
The 'central theoretical problem of socipbiology'^^ is also the 
problem whose solution has led to the naturalist meta-ethic which will be 
discussed in this chapter. This problem can be fi-amed in terms of a paradox. 
Natural selection operates in such a way that organisms with self-destructive 
genes will not be preserved. An entity is altruistic, biologically speaking, 
insofar as it 'behaves in such a way as to increase another such entity's 
welfare at the expense of its own';^^ therefore, altruism is self-destructive 
behaviour. The paradox arises as one realises that the natural world is 
replete with examples of altruism. Ground squirrels give alarm calls which 
render the one giving the alarm more conspicuous to the predator. Reed 
buntings spend inordinate time and energy raising babies of cuckoos.^^ 
Dwarf mongooses often baby-sit for nonrelatives.® ^  Vampire bats share 
food in times of shortage.®^ Wolves exercise restraint in fights with each 
other. ®^  Olive baboons and stickleback fish arrange themselves into
77wilson (1975), 3;
78r . Dawkins (1989a), 4. 
79Dunford (1977).
^^Davies and Brooke (1991). 
8lRood(1978).
82wilkinson (1984). 
83Lorenz(1964), 186-9.
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alliances where others will come to the aid of one in trouble.®^ And, most 
significantly, humans have that 'peculiar institution'®^ known as morality, 
whereby we often feel or think that we ought to do things which place 
concern for self second to that for others. Given the assumption behind 
sociobiology that behaviours have arisen because of their adaptive value, 
and the bias towards self-preservation inherent in natural selection, one 
would expect altruistic creatures not to persist in nature. Why, then, is this 
not the case?
b. Attempted solution: group selection
Some have thought that an explanation for altruism could lie on a 
level of natural selection that is other than the genetic. These scientists have 
thought that 'adaptations could be for the good, not of the individual, but of 
the group or population or species or some other level higher than the 
individual'.®^ Although through the 1960's the view was popular,®^ other 
writers have claimed that in most cases it was 'the woolly world view of
oo
some early work in ecology that fuelled this episode in Darwinian theory'.®® 
In a search for holism in biological science, ecologists saw no reason to 
refrain from postulating natural selection on any level of the hierarchy of 
life: the family, the population, the species, even the biosphere. As the role 
in evolution of replicating genetic information became clearer to the 
scientific community, the realisation grew that there was no such replicator 
at the level of the group, and so it seemed that 'group selection' was not 
possible. This realisation was fostered by the work of George C. Williams
84packer(1977); Milinski (1987).
85a  phrase used by B. Williams (1985), ch. 10. He does not relate morality to altruism or 
sociobiology, however. For him the 'peculiarity' is the sense of obligation; here it is the 
contradiction between morality and natural selection.
86cronin (1991), 275.
8?E.g. Allee (1938); (1951); Allee et al (1949); Emerson (1960); Wynne-Edwards 
(1962); (1963); (1964).
^8cronin (1991), 278.
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and David Lack, both of whom wrote in vehement opposition to the group 
selection theory of V. C. Wynne-Edwards.®^ This debate has continued into 
recent years.^^ The suggestion has been made that 'the assumption that 
selection almost invariably centres on the individual is crucial to the theories 
and conclusions of the sociobiologists'.^^ Whether or not this is the case, 
group selection is not generally a part of sociobiologists' resolutions of the 
paradox of altruism, and so hereafter it will be ignored.^^
(
c. Solution part 1: kin selection
Sociobiologists have not found much difficulty in developing 
mechanisms for altruism apart fi'om the idea that natural selection might 
favour a healthy group in its own right. In fact, the hypothesis that a 
phenomenon known as kin selection might be widespread in nature 
paralleled the realisation that genetic material was the basis for natural 
selection. The two consecutive papers written in 1964 by William Hamilton 
which first thoroughly explain this idea have been said to be 'among the
QO
most important contributions to social ethology ever written'.^
89williams (1966), esp. 92-124; Lack (1966). See also Maynard Smith (1964).
90 Wynne-Edwards recanted in 1978. In the words of Richard Dawkins: 'Magnanimous 
these second thoughts may have been, but unfortunately he has had third ones: his latest 
book re-recants' (R. Dawkins (1989a), 297). For another group selectionist, see Wade 
(1976) and (1977), although he criticises prior models of group selection in (1978). Other 
discussions are Maynard Smith (1976); Hull (1981); Grafen D984); R. Dawkins (1982), 
81-117; (1986), 128-38,265-9; (1989a), ch.7; Cronin (1991), ch. 12.
9lRuse(1980), 34.
92part of the problem of group selection stems from two facts: first, some use the term 
liberally, even to represent levels of selection that ultimately rely on the gene. See, for 
example, Wilson (1975), ch.5. Second, even ardent anti-group selectionists are beginning 
to allow for higher-level selection in certain circumstances. For instance, certain groups 
may be better at evolving than others, which would create a second-order natural selection 
of groups (R. Dawkins (1989); Cronin (1991), 289-91). Several writers have also noticed 
that reciprocal altruism (q.v.) brings about distinctiveness in the gene pool of a close-knit 
group, which would allow for one group to be more likely to persist than another (Mackie 
H978); Singer (1981), 19ff; R. Dawkins (1981)).
^^Hamilton (1964). The quote is from R. Dawkins (1989a), 90. Among the other places 
where kin selection is described are: Wilson (1975), ch.5; Singer (1981), ch.l; M. 
Dawkins (1986), ch.3; R. Dawkins (1989a), ch.6-8; Cronin (1991), ch.l 1-13; Mark 
Ridley (1995), ch.lO.
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The only reason why natural selection as it has been described here 
tends to preserve one organism over another is because there is a certain 
advantage to be gained from an organism having a specific genetic makeup. 
However, in situations where more than one individual have a similar 
genetic makeup, natural selection can occur as long as any individual with 
the relevant genetic makeup gains the advantage. When a gene is 
advantageous, it tends to persist in a population in whatever organism 
possesses that gene. This means that if a parent possesses what in some way 
is an advantageous genome, that parent's offsprinjg will tend to possess a 
similarly advantageous genome as well, for offspring possess their parents' 
genes. The genetic material of a parent who did not take care of its offspring 
would obviously not survive through the generations, because a crucial way 
for an organism's genes to persist is in the form of offspring. However, and 
this is where kin selection becomes relevant, offspring are not the only way 
in which an organism's gènes can persist. That organism had parents of its 
own, and those parents had parents, all sharing genes. At each fork in the 
family tree, any offspring will share a certain percentage of their genes with 
each other because they share the same parents. This is why siblings have 
more similar characteristics than cousins, which have more similar 
characteristics than second cousins. Theoretically, two siblings could differ 
completely from each other, if each were bequeathed with entirely different 
genes from each other. Just as improbably, two siblings might share all of 
the same genes, and thus not differ at all. Understandably, then, siblings 
will on average share the mean percentage between these extremes, or 50%, 
of their genes. Following the mathematics of relationships between more 
extended kin, nieces and nephews share an average of 25% of their genes 
with their aunts and uncles; and cousins share an average of 12.5% of their 
genes with each other. This is the basis for the light-hearted comment of J.
B. S. Haldane that he would find it worthwhile to save two siblings or eight
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cousins from drowning;^^ for this many of each kin type would possess, on 
average, 100% of his genes. So, as far as natural selection is concerned, 
there is no distinction made between one individual and eight of his cousins.
On this model, natural selection could even favour self-sacrifice. 
Take, for example, a colony of bees, any of which will die after delivering a 
sting. An individual protecting the nest is effectively protecting many times 
its own genes, for all of the members of the colony share genes. If a bee is 
genetically predisposed to react by freeing when the nest is attacked, that bee 
will survive but its nest may not; in which case, many others with that bee's 
genes who are still in the nest will perish, and with them will perish the 
genetic predisposition to flee an attack. On the other hand, if a bee stings 
the attacker of a nest, that bee will die, but the nest will stand a better chance 
of survival. Since the nest contains so many relatives, and thus so many 
times the individual's genetic information, the net result is that all of those 
survivors will live to reproduce, passing along that genetic predisposition to 
sting an attacker of the nest.
Some have raised the objection at this point that 'fractions are of very 
rare occurrence in the world's languages... I refrain from comment on the 
even greater problem of how animals are supposed to figure out' the 
percentage of genes they share with others.^^ This is an ill-conceived 
objection, for there is nothing in the model of kin selection that necessitates 
that animals know the percentage of genes they share with others. The fact 
of the matter is that if their genes predispose them to save their kin to a 
certain extent, then they will tend to survive longer than those who do not. 
The bees need not actually know that they share genes, or how much they 
share; they need only effectively show certain behaviours in certain 
circumstances. Richard Dawkins makes this point:
94Haldane (1932); (1955). 
95sahlins (1976).
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'A snail shell is an exquisite logarithmic spiral, but where 
does the snail keep its log tables; how indeed does it read 
them, since the lens in its eye lacks "linguistic support" for 
calculating m, the coefficient of refraction? How do green 
plants "figure out" the formula of chlorophyll?'^^
Still, an organism needs to have some cue that there are kin about, in order 
to be able to behave differently from when there are not (there would be no 
evolutionary advantage for a bee to defend a nest that wasn't its own). Such 
differentiation is made in various ways. Familiar cues for kin among 
animals include specific odours (cue=I smell someone familiar), specific 
locations (cue=I am around the home), or specific sounds (cue=I hear 
familiar buzzes or grunts). The way in which paper wasps determine 
whether there are kin about is by the detection with their antennae of certain 
chemicals present on the external surface of others. If these chemicals are 
removed, a wasp will not be able to distinguish a foreign individual from a 
nestmate.^^ When an organism possesses any such means of distinguishing 
kin from non-kin, kin selection is possible. Much work has been done in 
determining means of kin recognition, including among humans.^®
d. Solution part 2: reciprocal altruism
Kin selection cannot be the only solution to the paradox of altruism, 
for many instances of altruism in nature do not involve relatives. The 
common phrase 'you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours' is often used to 
characterise the second model which has contributed to a solution of the 
paradox of altruism; perhaps a more accurate representation would be 'I 
scratch your back and hope that you'll scratch mine'. Following Haldane's 
talk of rescuing drowning people, Robert Trivers in 1971 suggested that he
96R Dawkins (1979). Eleven other possible misunderstandings of kin selection are also 
dealt with in this paper.
^^Singer and Espel (1992).
^^chagnon and Irons, ed. (1979); Fletcher and Michener, ed. (1987); Barnard (1991); 
Hepper (1991).
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would find it worthwhile to rescue a drowning person in the hope that the 
favour might be returned at some time in the fiiture.^^ Of course, all of this 
talk is metaphorical, and refers to the fact that natural selection favours 
co-operation in certain circumstances. The political scientist Robert 
Axelrod has most fully developed this theory, along with William 
Hamilton.
It is obvious in certain cases that two individuals would tend to 
survive more often if they engaged in a programme of mutual aid than if 
they acted alone, in hunting or defence for example. The question which 
Trivers, Axelrod and Hamilton attempted to solve, however, is how such 
co-operation could have evolved, for it seems that the most advantageous 
situation for an organism's genes would be for that organism to receive aid 
and then never return the favour. In other words, cheating is more profitable 
than fairness in co-operation.^Axelrod found, however, that this would 
not be the case in social animals, when individuals are likely to meet each 
other many times throughout their lives and have the opportunity to 
withdraw help fi’om those who are disposed to cheat. If x cheats y  and z, 
natural selection would favour y, who ceased helping x in the future, over z, 
who continually gave aid to x without any favours being returned. In this 
illustration, x is called a 'cheat', y  a 'grudger', and z a 'sucker'. Natural 
selection among those disposed to aid others (i.e., non-cheats) will therefore 
favour a grudger over a sucker. Moreover, if (and only if) there are enough 
grudgers about, a cheat vrill eventually suffer because of a difficulty in 
finding others to aid him in times of trouble. The grudgers and suckers in
^^Trivers (1971). See also Trivers (1985), 361-94.
Axelrod and Hamilton (1981); Axelrod (1984), esp. 88-105. It is also discussed in 
Wilson (1975), ch.5; Singer (1981), ch.l; M. Dawkins (1986), ch.3; R. Dawkins (1989a), 
ch .9 ,10; Cronin (1991), ch.l 1,14; Mark Ridley (1995), ch.lO.
^®^The analysis that leads to this conclusion has been well-established, thanks to a model 
often used in game theory known as the Prisoner's Dilemma. In this model, two prisoners 
awaiting sentence for a jointly committed crime must independently decide whether to 
confess (cheat) for a lighter sentence, or remain silent (co-operate). If each looks out for 
his own interest, both will confess rather than co-operate. See, e.g. Gauthier, ed. (1970).
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the population, on the other hand, will continue to aid each other (for the 
grudgers only grudge those who cheat them). Thus, as long as a critical 
percentage of the co-operators in a population tend to be grudgers rather 
than suckers when they are cheated, co-operation will be adaptive, and those 
who do not reciprocate will tend to die out before those who do.
Two issues become important at this point. First, how does a 
population reach the level of grudgers necessary for reciprocal altruism to 
work? For otherwise, the cheats will continually dominate the population. 
Axelrod has postulated several properties which he believes could work 
towards the establishment of grudging, including a penchant for retaliation 
against cheats. In addition, kin selection might operate in certain groups 
until sufficient co-operation occurred for reciprocal altruism to take root. 
Still another possibility is that a population without reciprocation will not be 
as successful as one with it, and so a sort of group selection could result in 
the success of small groups with sufficient grudgers. A second issue is 
analogous to the kin recognition problem: there must be a way for 
organisms to recognise fellow reciprocators and avoid cheats. The solution 
to this problem is also analogous to that of kin recognition. As Helena 
Cronin writes,
'they don't need a highly developed brain, or any brain at all, 
to manage this; as we noted with kin selection, any 
functional equivalent to intelligent discrimination will do. It 
could be constant contact between two mutually dependent 
species, such as a hermit crab and its sea-anemone partner, 
or it could be a unique meeting place, such as the reliable 
locations adopted by fish that need their parasites removed 
and those that remove them.' ^
As social interactions become more advanced, however, and a creature is 
likely to relate with several others, memory will become more important. If 
creatures in a community cannot remember whether and which individuals
102cronin(1991), 259.
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cheated yesterday, they will not be able to respond appropriately by 
grudging today. Therefore cheats will flourish and reciprocation will 
eventually fail in that community.
e. Solution part 3: manipulated altruism
Altruism is seen in nature in still other circumstances, where neither 
relatives nor reciprocation is involved. Neither kin selection nor reciprocal 
altruism can explain such cases, but a third factor can explain at least some 
of them: manipulated altruism. Genetic information that specifies 
behaviour that is advantageous to a certain individual does not have to 
produce the behaviour in that individual. The situation could, on the other 
hand, be such that a behaviour is elicited in another individual, even of 
another species.. An obvious example is the familiar 'eye-spots' of 
butterflies, which tend to elicit a behaviour of avoidance in predators who 
automatically associate large eyes with a large body. A more 
straightforwardly altruistic example of genetic material in one creature 
eliciting behaviour in another is that of the cuckoo. This bird lays its 
eggs in the nests of other birds, such as the reed bunting. The larger cuckoo 
baby takes up most of the time and energy of the mother bunting, who 
attempts fi-antically to feed it as though it were her own offspring. This is a 
case of one creature taking advantage (unconsciously, of course) of the drive 
of the mother to take care of the young in her nest. The bright red throat and 
the loud calls of the cuckoo are thought to be the factors which allow this 
manipulator to 'inject its c o n t r o l ' i n t o  the bunting. Such trickery, or 
manipulated altruism, will continue in nature as long as the benefits to the 
manipulator outweigh the costs to the manipulated.
lO^Davies and Brooke (1991).
Dawkins (1982), 227.
 ^^ ^Manipulated altruism is a favoured subject of Richard Dawkins in The Extended 
Phenotype (1982), 54-5,67-70,226-7,233,247. It is also discussed in M. Dawkins (1986), 
ch.3; Cronin (1991), 261-4.
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3. THE NATURE OF BIOLOGICAL ALTRUISM
Although other models may explain other ways in which altruism 
could persist in nature, these three examples are the most commonly 
cited. A simple and fundamental fact of evolutionary biology is that 
genetic information which is responsible for behaviours will tend not to 
survive if those behaviours are a net liability to that genetic information (this 
is the point of Dawkins's claim that genes are 'selfish'). The mistaken belief 
that this fact about genetic information can be equally well said about the 
organism exhibiting the behaviour has led to the so-called 'paradox of 
altruism'. On the contrary, the kin selection and manipulated altruism 
models show that although a specific piece of genetic information may 
flourish because of a certain behaviour, the particular organism performing 
the behaviour may suffer, or even die, as a result. Another mistaken belief 
that contributes to the notion of a 'paradox of altruism' is that the benefits 
which behaviours facilitate must be immediate. The reciprocal altruism 
model shows that when creatures act in a sufficiently close relationship with 
each other, benefits of behaviours can often come later in the future; and, 
the genetic information which specifies such behaviours will persist over the 
generations because of those delayed benefits.
The definition for 'altruism' as it has been discussed here is, again, 
behaviour of one organism that 'increase[s] another such entity's welfare at 
the expense of its own'. A conventional dictionary definition of 
altruism, on the other hand, might read, 'unselfish regard for or devotion to 
the welfare of others'. A crucial distinction between the two definitions
Another concept which might partially explain the persistence of altruism in nature is 
'heterozygote superiority'. This controversial idea is described in Thompson, ed. (1995), 
33-35.
Dawkins (1989a), 4.
^^^Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary^ 1980 ed.
Chapter III 177
reflects a distinction between the biological notion of'altruism' and the 
concept as it is often used in ordinary l^guage. This distinction is between 
effect and intention. The biological concept of'altruism' refers solely to the 
effect of a certain kind of behaviour, regardless of any intentions. When a 
bee, reed bunting, vampire bat, olive baboon, or human exhibits behaviour 
that expends energy or puts itself at risk whilst at the same time mding 
another creature, such conditions are both necessary and sufficient for 
calling such behaviour altruistic; and the organism an altruist, in the 
biological sense. A human x, for instance, pushes an innocent someone else 
y  from the pavement onto the street, intending for y to be hit by a bus. In 
actuality this does not happen, but in the process y  escapes a mad driver who 
careers down the pavement and collides with x. If altruism is defined only 
in terms of the effect, as it is in sociobiology, x is an altruist. Such 'effective 
altruism', however, clearly contrasts with the 'intentional altruism' of the 
conventional definition. Given x's intentions, he could hardly be called 
'devoted to the welfare of others'. 'Intentional altruism' requires devotion on 
the part of the individual to the cause of the welfare of others. Assuming 
that an intentional altruist could speak, he should be able to say vrith honesty 
'I know that this action I am performing benefits someone else, and I am 
doing it for that reason'. Altruistic behaviour in this conventional sense 
might, in actuality, benefit oneself as well. However, in order to be 
altruistic, the intention behind the action must be that someone else be 
benefited, rather than oneself. An action is intentionally altruistic if the 
person performing it is doing so out of other-regard rather than 
self-regard. Sociobiology deals not with this kind of altruism, but solely
with effective altruism.
Hepbum (1995) for this opposition of altruism to egoism. For other material on 
(intentional) altruism, see Schweitzer (1965) and T. Nagel (1970).
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With this distinction, this overview of sociobiology and its dealings 
with altruism comes to a close. This introduction to the science was 
necessary in order to facilitate a proper understanding of a certain claim: 
that the material summarised above can serve as an empirical basis for a 
particular meta-ethical theory. That claim has been made and the theory 
most fully developed by the philosopher of science Michael Ruse. This 
theory will be described and criticised in the following sections.
C. Sociobiological Meta-ethics: Description
Ever since its publication, Darwin's Origin o f Species has been seen 
by many to have considerable philosophical implications. One writer in the 
late nineteenth century believed that 'With the one exception of Newton's 
Principia no single book of empirical science has ever been of more 
importance to philosophy than this work of Darwin'.^ In the end of the 
work Darwin himself vaguely spoke of'open fields for far more important 
researches' regarding humans, but referred only to their origin, history, and 
psychology. ^   ^  ^ A dozen years later, he was more specific in his beliefs 
about the relationship between the new evolutionary biology and 
philosophical topics, especially .regarding ethics. Working from his belief 
that humanity's 'moral sense is fundamentally identical with the social 
instincts' which in 'man and the lower animals have no doubt been 
developed by the same steps',^ he briefly sketched an ethical theory he 
believed to be 'advisable' from the standpoint of evolution: 'to take as the 
test of morality, the general good or welfare of the community'.^ His
 ^^®Royce (1892), quoted in Flew (1984), 32. 
lllDarwin(1859), 458.
U2Darwin(1871), 97-8. 
ll^ibid., 98.
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contemporary Herbert Spencer had a different idea; namely, that the 
principle of natural selection should be seen directly as an ethical as well as 
a biological principle, and so 'good conduct' is defined as 'miore evolved 
conduct'. In the one hundred years that followed, several other ideas 
have arisen as to ways in which evolutionary biology could be used to 
explain morality and moral principles. Julian Huxley believed that the 
morality of actions could be judged by their contribution to the progress of 
evolution in general.^ C. H. Waddington sought moral guidelines more 
specifically in the process of human evolution.^ All three of these— 
Spencer, Huxley, and Waddington- have been said to be refuted by the 
arguments provided by David Hume and G. E. Moore which were discussed 
in the last chapter. ^  ^  ^  Whether or not this suggestion is correct (for as has 
been shown,^^® Hume's and Moore's arguments have a specific scope), the 
most prominent evolutionary ethical theories today tend not to connect so 
directly the facts of the evolutionary process and the moral values we ascribe 
to things.^ However, many of theni do agree with Waddington's assertion 
that 'ethics is based on facts of the kind with which science deals'. By 
the definition offered e a r l i e r , i f  one accepts this statement then one is an 
ethical naturalist. If one claims this to be the case not analytically (by virtue 
of either logic or semantics), but rather as a matter of synthetic fact, then one 
is a synthetic naturalist.
1 l^Spcncer (1879). See also (1892).
Huxley (1953).
1 l^Waddington (1960). These and other evolutionary ethical theories are reviewed in 
Hofstadter (1959); Russett (1976); Jones (1980); Richards (1987).
 ^^7see, e.g. Ayala (1987), 304-7. Certain contemporary arguments against their views 
have often been viewed as decisive as well. Against Spencer, there is T. Huxley (1894), 
esp. pp.46-86. Against Julian Huxley and C. H. Waddington there is G. Simpson (1949), 
and even more to the point, (1969); and Dobzhansky (1962); (1973).
118Seech.II.
i  ^^ Probably the three most notable contemporary proponents of evolutionary ethics are: R. 
D. Alexander (1979); (1987); Robert J. Richards (1986); (1987); and Michael Ruse
(1986); (1986a); (1989); (1991); (1995). Their prominence is described in such papers as 
RottschaefTer and Martinsen (1990), 375-6; and Collier and Stingl (1993).
120waddington (1942), 18.
121 See Introduction, and LA.
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One contemporary philosopher of evolutionary biology, Michael 
Ruse, firmly stands in this synthetic naturalist camp, and has produced a 
meta-ethic which he claims to be based on the empirical findings of 
sociobiology. These findings, however, do not only include the models 
for the evolution of biological or effective altruism presented in the last 
section, but also other claims which do the work of linking that information 
with the more meta-ethical premises on which Ruse builds his argument. 
This linkage was provided by the sociobiologist E. O. Wilson.
1. E. O. W IL S O N  AND THE NEW GENEALOGY OF MORALS
The Preface to a recent collection of papers on evolutionary ethics 
says that 'Two watershed dates in this endeavor are 1859 and 1975'.^^^ The 
first, being the publication date of Darwin's Origin o f Species, is 
understandable given the efforts of those who were inspired by it and his 
later works to develop evolutionary theories of ethics. The second date 
marks the publication of Wilson's Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, which 
has directly contributed to its own legacy of evolutionary approaches to 
ethics only with very small portions of the first and last of its twenty-six 
chapters.
Wilson states his vision in the beginning of the book, in a now
well-known passage:
'The biologist, who is concerned with questions of 
physiology and evolutionary history, realizes that 
self-knowledge is constrained and shaped by the emotional 
control centers in the hypothalamus and limbic system of the 
brain. These centers flood our consciousness^ with all the 
emotions- hate, love, guilt, fear, and others— tliat arc 
consulted by ethical philosophers who wish to intuit the 
standards of good and evil. What, we are then compelled to
122rusc (1984); (1986); (1986a); (1991); (1995), ch.8; Ruse and Wilson (1986). 
^^^Thorapson, ed. (1995), ix.
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ask, made the hypothalamus and limbic system? They 
evolved by natural selection. That simple biological 
statement must be pursued to explain ethics and ethical 
philosophers, if not epistemology and epistemologists, at all 
depths.'
This explanation, or as he later calls it, 'biologicization',^^^ is described 
further in several places, such as various points in his treatise On Human 
Nature: 'Human emotional responses and the more general ethical practices 
based on them have been programmed to a substantial degree by natural 
selection over thousands of genera t i ons . ' Thi s  means that 'Morality has 
no other demonstrable ultimate function' than to be one of the many means 
'by which human genetic material has been and will be kept intact'. Any 
additional meaning or purpose to morality, unrelated to biological utility, is 
therefore misconceived. Furthermore, this adaptation is not to the 
environment of our own day. Rather, our moral decisions are choices on the 
basis of'value systems... created in an evolutionary age now long vanished.' 
As a result, just as the realisation that religious beliefs are an idiosyncratic 
biological phenomenon means that 'scientists cannot in all honesty serve as 
priests', the realisation that morality has a similar origin and purpose 
means that we have no reason to take seriously the moral pronouncements of 
the 'merely wise'.^^^ Better ethical guidelines will come from a new belief 
system, which is different from those which have produced our conventional 
ethical norms: 'the mythology of scientific materialism'.
Approaching ethics in the spirit of iconoclasm on the basis of the 
view that morality's origin and purpose is actually the fostering of one's own
124wilson(1975),3.
^25 Wilson (1975), 562. His discussion of ethics continues to p.564.
126wilson (1978), 6 .
127ibid., 167.
128ibid., 193.
129ibid., 7.
UOibid., 209. This belief system is described on pp. 196-209. His programme for the 
'biologicization' of ethics is also discussed in (1980); (1980a); Lumsden and Wilson 
(1983), 175; Ruse and Wilson (1985); (1986).
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interests is nothing new in moral philosophy. The Sophist Callicles, as Plato 
depicts him, claims conventional morality to be an invention of rulers to 
keep slaves under their control. ^  ^  ^  Friedrich Nietzsche, in his Genealogy o f  
Morals, brings judgement on conventional morality because of its origins in 
feelings of resentment among the weaker elements of society.
Moreover, Nietzsche seems to presage sociobiology in his claim that since 
the instincts producing morality are actually 'a self-preservative measure... 
the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism'. ^
Wilson's proposal is importantly different from prior 'genealogies o f 
morals', however. Neither Callicles nor Nietzsche were in a position to offer 
significant empirical evidence for their beliefs. Wilson, however, only 
arrived at his position on ethics after considering the scientific evidence for 
sociobiology and applying its conclusions to humanity, as seemed to him 
appropriate. Wilson found his claims to have enough scientific warrant 
for him, with Michael Ruse, to state confidently that 'ours is an empirical 
position'.
The precise connection between the facts of sociobiology described 
earlier and the ethical claims Wilson makes, can be gleaned from the flow of 
his arguments on the subject. In 'The Morality of the Gene', the telling title 
of the first chapter of Sociobiology, Wilson proceeds directly from 
discussing moral principles and their origin, to a discussion of the 'central 
theoretical problem of sociobiology', that of explaining (biological) 
altruism. Likewise in On Human Nature, a discussion of courageous 
warriors in battle and other human actions which are claimed to be morally
^3 Ipiato, Gorgias, 482-6.
U^Hietzsche (1887). 
i33Nietzsche (1889), no.373.
autobiographical description of his attaining sociobiology and its human 
implications is Wilson (1994), ch. 16-17.
Û jrusc and Wilson (1986), 433.
136wilson (1975), 3-5.
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praiseworthy leads into an explanation of kin selection. The transition
occurs at a precise point in the discussion, in these two sentences:
T doubt if any higher animal, such as an eagle or a lion, has 
ever deserved a Congressional Medal of Honor by the 
ennobling criteria used in our society. Yet minor altruism 
does occur frequently, in forms instantly understandable in 
human terms, and is bestowed not just on offspring but on 
other members of the species as well.'^
It is clear from this statement and others that Wilson is close to Darwin in 
this regard, believing that the morality of humans is fundamentally a growth 
from the altruistic behaviour of animals, and therefore can be explained 
fundamentally in the same terms as that altruistic behaviour.
Wilson's remarks on ethics have been criticised heavily from several 
directions. Some, whose political ideologies apparently contradict Wilson's 
claims, have argued oh the basis of those ideologies. This type of 
criticism will not be discussed here, on the assumption that in order for an 
allegedly empirical theory t to be called into question, either empirical 
evidence must be applied against t, or else it must be shown tliat the 
empirical evidence presented for t is either false or underdetermines the 
range of possible consistent theories. In and of themselves, neither the 
assertion of a political credo nor the demonstration that the credo is 
inconsistent with t does either of these things. ^
Some sociologists have claimed that a cultural relativism rather than 
the belief in a uniform human morality is the empirically justified view.^^^
137wilson (1978), 149-153.
13«ibid., 150.
Lewontin and Levins (1976); Fisk (1984); Lewontin, Rose and Kamin (1984); 
Lewontin (1991); S. Gould defends their political objections in several places, e.g. (1978), 
ch.30, esp. pp.237-9; and (1988), ch.9.
^^Ojhis is not meant to suggest that this is all that is attempted or accomplished by the 
works cited above. Rather, the point is that any arguments against a purportedly empirical 
theory on the basis of a political view will be ignored hereafter.
^4^E.g. Sahlins (1976). Lumsden and Wilson (1981) attempts to take into account cultural 
differences, admitting that 'sociobiology has not taken into proper account... the diversity of 
cultures' (p.ix).
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This criticism will not be discussed here either, but not because this is an 
invalid area for debate. Rather, the significance of cross-cultural 
universals follows fi*om a working assumption accepted earlier for the sake 
of argument, that the genes are significant enough in the formation of human 
attitudes and behaviours for human sociobiology to be a legitimate 
discipline.
Others in the years following Wilson's works cited flaws that more . 
specifically relate to the articulation and defence of his view. Peter Singer 
criticised him for the absence of serious engagement with moral philosophy, 
and the vagueness and scarcity of his argumentation.^^ Roger Trigg 
argued that Wilson failed to support adequately his connection between 
anhhal altruism and human morality. Philip Kitcher divided Wilson's 
project of'biologicizing ethics' into four distinct claims, and accused him of 
equivocation among those claims and a lack of argument for the two most 
ambitious and controversial of them.^^^ Rather than respond to these 
substantially philosophical arguments alone, Wilson worked with the 
philosopher Michael Ruse in such a way that at least some of the 
philosophical shortcomings noticed by the critics could be remedied by the 
latter's argumentation. After a short period of collaborative effort, Wilson 
turned to other p r o j ec t s wh i l s t  Ruse developed the sociobiology-based 
meta-ethic in his own way in a series of papers and books.
2. MICHAEL RUSE'S NATURALISM
l^^Notable in the debate over the significance of cross-cultural moral universals is 
Westermarck's classic (1906), and the opposing view held by Duncker (1939) and Asch 
(1952). A recent way into the discussion is the collection of papers in The Monist 78:1 
(January 1995).
^43see section B.lb.
144singer (1981), ch.3.
145Trigg(1982).
l^^Kitcher (1985), 417-34. A more recent restatement is (1994).
l^^The fruits of the collaboration are Ruse and Wilson (1985); (1986). Since then Wilson
has been best known for his work on biodiversity.
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The central purpose of this chapter is to provide an example of a 
critique of a synthetically naturalistic ethical theory. Although logical and 
semantic forms of naturalism have been thoroughly criticised with such 
tools as the 'is-ought gap' and the 'naturalistic fallacy', synthetic naturalists 
do not claim their theories to be true analytically, that is by logic or the 
meanings of words, which is the type of justification those tools criticise. 
Therefore new tools, or at least old tools modified in important ways, need 
to be developed in order to assess the validity of synthetic naturalism.
In order for this chapter to be successful, then, Michael Ruse's 
meta-ethic must be shown to be a synthetically naturalistic theory. Ruse 
describes the naturalism to which he adheres in the beginning of his most 
recent book. Evolutionary Naturalism:
'For me, "naturalism" is something to do with nature, 
meaning the world of experience, and since the most 
powerfully successful approach that we have to this world— 
the only true approach that we have towards real 
understanding— is the metliod of science, I take a naturalist to 
be someone who would understand through the methods and 
results of science... Naturalism for me, therefore, means 
trying to understand through empirical law. This means that 
you have got to appeal to experience— you cannot just think 
things through a priori— and, without wanting to make this 
sound altogether too much like the Thirty-nine Articles, I 
believe that there are certain general rules which people have 
discovered and perfected to ensure that the understanding 
through law is as reliable and solid as is possible to fallible 
mortals, given the scope and limits of what is known at that
Among the 'general rules' of which he speaks, one of his personal favourites 
is
'the attempt to explain as much as possible by as little as 
possible, especially explanation involving the unification of 
two or more hitherto disparate areas of understanding
148rusc (1995), 1-2.
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beneath one or a few high-level hypotheses or established 
laws.'^^^
His description o f  naturalism' accords with that used in this thesis; namely, 
that a particular realm of enquiry is properly understood as dealing only with 
principles, properties and terms that are accessible to science. Therefore 
Ruse is a naturalist in a broad philosophical sense. With respect to ethics, he 
is consistent in his naturalism:
'...the philosopher as naturalist must move beyond the Values 
inherent in science and turn to the broader question of moral 
and social values... Fortunately, thanks to recent advances in 
the science, we can now see that it is only by taking an 
evolutionary approach to human nature that we can hope to 
solve some of the most pressing questions of traditional 
ethics.'^
He goes on to provide detailed support for his 'evolutionary based 
ethics',^ by which he means an ethics based on the science of evolutionary 
biology (especially sociobiology) as it has been presented in this chapter. 
Therefore, he is a naturalist in the ethical sense in particular. That he is a 
synthetic naturalist, rather than a logical or semantic, is shown by his above 
rejection of the a priori, together with the absence in his work of any claim 
that moral terms can either be logically derived or defined in terms of 
nonmoral terms. In fact, he argues against this in several p l a c e s . H i s  
belief, rather, is that 'on the basis of factual theory about the nature and 
process of evolution, you can provide a total explanation of morality'. In
149ibid., 2.
150ibid., 9. 
l^libid.
152ibid., Partin.
153rusc (1986), 227-8; (1989), 254; (1991), 501; (1995), 230-1. 
154rusc (1986a), 256.
Chapter III 187
the words of Ruse and Wilson, 'The time has come to turn moral philosophy 
into an applied science'.
3. RUSE'S DEFENCE OF ETHICAL SCEPTICISm I^ô
Although the sociobiological approach to ethics was introduced in 
terms of E. O. Wilson, and although he worked with Ruse in the beginning 
stages of the latter's philosophical development of the position, there are 
important differences between their views. Among these are the degree to 
which our genes control our behaviour (Ruse claims to be less deterministic 
than Wilson^ the issue of whether evolution is progressive (Ruse being 
more opposed to this than W i l s o n ^ a n d ,  perhaps most significantly, the 
question of whether ethical imperatives can be derived from our biological 
nature (Ruse answering in the negative and Wilson in the positive^ . So, 
although Wilson has worked with Ruse on the support for the linkage 
between sociobiology and meta-ethics. Ruse's meta-ethic is his alone.
Ruse believes that an attention to morality and to the facts of 
sociobiology yields an 'error theory'. More specifically, an attention to 
sociobiological facts provides an explanation of why we believe what we do 
regarding morality, as well as a basis for the assertion that all of these beliefs 
are false.
l^^Ruse and Wilson (1986), 421. Note: Although this does reveal synthetic naturalism, 
such a drastic claim is not required by synthetic naturalism; in fact, many synthetic 
naturalists believe that it is our best science together with our best moral philosophy that 
will produce a proper meta-ethic (e.g. Sturgeon (1988)). The requirement is that the moral 
philosophy not utilise any principles, properties or terms that cannot also be employed in 
science.
^^^After reading this section and the subsequent critical analysis. Prof. Ruse endorsed this 
description of his view as indeed his own, and suggested that he be quoted here as saying 
that 'almost uniquely you seem to have got my position right. (3 September 1997). 
157Ruse(1995), 158-9.
^^^ibid., ch.4 and pp.230-1; c.f. Wilson (1975), e.g. 379, 382.
159rus6 (1995), 229; c.f. Wilson (1980); (1984).
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Morality, on Ruse's view, possesses certain distinguishing 
characteristics. First among them is the feeling of obligation, or a peculiar 
emotional draw towards certain things and away from other things. This can 
be called the prescriptivity of morality. Second is an 'sài of 
objectivity ',^w hich for Ruse includes the senses that such prescription is 
universal, or applicable to anyone in a similar situation, and also that the 
foundations for these claims that are external to the will of the subject, or 
nonsubjective. These characterisations of morality are not unreasonable, 
and are regularly cited by meta-ethicists as aspects inherent in morality.
It is widely believed that an ethical theory which dispenses with any of these 
features is to that extent revisionist, and must provide an explanation for 
why we tend to think the contrary. ^
Ruse believes that an attention to scientific facts as they are 
presented in sociobiology can yield an understanding of why such 
prescriptivity, universality and nonsubjectivity are a part of moral 
judgement, as well as a realisation that these features are actually misleading 
us. His argument proceeds as follows:
PI : Strategies for co-operative behaviours have evolved in certain 
creatures because of their adaptive value.
P2: Strategies for behaviours which have evolved because of their 
adaptive value must achieve behaviours.
I^Orusc (1984), 173-4; (1986), 227-30; (1986a), 221-2; (1989), 263-9; (1991), 502-3; 
(1995), 245; Ruse and Wilson (1986), 431-2.
l 6 lRuse (1984), 190-2; (1986), 235-6; (1986a), 253; (1989), 268-9; (1991), 506-7; (1995), 
241; Ruse and Wilson (1986), 431-2. Hereafter only one citation per point will be 
provided, although each of the most significant points may be found in most or all of these 
seven sources.
 ^ Among those who have argued that one or more of these are inherent in moral 
judgement are: Moore (1922), ch. 10; Prichard (1937), 94-5; Frankena (1973), 100; 
Mackie (1977), 35,52; Hare (1981), ch.6; MacIntyre (1981), ch.2; Carson (1984), 26; 
Smith (1994a), 39-40; Blackburn (1984), 187-9; (1988); (1995). 
l^^see II.D.3.
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P3: A belief in moral (prescriptive, universal and nonsubjective) 
guidelines has evolved in humans because it achieves behaviours in line 
with the co-operative strategy.
P4: It is practically impossible, and at any rate irrelevant, for a belief 
in moral guidelines to have evolved because of its adaptive value, and at the 
same time for that belief to be true.
C: Moral guidelines are an (adaptive) illusion, and our belief in them
false.
PI: Strategies for co-operative behaviours have evolved in certain 
creatures because o f their adaptive value.
This premise may be called the 'sociobiological foundation', for it is 
precisely the conclusion of sociobiology. Support for this point has been 
described in the first half of this chapter, most notably in the work of G. C. 
Williæns, W. D. Hamilton, Robert Trivers, E. O. Wilson, Richard Dawkins, 
and Robert Axelrod. Ruse argues that sociobiology is not a new paradigm, 
but is an integral part of Darwinism, and should be accepted together with 
the more long-standing elements such as natural selection itself He was 
convinced of the irrelevance of most criticisms of sociobiology long before 
he even thought that it was relevant to ethics; and is generally confident 
that the success of the science will continue, although he states this claim 
with caution.
Regarding the adaptive nature of co-operative behaviour. Ruse 
claims that
'Behaviour is a function of the genes as sorted by natural 
selection, and it succeeds and is preserved because it confers 
adaptive advantage on possessors... Human thought and 
behaviour- particularly, human social thought and
l^Ruse(1987). 
165rus6 (1979). 
166Ruse(1989), ch.7.
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behaviour— results from and must be related to biologically 
rooted adaptive advantage'. ^
Therefore, Ruse is a thorough adaptationist. Also, he finds empirical 
successes in the sociobiology of culture in both directions: behaviours with 
adaptive value being translated into cultural values (e.g. incest taboos), and 
cu ltu ^  values being translated into behaviours with adaptive value (e.g. 
traditions of paying for brides). With regard to co-operation, he cites 
both kin selection and reciprocation as strategies which are adaptive and 
able to produce such behaviour. This behaviour he labels 'altruism' (in 
quotes), which is a 'technical biological term, and does not necessarily imply 
conscious free giving and receiving'.
P2: Strategies for behaviours which have evolved because o f their adaptive 
value must achieve behaviours.
This is a noncontroversial transitional point. It presents the 
stipulation that if a behaviour is adaptive, then it is the behaviour which 
must be elicited in order for the genes specifying such behaviour to be 
'naturally selected'. In genetic terms, it is the phenotype, or the actual 
exhibition of the trait specified by genetic information, which enables 
natural selection to operate. A strategy therefore must include some 
mechanism, or vehicle, by which to ensure that the behaviour will be 
produced.
1^7ibid.^ 161 
168ibid., 172-86.
l^^Ruse and Wilson (1985); Ruse (1985a), 230-1. 
^70rusc and Wilson (1986), 425.
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P3: A belief in moral (prescriptive, universal and nonsubjective) guidelines 
has evolved in humans because it achieves behaviours in line with the 
co-operative strategy.
Ruse finds morality to be the fulfilment of the stipulation mentioned 
in P2 regarding humans. People are not 'unthinking genetic r o b o t s ' ; s o  
there must be some type of mechanism other than rigid programming which 
could still ensure that we co-operated with others, but that would be more 
appropriate for 'conscious, reflective b e i n g s ' w h o  'seem to have a 
dimension of freedom, of flexibility'. Moreover, it would be so 
time-consuming to have 'very efficient on-board computers' which make the 
perfectly adaptive decision every time a social situation arose, that the 
adaptive value of co-operation would surely be overridden by the adaptive 
disvalue of the time spent in deliberation. So there are good evolutionary 
reasons why 'we are not altruists like the ants, nor are we altruists like the 
mega-brains'.
Genetic predisposition of behaviour in humans, on the other hand, is 
best described as a system of'epigenetic rules', where the genes specify a 
'rough biological map'^^^ of generally advantageous strategies, much as 
modem chess games employ. In answer to the question of'How does 
the cooperative strategy present itself to us in our consciousness?' Ruse 
answers:
'In a word, they are the rules of moral conduct! We think 
that we ought to do certain things and that we ought not to do 
other things, because this is our biology's way of making us 
break from our usual selfish or self-interested attitudes and to 
get on with the job of co-operating with others. In short.
171 ibid.
172[bid.
173Ruse(1995), 240.
174ibid.
173rusc and Wilson (1986a), 143, Sèè also Lumsdon and Wilson (1981).
176Ruse and Wilson (1986), 427.
177rusc (1995), 241. This is a type of'evolutionarily stable strategy'; see Maynard Smith 
(1972); (1982); Parker (1984); R. Dawkins (1989), 69-87.
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what I am arguing is that in order to make us "altruists" in the 
metaphorical biological sense, biology has made us altruistic 
in the literal, moral sense.'
In support. Ruse cites ethological literature regarding chimpanzees, which 
display a 'quasi-morality' which seems to be a transitional form between the 
nonmoral 'altruism' of lower animals and the genuinely moral altruism of 
humans.
The distinguishing features of morality aid in ensuring that we
follow our moral feelings, for if we did not have them we would probably
ignore moral guidelines when they went against our selfish desires. 'But
because they give the illusion of objectivity to morality, they lift us above
immediate wants to actions which (unknovm to us) ultimately serve our
genetic best interests'. More explicitly,
'Unless we think morality is objectively true- a function of 
something outside of and higher than ourselves- it would not 
work. If I think I should help you when and only when I 
want to, I shall probably help you relatively infrequently.
But, because I think I ought to help you- because I have no 
choice about my obligation, it being imposed upon m e-1  am 
much more likely, in fact, to help you... Hence, by its very 
nature, ethics is and has to be something which is, 
apparently, objective'. ^  ^  ^
Therefore, 'morality, or more strictly our belief in morality, is merely 
an adaptation put in place to further our reproductive ends'. ^  In Ruse's 
words again:
’We survive and reproduce more efficiently with it than we 
do without it. In the past, those people who lacked a sense of 
morality, simply tended to be ostracized and at a 
disadvantage. So they failed to survive and reproduce as 
efficiently as those with a sense of morality.' ^
178Ruse(1995), 241.
179dc Waal (1982); Goodall (1986). 
^^®Ruse and Wilson (1986), 427. 
l^lRuse (1989), 268-9.
182Ruse and Wilson (1985), 52. 
183rus6 (1985a), 231.
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This follows from the nature of reciprocal altruism, where one who does not 
reciprocate is 'grudged' by other reciprocators once they realise that he 
doesn't 'scratch other's backs'.
None of this implies that morality operates perfectly, for it does not. 
For one thing, differing religious beliefs as well as other factors have 
resulted in the fact that 'people in different societies have taken different 
things to be right and wrong'. Secondly, 'We can certainly do immoral 
things. We do them all the t i m e . ' M o r a l i t y  works despite these 
imperfections, which are bound to be common in such a 'quick and dirty 
s o l u t i o n ' wh i c h  avoids the difficulties of either rigid determination or 
time-consuming perfection.
P4: It is practically impossible, and at any rate irrelevant, for a belief in 
moral guidelines to have evolved because o f its adaptive value, and at the . 
same time for that belief to be true.
If we believe moral guidelines to be true simply because believing 
this allows us more successfully to survive and reproduce (or, more 
precisely, because believing this allowed our ancestors to do so), it seems 
impossible, and anyway irrelevant, for one to make the assertion that moral 
guidelines really do exist and that we really ought to do things that we have 
evolved to think we ought to do. Therefore, we can explain the causes of our 
moral beliefs, but cannot justify them.^^^ There are separate arguments for 
the impossibility and the irrelevance respectively.
First, evolution does not operate in such a way that particular 
outcomes are necessary; rather, it 'works in a gerry-building fashion, 
making do with what it has at hand',^^^ and different results would occur if
184ibid., 233. 
l*5Ruse(1986), 236.
186Ruse(1995), 241.
187Ruse (1984), 185-94; (1986a), 256-8. 
18*Ruse(1995), 168.
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the history of life were to repeat itself. Progress in evolution of the sort that 
involves predetermined goals such as human existence and knowledge of 
moral principles 'is impossible in the world of Darwinism, simply because 
everything is relativized in the sense that success is the only thing that 
counts'. However, in believing what our biology attempts to convince 
us— that prescriptive, universal, and nonsubjective moral guidelines obtain— 
we would be believing that these guidelines have some sort of currency 
which is independent of our idiosyncratic evolutionary history. On the 
contrary, the evidence of sociobiology shows us that these guidelines, far 
from transcending our biology, are actually the result o f our evolving the 
way we did. Morality is wholly contingent upon the undirected path of our 
evolutionary history. An attempt to defend or assert the truth of the claims 
morality makes upon us thus amounts to a misunderstanding of what 
morality is all about. This is the basis for the claim that 'the recognition of 
morality as merely a biological adaptation shows' that 'morality is just an aid 
to survival and reproduction, and has no being beyond or without this'.^^^ 
Again, 'it is precisely because morality is not necessary and it could have 
been other than it is— we might have had no morality at all— that I want to 
argue that, in the end, it is all a collective illusion of the genes'. In this 
sense our minds, fashioned by evolution, have deceived us because such a 
deception benefits our survival.
Second, even if moral guidelines could actually obtain and have 
some validity over and above our idiosyncratic,
'might-have-happened-otherwise' biological constitution, the truth of moral 
claims would be completely irrelevant, 'which is surely a contradiction in 
terms'. This can be illustrated by a thought experiment:
189ibid., 178. 
190Ruse(1989), 268. 
19lRuse(1995), 268. 
192Ruse(1991), 507.
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'Consider two separate worlds, identical except one has an 
objective morality and the other does not. Humans could 
have evolved in both worlds, to believe in exactly the same 
things! The two identical species could share thoughts about 
right and wrong. To suppose otherwise, that is, to suppose 
that only the world of objective morality could have humans 
believing in it, is to suppose an extra-scientific channelling of 
events— a channelling which is quite antithetical to modem 
evolutionism. In short, therefore, in a sense, the objective 
morality is redundant. Its existence is irrelevant to human 
thought and action.'
A belief in prescriptive, universal, nonsubjective principles has arisen by 
biological means, i.e. irrespective of whether any such principles really 
obtained. It therefore makes no difference whether they do obtain, because 
we think this way nevertheless. Both worlds, the one with and the one 
without actual moral principles, are populated by people who are 
programmed to think a certain way about morality. What the truth of the 
matter is does not matter, because evolution has created an illusion in our 
minds and that is all we can know on the subject.
Ruse counters what is probably the immediate objection to this 
argument, that according to this line of thinking all of our evolved capacities 
which purport to relate to something objective and actual would be 
deceiving us in the same way as our capacity to understand moral 
guidelines. Attempting the same thought experiment above with some other 
evolved capacities does not yield the same conclusions, however, which 
shows that those other capacities are not illusory as our moral one is. 
Imagine two worlds, identical except that there are no predators in one. 
Would people in both worlds have evolved in such a way that they perceive 
predators in order to avoid them, if in one of the worlds they do not exist?
In the world with predators, it is sensible that people would have evolved to 
perceive them, for this benefits survival immensely. In the world without
193Ruse(1989), 268-9.
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predators, however, there is no survival value gained by a person perceiving 
predators when they do not exist, and so there is no reason to believe that 
any genes for such an illusion-mongering capacity would ever evolve. 
Therefore, although 'our eyes are no less an adaptation than is our normative 
ethics', healthy eyes are generally to be believed because there is no 
adaptive value in their informing us of things that do not really exist, whilst 
there is good adaptive value in their informing us of things that do in fact 
exist. On the other hand, our capacity to understand moral guidelines is not 
to be believed because there is good adaptive value in its informing us of 
morality regardless of whether that information is true- 'We need it for 
"altruism"'.
D. Sociobiological Meta-ethics: Critique
A synthetically naturalistic theory of meta-ethics can be criticised 
from two different perspectives. First, since science is said to do the work 
of justifying the principles, properties and terms involved in such a theory, a 
critic can focus on the allegedly scientific claims and assess the merits of 
these as such. Certain assumptions necessary to sociobiology will not be 
criticised here, as was stated in the description of that science; but several 
other aspects of Ruse's claims will be criticised from the perspective of 
science or philosophy of science. Second, since it is moral philosophy with 
which a synthetically naturalistic theory deals, such a theory is susceptible to 
criticism from that perspective as well. Such criticism, informed by the 
work of the last two chapters, will also be offered here. Moreover, results of 
an appraisal of this one synthetically naturalistic theory may be to some
194Ruse(1995), 250. 
195ibid., 251.
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extent generalisable; and if so, it could contribute to an understanding of 
whether synthetic naturalism, and even ethical naturalism in general, is an 
appropriate framework within which to develop an ethical theory.
1. ARGUMENTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SCIENCE
a. Th)e nature o f the empirical
After several statements, one of which is that humans are 'deceived 
by their genes into thinking that there is a disinterested objective morality 
binding upon them', Ruse and Wilson write (in a paper entitled 'Moral 
Philosophy as Applied Science') that 'Such are the empirical claims'.
Several other times in the paper they assert the nature of their position as 
empirical. Ruse defines 'empirical' elsewhere as regarding 'the 
experiences we have of the world about us'. He admits that empirical 
matters require evidence, and so there is a very good possibility that we may 
not have enough evidence to settle an empirical matter at any given time. 
Examples Ruse presents of matters which are not empirically settled are 
whether the 'epigenetic rules' which govern our behaviour can change in 
only a few generations, and whether natural selection can occur at the level 
of the group.^^^ These for Ruse are empirical matters which are not yet 
decided. On the other hand, the illusory nature of objective moral guidelines 
is an empirical matter which is, or is nearly, decided, as is repeatedly 
claimed in his paper with Wilson. Presumably, then, sufficient experiential 
evidence has not been established for rapid genetic change or for group 
selection, but has been established regarding the nature of morality.
^^^Ruse and Wilson (1986), 425-6. 
197ibid., 422, 426, 430,433. 
l^%use(1985), 200.
199rusc (1995), 159; (1980), 34.
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The empirical evidence for the illusory nature of moral guidelines 
should therefore be more significant than that for either of the other two 
issues. Ruse claims as empirical support the fact that chimpanzees exhibit 
behaviour which might be interpreted as 'qüasi-inûrâlity'.^^® This piece of 
evidence is doubtful in its utility, as its relevance for morality depends on 
the very strict continuity of biological altruism and morality, which is the 
point to be proven. With respect to morality, as opposed to biological 
altruism, the several defences of his view do not contain any empirical 
evidence at all, but philosophical description of the particular relationship he 
believes to exist between altruism and morality, and the mutual exclusivity 
of contingency and objectivity regarding m o r a l i t y . T h e  case is put forth 
with thought experiments regarding parallel worlds and other argumentative 
devices that are designed not to provide evidence, but to aid one in grasping 
the central claim and to persuade one of its plausibility. The proposition that 
morality is merely a vehicle for biological altruism may be very reasonable, 
and not inconsistent with known facts of evolutionary biology; it may strike 
many people as an attractive possibility and be capable of strong 
philosophical support. However, for one who claims to gain understanding 
only 'through empirical law*,^®  ^this cannot be an acceptable ending point, 
but only a starting point— a hypothesis to be tested.
In objection, one might ask what kind of empirical evidence is 
possible in support for the claim that morality is nothing more than a vehicle 
for effective altruism. It might seem that no matter what evidence is given, 
someone will be able to object that a question has been begged. In answer 
to this objection, one need simply agree that this very well might be the 
case, but it does not decrease the validity of those objections at all. Of 
course, one can imagine evidence that directly relates to morality in some
200r u s c  ( 1995), 241.
These arguments are taken up in the following subsections. 
202ibid., 2.
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way, such as the adaptive nature of moral taboos against incest; but this 
type of evidence only supports the conclusion that morality makes a 
contribution to the preservation of our gene pool. It shows that at least some 
of the things we regard as good, are also good for us in some sense. Such 
evidence does not at all support the claim that moral guidelines are nothing 
more than the contribution they make to our preservation. Plato, who is 
taken by Ruse to be a prime example of a philosopher who erroneously 
believes in the reality of moral guidelines,^®^ would nevertheless have 
embraced evidence that moral guidelines help us more successfully 
reproduce, believing as he did that the just man is more healthy, successfiil, 
and fulfilled than the imjust.^^^ So it seems that empirical evidence for 
morality's being adaptive, if found, would not be evidence for its illusory 
nature, but only contributes to such a view from a certain perspective of 
morality, which itself requires empirical evidence if it is to be claimed as 
empirical fact. Perhaps empirical evidence could be imagined which would 
contribute to Ruse's claim; but it may also be possible that there is no 
empirical evidence at all which could establish such a conclusion. If this is 
true, this would hardly lend support to the empiricist. Rather, it would seem 
to suggest that the hypothesis is empirically untestable— that the nature of 
morality is not strictly an empirical matter. Arguments concerning it may 
require a significant degree of philosophical penetration beyond the 
information that is provided by experience. In fact, this extra-empirical 
discussion is precisely how Ruse defends his point. As this is the case, it 
can only be misleading to assert that something is an empirical claim when 
it is not being supported by any empirical evidence. Moreover, since Ruse's 
naturalism is defined in terms of his commitment to empirical law, doubts as
203rusc (1985a), 229.
204Yjjis is a central theme of the Republic', see especially Bk.IX.
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to the empirical nature of his claims raise doubts as to whether he is being 
consistent when he makes them.^^^
Perhaps more important than whether Ruse's claims are empirical, is 
whether they are true. PI of his argument is its foundation in sociobiology, 
including the models for effective altruism which were described earlier.^®^ 
Since the assumptions necessary to the practice of sociobiology, including 
that of humans, have been accepted for the sake of argument, this premise 
will not be challenged. P2 depends only on the way in which natural 
selection operates, as has also been described earlier;^^^ so this premise 
will not be challenged either. Just as crucial to Ruse's argument, however, 
are P3 (the claim that morality is a vehicle for biological altruism) and P4 
(the claim that moral guidelines cannot be both contingent on the 
evolutionary process and objectively true). These two premises will be dealt 
with here, first from the perspective of the science.
b. From'altruism'to altruism
The claim of P3 depends on a particular connection between 
biological, effective altruism, and genuine, intentional altruism. The former 
was defined earlier as 'behaviour of one organism that increases another's 
welfare at the expense of its own', and the latter as 'unselfish regard for or 
devotion to the welfare of others'.^^^ The former is rooted in the effect of 
the behaviour, whereas the latter is rooted in the intention. Ruse's 
contention is that the latter arose as a vehicle for the former: that 'in order to 
make us "altruists" in the metaphorical biological sense, biology has made
^O^Again, a synthetic naturalist need not make such strong claims. Ruse goes beyond the 
definition of synthetic naturalism in his declaration of adherence to empirical law and 
nothing more.
206section B.2.
207section A.
^®^Section B.3.
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us altruistic in the literal, moral sense'.^^^ Furthermore, in order to make us 
altruists 'in the literal, moral sense'. Ruse suggests that guidelines have been 
manufactured in our minds, guidelines which appear to us to be universal, 
nonsubjective, and prescribing of certain actions. So, Ruse suggests that 
effective altruism is the adaptive trait; and that in order to produce this, 
intentional altruism has evolved; and that the means of producing this is a 
psychological illusion of objective guidelines.
Aside from the particular nature of our moral beliefs and their 
relations to intentional altruism, which will be discussed later from the 
perspective of moral philosophy, the connection made here between the 
concepts of effective and intentional altruism is worth investigating in its 
own right. In order for this connection to be made, it cannot be enough to 
show that effective altruism is adaptive to a greater extent than no altruism at 
all. This may very well be established by current sociobiological theory. In 
order for Ruse's claim to be considerable as a scientific possibility, 
intentional altruism— and specifically, a disposition to intentional altruism 
which comes out of an illusory belief in its universality, prescriptivity and 
nonsubjectivity— must be adaptive, as well as biologically possible. This 
stipulation presents problems at two points. The first is the connection 
between effective altruism and intentional altruism, and the second is at the 
connection between intentional altruism and illusory objective guidelines. 
The former will be discussed here, and the latter in the next subsection.
In order for the first connection to work in the way Ruse suggests, 
behaviour consistent with effective altruism must be similar enough to that 
consistent with intentional altruism, that the latter can be an effective vehicle 
for the former. Any differences in effect may compromise adaptivity.
Given the definitions of the two types of altruism, therefore, it is a valid 
question whether a concept defined in terms of effect and another defined in
209r u s c  (1995), 241.
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terms of intention could, by some means, be sufficiently equivalent in their 
results. The answer to this question depends primarily on the effects o f 
intentional altruism. If intentional altruism most often brings about effects 
congruent with the effective altruism predicted by the sociobiological 
models, then the connection Ruse proposes is strong. Otherwise, it is weak, 
to the extent that there are effects of intentional altruism which run neutral 
or even counter to the survival of the genes.
As was described earlier when these terms were defined, it is easily 
possible for the two types of altruism to go in different directions.^ The 
same behaviour was shown there to be both effectively altruistic and directly 
contrary to intentional altruism. Likewise, a behaviour can be intentionally 
altruistic but, through no fault of the altruist's, fail to produce the effect 
which was intended. Ruse, in claiming intentional altruism to be the vehicle 
for effective altruism, is depending on the effects being intended by the 
agents, and on agents being successful in effecting their intentions. Perhaps, 
all contrary examples aside, in actuality the majority of effects are intended, 
and the majority of intentions do reach fhiition. Even if this is the case, a 
more significant problem remains.
One of the fundamental points underlying Darwinian evolution is the 
fact that not every organism bom can survive to reproduce.^ ^  ^  This fact 
means that competition must be a significant part of the natural order. This 
has become even clearer upon realisation of the role which genes play in 
natural selection, because each individual in a sexually reproducing species, 
barring identical multiple births, carries a different genome. This 
competition, driven by the fact of limited resources, necessitates that the 
persistence of the genes in one individual depends, if indirectly, on the 
demise of others. The models of effective altmism that have been described
section B.3 there is an example of a person pushing someone else out of a position of 
danger into safety, but intending to do the opposite.
^Section A.2.
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have arisen within this framework. They have arisen either because 
co-operation benefits shared genes (kin altruism), because co-operation 
benefits one's genes in the future (reciprocal altruism), or because one's 
genes benefit at the expense of another's welfare (manipulated altruism). 
Ruse does not talk much about the third category, but there is no biological 
reason why he should not- parasitism is just as effectively altruistic as the 
other models. Regardless, based on current empirical evidence, co-operation 
must fit into one of these models in order to be considered adaptive to a 
sociobiologist, such as Ruse. These are very specific, although also very 
common, situations, which in no way contradict the inevitability and 
significance of competition in nature. Effective altruism, therefore, has 
definite biological limits, within which it works according to the interests of 
one's genes.^^^ Outside of these limits, effective altruism runs contrary to 
these interests, and is therefore anti-adaptive, or 'maladaptive'. The 
sociobiological models Ruse invokes cannot explain how such behaviour 
could ever arise in nature.
If intentional altruism is expected not to be extremely maladaptive, it 
cannot operate without bounds that are very much like the bounds to 
effective altruism. Otherwise, it would obviously be acting in ways 
detrimental to the probability of their genes' survival. Kin aside, organisms 
are individuals with evolutionarily significant genetic differences, and 
co-operative behaviours which do not benefit themselves are likely to be 
harmful. Even seemingly small disadvantages, such as the time and energy 
wasted in helping others, could result in a net liability to organisms bearing 
that genetic information, especially in a primitive situation. The question.
^^^Thatx is in the genes' 'interests' should be taken to mean merely that x is a trait which, if 
one's genes prescribe it, conveys an increase in probability that the relevant gene(s) will 
survive through the generations'. If y is contrary to the genes' 'interests', then y is a trait 
which, if one's genes prescribe it, conveys a decrease in probability of survival of the 
relevant gene(s). As with all metaphorical language with respect to genes, it is merely an 
effective 'interesf, rather than an intentional interest, which is meant here.
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then, is whether we find intentional altruism in humans to have the strict 
bounds that must exist in order for it to have arisen as a vehicle for an 
adaptive trait.
Undoubtedly altruism towards family members is very common,^ 
as predicted by kin selection. Likewise, we are often altruistic to others in a 
community setting^ (recall that reciprocal altruism depends on the 
capacity to recognise and remember altruists and cheats). Perhaps we also 
submit to others' manipulation of us when the benefits to others of our doing 
so outweigh the costs to us, as would be predicted by the manipulated 
alfruism model. As far as the present empirical evidence is concerned, this 
should be the extent of intentional altruism.^ In fact, however, this is 
only the beginning of the altruistic behaviour found in humans. Many 
people believe, and at least sometimes act as though they believe, that other 
human beings, whether in this community or in others, are no less deserving 
of resources than we are; and yet it is the competition for resources which 
drives much of evolutionary change. People give large amounts of money to 
organisations dedicated to the aid of destitute foreigners and even 
nonhumans, cases which reciprocal altruism could not possibly sanction. 
Intentional altruism, by definition, is a devotion to the welfare of others.
The concept places no bounds on this devotion. Peter Singer is not alone in 
his belief that 'Taking an objective point of view involves seeing our own 
interests as no more important than the like interests of anyone else. This 
yields the principle of equal consideration of the interests of all.’^ ^^ Such 
an attitude, and even more significantly any behaviours which may result 
firom it, far firom being a vehicle for an adaptive trait, works in direct
2Usinger (1981), ch.2.
214ibid.
2URecalI that the type of group selection which sociobiologists accept (see section B.2b) 
merely tends to reinforce reciprocal altruism in communities, and would not produce 
altruistic behaviour of a different sort than those already mentioned.
216singer (1981), 151.
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opposition to anything that could be considered one's genetic best interest. 
Arguably, few people if any actually live in such a way that others receive 
just as much attention from them as they give themselves. However, the 
very existence of intentional altruism which goes beyond the boundaries of 
genetic self-interest in its effects, is by itself empirical evidence against the 
idea that intentional altruism is nothing more than a vehicle for effective 
altruism. Perhaps some other models will someday be revealed to explain 
intentional altruism further; but as Ruse claims his theory to be an empirical 
one, he cannot claim that the evidence, as it is now, is completely in his 
favour on this point. Intentional altruism by definition, and at least to some 
extent in practice, recognises no definite boundaries of kinship or 
community.
c. Achieving altruism: the adaptive value o f illusory objective guidelines 
In order for Ruse's claim to be true, not only must intentional ' 
altruism be restricted in general to the production of effective altruism, but 
also the physiological/psychological means by which Ruse suggests 
intentional altruism to be promoted must be able to do the task efficiently. 
Whilst it is false to suppose that existing traits are the most efficient ones 
possible,^ it is also false to suppose that a less efficient vehicle would 
arise to replace a more efficient one, all things considered. Furthermore, it is 
reasonable to suppose that if a vehicle has been found to be effective in the 
promotion of several behaviours, natural selection may tend to favour its 
effectiveness in promoting another behaviour as well. Another reasonable 
supposition is that an untried, more complex and intricate path would be less 
likely to be 'stumbled upon' by natural selection than a relatively simple 
adaptation that was equally effective. These suppositions cannot be taken as 
necessarily true in all cases, but they are reasonable points of departure for
Gould and Lewontin (1979);
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an enquiry into the adaptive value of a trait. If Ruse is right, intentional 
altruism should have some adaptive advantage over more primitive vehicles 
for effective altruism, and it would likely have adaptive advantage over 
vehicles which have been found or supposed to operate for other behaviours. 
If no adaptive advantage is found for Ruse's particular model of intentional 
altruism over these others, there would have been no conceivable reason 
why the new, complicatedly objectified morality would ever have evolved to 
replace other vehicles.
i. Comparison with alternatives
Ruse claims (see the beginning of the description of P3) that the 
vehicle he proposes for effective altruism- rules ofmorM conduct— is more 
adaptive than two other possible vehicles: rigid mechanical determination, 
and an involved cost-benefit analysis for every encountered situation. 
Granted, for the reasons Ruse provides, these two alternatives would not be 
as adaptive for a human. Despite Ruse's confident conclusion from this, 
there seems no reason to believe that there is only one possible alternative to 
these two extreme views. In fact, there are at least two forks in the path 
from a rejection of these extremes to the concept of rules of moral conduct, 
each of which provides a range of alternatives. Moreover, these alternatives 
are not just speculations, as are Ruse's ideas both of the 'mega-brain' and the 
illusion of objectivity; rather, they are actual vehicles, used in nature today 
to promote all sorts of behaviours.
The first fork is at the level of the evolutionarily stable strategy.
Since John Maynard Smith began testing this idea in the early 1970's, a great 
amount of work has been done in elucidating strategies for behaviour, many 
of which fall under neither the rigid determination category nor the 
mega-brain category.^This  work, which has been said to have enjoyed
work is Maynard Smith (1972); (1974); (1976). This and other work is
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'enormous success' and is called a 'trend in modem evolutionary theory',^ 
provides à mass of alternatives to either extreme. As Richard Dawkins 
writes, 'A "strategy" is a pre-programmed behavioural policy... An 
evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS is defined as a strategy which, if most 
members of a population adopt it, cannot be bettered by an alternative 
strategy'.^^® When Ruse provides the example of a computerised chess 
game to support his vehicle, he is in effect describing the principle 
underlying the ESS: that a policy of when and when not to behave in a 
certain way, as distinct from a particular behaviour itself, can evolve. 'There 
could be, say, a set of decisions on when to escalate a fight and when to give 
up and slink away.'^^^ Thus, in order to make us effectively altruistic, 
certain policies could have developed in the proto-human psyche which 
predisposed them in one of a number of ways. A decision to be altruistic 
could operate in the same way, for instance, as a squirrel's decision as to 
when and for how long it is worthwhile to risk predation in order to forage 
for food, or as a wolfs decision that further conflict with the alpha male is 
disadvantageous.^^^ In other words, strategies can be very flexible, and 
they need not be entirely new and speculative in order to avoid the 
maladaptive extremes which Ruse presents as the only alternatives to his 
view.
The second fork at which many other alternative paths are available 
besides the illusory objectification of morality is that of the 'epigenetic rules' 
which E. O. Wilson postulates to be important elements in culture.^^^ Ruse
summarised in (1982). Later work is Rj Dawkins (1980); (1982); Parker (1984); Maynard 
Smith (1988). Summaries are given in R. Dawkins (1989), ch.5; Cronin (1991), ch.3. 
2i9cronin  (1991), 70-78.
220r . Dawkins (1989), 69.
221Cronin(1991),71.
222'Decision' should be taken loosely in this sentence, as the possibility of a certain 
flexibility of behaviour when a creature is faced with a range of alternatives, governed by 
the dictates imposed by the stable strategy. No intention is necessarily involved (such 
strategies are described in relation to scorpions, for example), although it can be. 
223Lumsden and Wilson (1981); (1983).
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endorses these, which he arid Wilson describe as 'genetically based 
processes of development that predispose the individual to adopt one or a 
few forms of behaviours as opposed to others'.^^^ Although these may be 
considered as a subset of the evolutionarily stable strategy, Wilson most 
specifically identifies epigenetic rules with humans, and they involve 
thought, reflection, and in many cases communication and consensus in a 
population.^^^ The study of these rules in a behavioural context is a 
fledgling science,^^^ but there already are many areas in which Wilson and 
others have found these types of rules to be operative. Examples he 
provides are
'the peculiarities of color vision, phoneme formation, odor 
perception, preferred visual designs, and facial expressions 
used to denote emotions. All are diagnostic of the human 
species, all part of what must reasonably be called human 
nature.'^^^
None of these are claimed to have produced the sort of psychogenic illusions 
which Ruse and Wilson suspect our nature to have produced in order to 
achieve effective altruism. Perhaps we all recognise yellow as a single 
(indeed, primary) colour, whereas yellowish-green is regarded as in some 
sense a mixture or transitional colour. Perhaps such a recognition has a 
genetic basis. But, in order for such recognition, we (or at least most of us) 
have not had to imagine that there is an objective principle of yellowness 
which in some way is existent whereas the principle of yellowish-greenness 
is only derivative fi-om it; much less have we been mesmerised that there is 
a universal prescription which we all should obey, to believe that yellow is a 
distinct colour. Phobias, another area of much work in epigenetic rules, are 
not perpetuated in humans by the manufacture of substantive psychological
224Ruse and Wilson (1986), 426. 
225ibid., 426-8.
226ibid.,428.
227wilson (1994), 352.
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illusions that spiders, heights, or tight spaces are actually something that 
they are not. Even the most crippled arachnophobe, who is far from the 
norm, can agree with the world's leading expert on the structure and 
physiology of spiders. He just has an uncontrollable and irrational fear of 
them. There seems no reason to suppose, then, that at the level of the 
epigenetic rule there is only one way in which our genes could consistently 
achieve a behaviour such as effective altruism. It is not necessary to 
postulate a radically new, scientifically unprecedented type of mechanism to 
assure that effective altruism is achieved in a population of humans.
Any number of evolutionarily stable strategies could have been 
developed other than the conscious, distinctively cultural epigenetic rules 
which Wilson claims to operate in our minds in the production of 
behaviours. Or, if epigenetic rules are the way nature did go with regard to 
effective altruism, there are many options at this level also which could have 
achieved effective altruism just as well as the production of illusory 
guidelines has been supposed to do. Nonhuman animals still care for their 
young, show restraint in fighting, give warning calls, protect each other, 
remove parasites from each other's heads, and share food. Why we should 
have to possess a radically different mechanism from these other mammals 
in order to achieve results of the same general type, requires some 
explanation beyond a simple contrast of epigenetic rules to the rigid 
programming of particular behaviours.
If illusory objective guidelines are claimed to have been needed in 
order to achieve altruism because of the unique complexity and flexibility of 
humans, this does not by itself provide anything in the way of explanation.
A human can be hungry, tired, angry, in love, jealous, impatient, afraid, 
hurting, desirous, or faced with any number of other situations characterised 
by the necessity to make a decision and exhibit some type of behaviour. As 
Ruse says, our genes do not operate in either the rigidly robotic nor the
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mega-brain manner to settle these matters. But, neither are we burdened 
with any illusions with regard to them. Feeding is obviously adaptive, and 
vehicles (hunger, set eating times) are in place to assure such behaviour in 
humans, although this behaviour can be and often is overridden by the 
individual. Vehicles are in place in humans for many other adaptive 
behaviours as well, such as mating. These may or may not be governed by 
what Wilson calls 'epigenetic rules', but we certainly do not find ourselves 
subjected in these cases to the extraordinary illusion-mongering mechanism 
which is said by Ruse to assure altruistic behaviour.
Furthermore, one cannot say (as Ruse has^^^) that it is the peculiarly 
non-self-regarding nature of altruism which makes moral guidelines the only 
workable vehicle. This confuses effective and intentional altruism. A 
person need not even know that an act is or is not beneficial to oneself, in 
order to be predisposed to do it. In fact, in many cases we are disposed to do 
things which we may very well know could actually jeopardise our personal 
welfare more than aid it; i.e., some instances of violence. If the 
sociobiologist's thesis regarding the genetic basis for aggression is accepted 
for the sake of argument, one may point out many instances where 
aggression in a particular circumstance is against my personal best interest, 
as opposed to that of my genes. Small-scale fights over trivial matters is a 
prime example. Our genetic constitution might predispose us to aggression 
in such cases because it is an evolutionarily stable strategy, and we may 
never stop to think that appeasing our (or someone else's) angry desires in 
this instance may not be in any particular person's best interest ^  an 
individual. For another example, caring for my young may not be in my best 
interest as an individual, but I do it anyway, even realising that fact, and so 
do nonhuman creatures without morality. The reason for this is that my 
intellectual knowledge of what is and is not in my personal interest does not
228rusc (1990), 65.
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necessarily govern my actions. I may do many things, and not for moral 
reasons, which I know not to be in my interest as an individual organism. In 
fact, in many of these cases, possibly including both war and the raising of 
children, it is misleading to characterise our thoughts on the matter as being 
in any way individualistic, not to mention strictly selfish. One regularly 
hears of esprit de corps in battle, and also of family devotion, and few 
would claim that such instances are always, or even often, results of a 
recognition of objective moral guidelines. These examples, and indeed the 
very foundations of sociobiology, suggest that it is relatively unimportant 
whether creatures realise something to be in their individual interests or not. 
Their biology never has difficulty in predisposing them to behave in other 
ways; especially, those ways which are consistent with their genes' 
interests.
Confusion on this matter could stem fi-om the fact that intentional 
altruism is to some extent distinctive because of its requirement that we be 
intentionally other-regarding; but whether we are intentionally altruistic is 
irrelevant fi-om the perspective of the gene. As far as the genes are 
concerned, effective altruism is the object. Effective altruism can be 
achieved by the same mechanisms as any other genetically predisposed 
behaviour is achieved. Whether we know, or care, whether it is in our best 
interests is nowhere near an insuperable obstacle to genetic predisposition. 
Although Ruse shows in several places a recognition of the difference 
between effective and intentional altruism, at this point in his defence he 
regularly blurs the distinction. For example, he claims that 'Struggle and 
selection obviously incline one towards selfishness', and so in order to 
perform actions in the interests of some other individual 'we need an extra 
push... ob l i ga t i on ' .Th i s  confuses effective and intentional types of 
selfishness. Struggle and selection undoubtedly maximise effective
229rusc (1990), 65.
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'selfishness', in the sense that most of our actions happen to benefit 
ourselves. This is understandable, given the fact that our interests often 
coincide with the 'interests' of the genes within us, and sociobiology predicts 
that we tend to do what is in the interests of our genetic information. 
However, there is no substantiation, and much evidence to the contrary, that 
such genetically-based, effective 'selfishness' should be translated into the 
type of intentional selfishness which Ruse claims us to have to overcome in 
order to produce effectively altruistic behaviour. Intentional selfishness, if 
defined in terms of our beliefs about what is in our personal best interest, is 
often overridden by other factors, as in violence and the raising of children. 
If, on the other hand, intentional selfishness is defined in terms of whatever 
desires we happen to have, then it is clear that we can have desires not only 
in accord with our personal best interest, but also against it, as these cases 
suggest. In some cases (though not all— take drug abuse, for example) these 
desires are in our genetic best interest, and on this level effective altruism is 
just as 'selfish' as any other behaviour. No radically new, inordinately 
complex or otherwise extraordinary mechanism is necessary to prescribe 
such a behaviour relative to others.
To sum up, some type of vehicle or mechanism is necessary in order 
to achieve behaviours which are effectively altruistic. But, we need such 
mechanisms in any case of behavioural predisposition. Effective altruism is 
in no special place in this respect, and has no unique requirements to be 
achieved. We need to be altruistic in the same sense as we need to raise our 
children, to eat, to assert our position in relevant hierarchies, to defend our 
community, and to do many other things. Insofar as we are disposed to do 
these things by our genes, we are disposed regardless of whether they do our 
individual person any benefit, and so effective altruism places no unique 
requirements on our biology in order to be achieved. Furthermore, there are 
at least two levels, one common to all animal life and one common to all
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human behaviour, on which mechanisms exist for behavioural 
predisposition. These satisfy the conditions Ruse presents for predisposition 
in humans just as well as he supposes his own idea to do. In fact, they may 
be said to be more likely as vehicles than Ruse's idea of illusory objective 
guidelines. In addition to being actually operative in nature rather than 
purely speculative, they are much simpler. Also, they do not present a 
radically different solution to what is in fact a very common type of 
requirement in nature, in humans as well as in other organisms: the 
requirement that an organism exhibit certain behaviours in certain 
circumstances, and yet be flexible enough to alter or restrain those 
behaviours as those circumstances necessitate.
ii. Internal problems
In addition to being unlikely relative to other mechanisms for the 
promotion of behaviours, for the reasons given above, the concept of 
illusory moral guidelines is also beset with internal difficulties which affect 
its usefulness in this regard. One of these is what may be called the 
'situation-action lag'. This represents that period between the perception of a 
situation and the exhibition of the adaptive behaviour. In instances where 
this gap is wide (such as when a rabbit is confused by a fast-approaching car 
and cannot decide which way to flee), there is a definite disadvantage 
present. If gap is narrower (such as in the strike of a fi-og's tongue at a 
passing fly), an advantage is conveyed instead. With respect to moral 
guidelines, relative to other behaviours, an argument can be made that this 
lag is significant. The breadth of the gap is because of the reflection and 
deliberation which accompanies the making of moral decisions. The more 
such thought is necessary to the practice of morality, the wider the gap 
becomes and the less adaptive the mechanism. It is therefore understandable 
why Ruse says that 'too heavy an emphasis on thought in morality worries
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me'.^^^ One might reasonably ask the question whether a simpler, more 
straightforward desire to perform certain behaviours might be more adaptive 
than the time-consuming, often confusing and sometimes agonising 
deliberative capacity that we have now. If morality arose as an adaptation, 
its efficiency is dubious when one looks at the history of moral philosophy, 
which is characterised by millenia of this capacity challenging and often 
bewildering humans. Similar obstacles to efficient and consistent action do 
not seem to plague other behavioural traits, traits which (as was defended in 
the last subsection) do not seem to be relevantly different from effective 
altruism.
Another stipulation for the usefulness of this mechanism is the 
relative infrequence of situations where people do not do what is in 
accordance with those objective guidelines. As Francisco Ayala has wntten, 
even if our biological nature predisposes actions in accordance with certain 
principles, 'it does not constrain us to accept them, nor to behave according 
to them.'^^ ^  Consequently, the problem that Euripides mentioned is widely 
known: 'we know and see what is right, yet fail to carry it out'.^^^ In order 
for Ruse's proposed mechanism to work, the majority of people in the 
majority of cases must be intentionally altruistic insofar as it contributes to 
effective altruism. Whether this is the case is an empirical matter, so this is 
a ftiiitful area for discussion among sociologists, psychologists and moral 
philosophers.
d. Contingent/objective dichotomy
The above subsections criticise, from a generally scientific 
perspective, P3 of Ruse's reasoning: the claim that illusory objective 
guidelines have arisen as a vehicle for effective altruism. How this claim
230Ruse(1995), 266. 
23lAyala (1987), 312. 
^^^Hippoiytus, 39.
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squares with the content and scope of morality will be taken up in the more 
ethically-based half of the critique. Here the next premise of Ruse's 
argument will be examined: P4, or the claim that there are serious 
implications to the idea that morality might not have come about at all.^^^ 
Since morality is contingent on the particular evolutionary history of our 
species, Ruse claims that it cannot therefore be objective, which for him 
means relating to something above and beyond our biology. In the moral 
case, this objectivity is the basis for the prescriptivity, universality and 
nonsubjectivity we attribute to moral principles. If this dichotomy between 
contingency and objectivity does not hold. Ruse's P4 would likewise not 
hold, for according to Ruse it is the contingency of morality that leads him 
to propose that its objectivity is illusory.^^^
Ruse does admit that the dichotomy does not hold for all things. Our 
ability to see is contingent on our particular history, but no one would claim 
that this provides any reason for thinking that a predator has no objective 
status. So, the dichotomy Ruse perceives between the contingency and 
objectivity of morality cannot be inherent in the concepts of contingency and 
objectivity themselves. Rather, a particular difference between the moral 
capacity and perception must be the factor which justifies this belief 
regarding morality.
Ruse claims this particular difference to be the adaptive value to be 
gained by perception versus the lack of adaptive value of a genuinely 
objective morality over and above the illusory moral guidelines we have 
now.^^^ This is an improper use of the adaptationist principle, however.
As was shown earlier, even if a trait is genetically predisposed, there are
233xhis raises the perennial issue in evolutionary biology and physics of the nature of 
chance. Monod (1972) is a classic work on this issue; responses to it are in J. Lewis, ed. 
(1974). Some later discussions are S. Gould (1980); Davies (1982); Prigogine and 
Stengers (1984); Gleick (1987); Stewart (1989).
234rusc(1995), 268.
235ibid„ 250-1.
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several ways besides being adaptive in which it can arise and persist in a 
population.^^^ Although often criticised for this, sociobiologists often work 
on the basis of assumptions, backed with varying degrees of evidence, that 
traits are adaptive. Sometimes their efforts are rewarded, and traits which 
were previously thought not to be adaptive are shown to be so.^^^
However, although traits regularly have adaptive value, and although 
assumptions to this effect are commonly made in evolutionary biology, this 
is no licence for, someone to make the assumption that if something is not 
adaptive, it cannot exist. A belief that actual moral guidelines are not more 
adaptive than an illusion of their actuality, even if true, does not justify a 
denial of the actuality of moral guidelines. If moral guidelines are actual 
rather than an illusion, they are so regardless of whether they contribute any 
differently to our evolutionary success than an illusion of their actuality 
does. In short, there is no necessity that moral guidelines in and of 
themselves be adaptive at all; so, of course, there is no necessity that they 
be adaptive over and above the adaptivity of our belief in them. Moreover, 
the belief that something is not adaptive is a belief that no evidence is 
available for its adaptivity. It is not a claim that such evidence is 
theoretically impossible. This is the very source of the strength of the .
adaptationist's position. Anything claimed not to be adaptive could 
theoretically at any time be shown by additional empirical evidence to be 
adaptive. . -
Incidentally, the very fact of Michael Ruse making arguments for the 
illusory nature of moral guidelines, if believed, undermines our genetic 
'push' towards altruism, and so seems to suggest that actual moral guidelines 
would indeed be adaptive relative to an illusion of such guidelines. If we 
see moral guidelines as an illusion, there seems no reason to believe that we
236gection B i d .  
237cronm(1991), 94-5.
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will still follow them. If this is true, the advantage to be gained from the 
illusion would be lost. On the other hand, if this is false, and we would still 
follow them, then the illusion of moral guidelines was not necessary in the 
first place! If Ruse believes that morality can operate just as well when we 
have seen the light, i.e. when we know there to be no objective guidelines,. 
then his main thesis that 'human beings function better if they are deceived 
by their genes...'^^^ is undermined. On the other hand, if we do fimction 
better to any extent when deceived, the conclusion is inevitable, that if our 
corporate illusion is shown to be such, altruism will decline, and our gene 
pool will suffer for it. However, if Ruse's theory were shown to be false, 
and people could still honestly believe in actual moral guidelines, altruism 
would not be affected, and so the benefit to be gained by that behaviour 
would continue. Therefore, the very possibility of Ruse making the claims 
he is making, is evidence for the adaptivity of actual moral guidelines above 
and beyond the adaptivity of m  illusion of those guidelines. The reason for 
this is that an illusion can be discovered, whereas the real thing will stand up 
to any investigation. This is not an argument for morality having arisen 
because of its adaptive value, nor for the actuality of mord guidelines. 
Rather, it demonstrates that Ruse's claim that moral guidelines are not 
adaptive whereas sight is adaptive is not a fruitful way to achieve an 
important difference between them (a difference necessary in order for Ruse 
to claim that things we see can be objective whilst things we morally believe 
are not). First, moral guidelines can exist without being adaptive. Second, 
one cannot dogmatise that actual moral guidelines cannot be adaptive in and 
of themselves. In fact, there is good reason to suspect that actual moral 
guidelines would be adaptive over and above the adaptivity of an illusion of 
their actuality, thanks to Ruse's own theorising.
238rus6 and Wilson (1986), 425.
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This argument suggests that an analogy is still possible between 
moral beliefs and such things as perception, only to the extent that both of 
them might make claims about something which is above and beyond our 
biology (i.e. objective in Ruse's sense), whilst our capacities for them are 
contingent on the evolutionary process.^^^ Arguments that the analogy 
cannot hold, beg questions against morality being truly objective in the 
sense that Ruse believes we falsely think them to be. In order not to beg the 
question either way, one must recognise the possibility that the contingent 
capacity of morality can, but also might not, reflect something universal, 
prescriptive and nonsubjective. A discussion from the scientific perspective 
is therefore not sufficient to establish a conclusion either way. One must 
take moral philosophy into consideration.
2. ARGUMENTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY
a. History and justification : the genetic fallacy
Naturalists, as represented in this thesis, have tried in three general 
ways to approach the problem of supporting their meta-ethical views. 
Avoiding the problems of the logical and semantic approaches has led many, 
including Ruse, to adopt a more synthetic approach, where scientific facts 
lead one to a naturalistic view of ethics. One is misguided, then, in 
employing Hume's Law or Moore's 'naturalistic fallacy', as they stand, 
against such views. In Ruse's case, the scientific facts used are 
sociobiological facts, and the proposed view of ethics is a meta-ethical
239Another analogy that might be made is to the truths of mathematics. Although 
mathematical knowledge is contingent on the evolutionary process, probably no one would 
claim that mathematical principles are nonobjective in the sense that Ruse claims moral 
principles to be. The counterargument and rebuttal offered above regarding perception 
pertain equally well to mathematics.
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scepticism or nihilism.^^^ The sociobiological facts specifically regard the 
origin and growth of moral thinking, and this provides the supposed 
connection to meta-ethics. Ruse feels that a proper understanding of the 
history of our moral beliefs will yield a conclusion regarding the 
justification of our moral beliefs— namely, the conclusion that no 
justification is possible at all.^^^ Several writers have declared à fallacy to 
be present in this move. James Rachels conducts the following thought 
experiment to illustrate this:
'Imajgine that someone proposed eliminating the study of 
mathematics, and replacing it with the systematic study of 
the biological basis for mathematical thinking. They might 
argue that, after all, our mathematical beliefs are the products 
of our brains working in different ways, and an evolutionary 
account might explain why we developed the mathematical 
capacities we have. Thus 'mathobiology' could replace 
mathematics. Why would this proposal sound so strange? It 
is not because our mathematical capacities have no biological 
basis; nor is it because it would not be interesting to know 
more about that basis. Rather, the proposal is strange 
because mathematics is an autonomous s u ^ c t  with its own 
internal standards of proof and discovery.'^^
There are many examples of such criticism, some variations of which 
employ the term 'genetic fallacy'.^^^
This argument may be true, strictly speaking, but one should 
understand the reason why Ruse has remained unimpressed by the 
accusation. The history of how one came to a belief may not logically rule 
out the possibility that the belief is correct, but it may nevertheless shed light 
on the validity of our reasons for believing it. Few would disagree that if a 
certain belief were injected into ouf minds by an evil genius, and if we came
240rusc (1989), 250 calls his view 'moral nihilism'; (1991), 507 calls it 'ethical scepticism'. 
241'Justification' here, of course, does not mean justifying the mere fact tliat we have these 
beliefs, but justifying the truth of the content of tiiose beliefs.
242Rachels(1990), 78-9.
243Dennett (1995), 470. Ruse (1995), 270-1 says that this is the most common argument 
levelled against him.
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to be aware of this, then we should have reason to doubt whether we were 
ever justified in believing what we did. That belief may very well be true, 
but an evil genius might just as easily place a false belief in our heads. If 
Ruse is right, that our beliefs were manufactured by our psychology in order 
to make us altruistic, we may likewise have reason to question the truth of 
the content of those beliefs. The possibility remains that our beliefs are true. 
But if a false belief aids our survival, from Ruse's perspective there seeins 
no barrier to such a belief propagating in our population, however unsavoury 
the idea might be to us. Therefore, two of moral philosophy's most popular 
exports to the philosophy of evolutionary biology, the 'naturalistic fallacy' 
and the 'genetic fallacy', are unlikely by themselves to stop the scepticism, 
which Ruse claims to be unavoidable because of sociobiology. Insofar as 
these 'quick fixes' are the extent to which one delves into moral philosophy, 
one may certainly expect many naturalist theories to be refuted by them, but 
Ruse's theory is not likely to be among them. From the perspective of moral 
philosophy. Ruse's theory is more appropriately examined by looking at the 
way he characterises morality, than by attempting to find a fallacy in his 
progression from matters of history to those of justification.
b. From biologically sound altruism to morality: normative discrepancies
P3 of Ruse's reasoning, that morality is a tool for the production of 
behaviour that is adaptive by the theories of kin selection and reciprocal 
altruism, is actually three premises in one:
1. Intentional altruism has been developed as a vehicle for effective 
altruism.
2. Universal, prescriptive and nonsubjective guidelines have been 
put in place in our minds to ensure this intentional altruism.
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3. Such intentional altruism ensured by universal, prescriptive and 
nonsubjective principles is what defines morality.
The focus of the argumentation so far regarding P3 has been twofold. First, 
one should doubt the happy congruence that is claimed to exist between the 
effects of intentional altruism, and effective altruism as predicted by 
sociobiology (this criticises subpremise 1).^^  Second, it is very doubtful 
that universal, prescriptive and nonsubjective guidelines are, or would ever 
be, the way we would evolve to exhibit effectively altruistic behaviour (this 
criticises subpremise 2).^^^ The plausibility for these two subpremises 
depends on assumptions which are either unwarranted or confused. Here the 
third of these subpremises, the most explicitly ethical of them, will be 
criticised. Is the picture one that bears sufficient resemblance to our 
experience of morality to lend plausibility to Ruse's theory? Let us suppose 
that intentional altruism produced effects which on the whole were in line 
with effective altruism as predicted by sociobiological theory. Let us 
suppose also that universal, prescriptive and nonsubjective guidelines were 
the biological tool by which such behaviour were assured. The question 
then arises as to whether the scheme thus constructed is like the scheme of 
our moral experience. One way to test this is to compare the normative 
principles that arise from the schemes.
There is certainly overlap at the normative level between the two 
schemes; indeed, such overlap provides a degree of plausibility that must 
have sparked the imaginations of such thinkers as Wilson and Ruse to 
believe that the schemes were in fact identical. Regarding kin selection, it is 
safe to assume that humans do feel on the whole that contributing to the 
welfare of family is a morally praiseworthy, even obligatory, function. We
244xhis is the argument of section D.lb. 
2457his is the argument of section D.lc.
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may look with genuine moral disapproval upon those who allow their 
children to live dangerously or unhealthily. We may certainly feel, as early 
sociobiologists predicted, a moral obligation to risk our own welfare to save 
aunts, uncles, cousins, brothers, sisters and other family members who are in 
danger. Reciprocal altruism takes into consideration much more of what we 
consider morality to be about. We should attempt to save from drowning 
not only those who are related to us, but anyone. Of course, in the early 
days of humanity those one found drowning were likely to be members of 
one's own community or communities nearby. However, the same impulses 
that initially resulted in reciprocation within these close-knit groups are now 
possibly leading us to be altruistic towards those we do not even know. 
Morally speaking, many others besides our relatives should be considered 
'our brothers and sisters'. In fact, our altruism towards others may not 
benefit our genes only from those individuals' likelihood of paying us back, 
but also because of the better reputation we might get in the community as 
an altruist, which would pay us dividends if we were ever to be in trouble.
In addition, one is more likely to produce offspring if one can impress a 
mate; and in a community where reciprocation is respected, a mate will 
surely look for a person with honourable and altruistic tendencies, among 
other qualities. We may look upon people with those tendencies with moral 
approval, and those without such tendencies we may morally condemn.
Thus, insofar as morality breeds co-operation, mutual caring, and sacrifice 
on each other's behalf, morality seems to be in line with the predictions of 
sociobiology. There are, however, serious discrepancies between the two 
schemes on the normative level. Just a few of these are described here for 
examples.
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i. The moral considerability of the nonaltruistic
'Cheats', sociobiologically speaking,^^^ are not those who actively 
do things which are detrimental to the welfare of others. They are not 
murderers, thieves, kidnappers, terrorists, or rapists— or, if they are, they are 
hot called cheats because of this, but because of something else. Cheats are 
those who, although helped when they need it, do not help others back. A 
chimpanzee who, having been cleaned of parasites by another, is presented 
with the other's back in a plea to return the favour but promptly walks away 
from the scene, is a cheat. A cheat is defined for the 'good' he has not done, 
rather than for the 'evil' he has done.
Sociobiology predicts that cheats must not be treated with the same 
respect and altruism as other altruists, or else reciprocal altruism will fail 
because there is no benefit to being an altruist and plenty to being a 
cheat.^^^ Thus the entire edifice of biological altruism, insofar as it 
depends on reciprocation, depends on the exclusion of cheats from the 
category of'those whom I must help'. If one is a 'suckeF- that is, if one 
helps those who do not help back- then one is doomed to biological failure 
when faced with cheats. The only hope is to be a 'grudger', who can 
distinguish between those who return favours and those who do not, and to 
mete out one's aid accordingly. The problem arises when one translates this 
into moral language. Morality, to be in tune with biological altruism, must 
exclude cheats from the realm of moral considerability. Prohibitions against 
stealing, murder, rape, blackmail and slander should be seen as only 
regarding those who are altruists or family members. One might object that 
it is an evolutionarily stable strategy not to murder at all; for if one is 
psychologically able to murder cheats, one might more easily murder 
noncheats with whom one has a disagreement. But this must be weighed
246The same, strictly biological, sense of the word 'cheaf and its cognates is meant 
throughout this section.
247xhis is discussed and referenced in section B.2d.
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against the strict and vital necessity to keep the level of cheats in the 
population low, and the just as vital necessity to withhold beneficence fi-om 
them. Evolutionarily speaking, it is advantageous for the success of 
biological altruism in a society to retaliate against those who are cheats, just 
for the mere fact that they are not altruistic.^^^ This would ensure the 
maintenance of the reciprocating community by keeping the levels of cheats 
in the population low.
In modem society, such behaviour would surely be morally 
offensive. To disregard people morally, or even to retaliate against them, 
merely for their failure to help in our time of need, may be a common 
emotional reaction, but few would morally sanction such behaviour. We 
may very well have a psychological constitution that predisposes us to 
search for cheats,^^^ but it seems that our actions regarding them are subject 
to the same moral constraints as our actions regarding anyone else. The 
equal moral considerability of all people, regardless of whether they are 
morally upstanding themselves, is a fundamental principle of most moral 
philosophies, and arguably all prominent modem ones. This does not 
necessarily mean that we have equal moral responsibilities towards everyone 
at any given time, but to say that their omission of altruistic behaviour 
towards us gives us licence for morally disregarding them is a claim that is 
not often found in moral philosophy or moral teachings. Few if any moral 
philosophers include any reference to one's actions, not to mention 
omissions, in their assessment of the moral worth of a human being or our 
responsibilities to a person in a particular situation. The reason why 
variables such as % or are so often used in moral philosophy to represent 
people is precisely because the identity o f the person in a situation is not o f  
significant moral relevance. Saving an altruist from drowning is a morally
248Axelrod (1984) discusses retaliation against cheats as an adaptive strategy.
249gee, for example, the psychological data provided by Leda Cosmides (1989); see also 
Cosmides and Tooby (1989).
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praiseworthy action; but before morality is therefore linked with biological 
altruism, one should realise that saving a cheat from drowning is morally 
praiseworthy as well. If biological altruism were the root of our morality, 
we should be morally untarnished if we were to sit on the pier and have a 
picnic as the cheat drowns, provided he is not related to us.
One might recognise some type of différence between the rescuing of 
the altruist and the rescuing of the cheat, but this cannot be a significaritly 
moral difference. In both cases a human being, with frailties and strengths 
in all areas including the moral, is in danger of losing life. There most 
probably is a psychological difference between rescuing the one and the 
other, in light of the fact that the first is morally upstanding whereas the 
second is known not to care about others who are drowning. It may be 
much easier for us to help the one rather than the other. Why, though, 
should a difference in one's psychological ease in rescuing two people 
translate into a difference in the moral status of the rescue? In fact, in some 
philosophies such as Kant's, the saving of the life of the cheat would even be 
more morally praiseworthy, for Kant wrote that 'the moral worth of the 
character is brought out which is incomparably the highest of all' when a 
person 'is bénéficient, not from inclination, but from duty'.^^^ Surely, in 
line with reciprocal altruism, our inclination is to help those who are 
altruists themselves. Such an inclination is evolutionarily, sound. To do as 
Ruse has done, however, and claim that this inclination is by itself the 
dictate of morality, is grossly to mischaracterise the nature of morality.
Roger Trigg claims reciprocal altruism's guidelines for the treatment of 
cheats to be a 'prime example of how dangerous the reduction of human 
morality to kin and reciprocal altruism really is'.^^^ In addition to its 
danger, it is simply a mischaracterisation of what morality is like. One does
230Kant (1785), 1.15. This is not intended to endorse his position or assume its truth. 
25lTrigg(1982), 120.
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not need to be a follower of Socrates or Jesus^^^ to understand that however 
much we may dislike certain people, our moral responsibilities towards them 
are not significantly affected by our beliefs as to whether they have treated, 
or would treat, us in a similar way in a similar situation. This is, however, 
an inherent and absolutely indispensable part of an ethical theory which sees 
morality as a tool for biological altruism. One cannot object, moreover, that 
we should just disobey those motives in favour of our more altruistic ones in 
general. The very capacity for making such a moral claim is what Ruse is 
saying has proceeded fi-om biological altruism. If we say that this tool can 
be put to immoral uses, then we are speaking from outside of biological 
altruism, and our moral codes must be coming firom somewhere else.
ii. The moral considerability of those unable to reciprocate
On Ruse's characterisation of morality, there are several classes of 
entities which are not morally considerable; in other words, we have no 
moral responsibilities as touching those entities. Among these are all 
entities which are not closely related to us^^^ and are not reciprocating 
members of our human society, for none of the models for altruism which 
have been discussed can account for any moral responsibilities that we have 
to distantly related or unrelated entities which do not pay us back for our 
troubles. Already having been discussed are those people who are not 
altruistic because they lack the corresponding genetic disposition, or else 
they just choose to go against their altruistic motives in favour of other 
motives; these are 'cheats'. Also in the category of'morally unconsiderable' 
are those who, for one reason or another, are not able to reciprocate altruistic
252xhese are the two moral teachers castigated by John Mackie (1978) for having 
pemetuated the moral considerability of immoral people.
^53Recall how quickly kin selection dissipates as individuals become more distantly 
related. It is significant regarding immediate family, but even first cousins share only 
12.5% of one's distinctive genes. It would take 8 cousins simultaneously in a needy 
situation to outweigh the adaptive value of (biological) egoism on the basis of kin selection.
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actions. If the permanently infirm, the incapacitated elderly, the mentally 
retarded, the insane, and the permanently imprisoned are not able, even if 
they wished, to reciprocate, natural selection would not favour altruistic 
behaviour towards them. Aid given to such people wastes time for they 
cannot return it, and those whose genes prescribe such aid will suffer a net 
loss of precious energy for nothing in those situations. In biological terms, 
energy is the stuff of survival. In times of stress or competition, those who 
spend their time taking care of the permanently infirm or incapacitated are 
not likely to survive over those who are burdened with no such obligations. 
Ruse, who emphasises the reciproeal nature of the altruism that has led to 
the origin of morality,^^^ must deal with the faet that our soeiety is not 
completely made up of reciprocating members.
To say that such individuals are not appropriate for moral 
consideration, or are only appropriate insofar as our actions towards them 
have emotional consequences on others in our society, runs contrary to the 
normative guidelines of many, perhaps most, people. Although some might 
be tempted to view people in life imprisonment or in the final debilitating 
stages of cancer as morally worthless, or solely as means to the emotional 
ends of others, such is arguably not the usual moral position to take on the 
issue in a civilised society. Probably most people would regard a nonchalant 
onlooker to the drowning of a person with a relatively severe Down's 
Syndrome ^  failing to live up to one's moral responsibilities regarding that 
person, not merely to others in the society; in fact, it would seem irrelevant 
to wonder whether any other people in society care about or even know the 
individual. The fact that such a person cannot reciprocate such or other 
beneficence, means that in evolutionary terms it is disadvantageous to waste 
any energy in the attempt to save that individual. In moral terms, on the 
other hand, the situation seems very different.
254Ruse and Wilson (1986), 426; Ruse (1995), 273.
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One might object that it is an evolutionarily stable strategy to be 
altruistic to all members of a society (excluding cheats), for those who do 
not return the favour because of a lack of ability are not going to be very 
frequent. This is confused, however, for there is no evolutionarily 
significant difference between cheats and those who are unable to 
reciprocate for whatever reason. As far as biology is concerned, both types 
of individual do not reciprocate. Whether this is because of a lack of genetic 
disposition towards altruism, or a failure for any reason to live up to that 
disposition, is irrelevant. Altruism provided to such individuals is not 
returned, and so natural selection should favour a genetic disposition to 
withdraw altruism from those individuals. Any evolutionary strategy which 
advocated altruism in general would advocate it towards those with life 
sentences, the permanently bedridden, the terminally ill, and the mentally 
incoherent, but would also advocate altruism to cheats. Such would spell 
disaster for reciprocation, for cheats would then prosper and the altruistic 
strategy would eventually collapse. To claim that a strategy would ever 
develop any mechanism to distinguish between cheats and those unable to 
reciprocate for other reasons, requires that there be something particular 
about the latter group which can aid the reproductive potential of their 
benefactors. But the distinctiveness of that group is that they have nothing 
to give, and so no mechanism would ever develop to separate them from the 
more straightforward cheats.
Other entities which are nonreciprocating and thus outside of the 
realm of moral considerability on Ruse's view of morality, are any entities 
other than Homo sapiens. Ruse admits this, claiming that
'Morality is the creation of the genes to help us get on with 
our fellows, not to help us get on with physical creation. As 
such, we should not expect to find, as indeed we do not find.
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that morality has any existence beyond the relationships 
between individuals.'^^^
Of course, many views of moral responsibility regarding animals or the 
environment claim such to be a deduction from strictly human ethics. This 
might be called anthropocentrism in ethics. Although this issue will not be 
explored here, it is sufficient to bring up the fact that this is debated, and 
many believe the nature of our moral responsibilities regarding nonhuman 
entities to be of a sort that is not anthropocentric; i.e., that a natural entity 
besides a human can be a 'primary target for an ethic'.^^^
iii. The moral considerability of oneself
On Ruse's conception of morality, what one does to oneself is 
morally irrelevant. If altruism is the defining characteristic of morality, then 
attention to oneself is actually the antithesis of moral action, This is another 
implication from his denial 'that morality has any existence beyond the 
relationships between individuals'.^^^ If it were to have any such existence, 
such as in the care of one's own mind and body, it would be beyond the 
scope of Ruse's theory to explain it. In order to incorporate it, he would 
have to postulate that our biology has invented objective guidelines 
regarding our treatment of ourselves as well as that of others. By so doing, 
however, he would have to back down on two positions which are major 
points in his thesis. First, he would have to admit that morality is not 
limited to the interrelationships among human individuals. Once this barrier 
is down, however, there is no reason to believe that nothing else could 
possibly reside within the pale of human morality and moral consideration.
255rus6 (1995), 290-1.
256Roiston (1988), 1. The rest of the book is a defence of this view. A few of the other 
works which advocate a nonanthropocentric ethic are Leopold (1949); Singer (1975); 
Taylor (1986); Callicott (1989); Naess (1989); Attfield (1991). A debate closely related 
to this is whether there is 'intrinsic value' in nature or natural entities besides humans. An 
introduction to this discussion is the collection of articles in The Monist 75:2 (April 1992). 
257rusc(1995), 291.
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His theory would be reduced to one of a number of ways in which we are 
biologically motivated to perform certain actions we call 'moral' for some 
other reason. Second, he would have to redefine 'moral' as something other 
than 'other-regarding'. Once this is done, however, the identity he proposes 
between altruism and morality will be broken; and if morality is larger than 
altruism in this way, it might be larger than altruism in other ways as well. 
The nothing but will have been removed firom the thesis that 'morality is 
nothing but a vehicle for biological altruism'. Denial is therefore vital to his 
thesis.
Whether this accords with moral experience is another matter. Ruse 
has been criticised on the grounds that 'Self-regarding behavior need not be 
either amoral or immoral',^^^ and this does seem to accord with the bulk of 
the history of moral philosophy. Plato claims that justice, a fimdamental 
ethical term, consists in the harmony of the different aspects within a 
person.^^^ Aristotle concentrates on the happiness of the moral agent as an 
ethical end.^^® The Stoics preach that one should aim for one's own 
se r e n i t y . J o s e p h  Butler pointed out two facets of morality: the private 
and the public good, the former having to do with oneself Kant's 
practical imperative was: 'So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own 
person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means 
only'263 Nietzsche spoke of a 'creative egoism'.^^^ G. E. Moore claimed 
that one of the greatest ethical goods was one's own contemplation of 
b e a u t y T h e  list by no means stops here, for anyone who finds 
normative guidelines to have something to do with the nature of humanity.
258Rottschaoffcr and Martinson (1990), 380. 
^^^RepubliCy IV.443c-e.
^^^Nicomachean Ethics, I.
26lEpictetiis, The Discourses, IV.ch.3. 
262Butler (1726), 1.27-32.
263Kant(1785), H.47.
264Nietzsche (1889), no. 373.
263^QQre (1903), ch.6.
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will of course find oneself to possess filât nature just as much as another. 
Ruse himself even speaks briefly of duties to o n e s e l f , b u t  as has been 
noted by other critics, he 'does not seem to recognize its significance for the 
issues of the nature of moral sentiments and the content of morality'.^^^
iv. The content of sociability
In addition to the various classes of entities which are not rendered 
moral considerability on Ruse's view, there are other types of normative 
discrepancies even with regard to those whom Ruse does admit within the 
scope of morality. These discrepancies have to do with the particular 
guidelines that would be sanctioned for sociability as determined by the 
models for biological altruism. As another evolutionist has noted, if what is 
morally right is held to be a certain subset of those actions that 'achieve 
biological gain (because that is, in their view, why the moral sense evolved 
at all)' then this type of morality 'would justify social attitudes that many of 
us (sociobiologists included) would judge morally obtuse and even 
heinous'.^^^ To take a few examples: The rich are more likely to be able to 
reciprocate than the poor, so it seems likely that natural selection would 
favour those who developed a greater moral regard for the wealthy than for 
the impoverished. One's stepchildren or adopted children, not bearing 
anywhere near the same percentage of one's genes as a biological child, 
would not be entitled morally to the same treatment and preference given to 
other children, for such derives from kin selection; rather, one's moral 
responsibility to such children is the same as that to any other close member 
of the community, as reciprocal altruism would suggest. Natural selection 
would select for an individual who was able to determine correctly whether 
his reputation as an altruist was at stake in a specific situation; such an
266rusc (1986a), 217.
Martinsen (1990), 380. 
268Ayala (1987), 316.
Chapter III 232
evolutionarily refined person would not feel, and would therefore not have, 
any moral obligation to help someone who could not possibly discover his 
lack of altruism in a certain situation. Reciprocal altruism suggests that 
people who 'turn the other cheek', or repay evil with good, are deplorable, 
for those people are responsible for the success of cheats and they thus 
endanger the success of reciprocation in the community; natural selection 
would favour retaliation against such people in the name of morality, just as 
we should retaliate against the cheats themselves.
Other questionable moral guidelines exist, but these are enough to 
show that a translation of biologically adaptive altruism both leaves out 
many moral principles which are widely regarded as binding, and claims 
many principles to be moral which are widely regarded as appallingly 
immoral. Moreover, it is not merely the specific normative rules given by a 
sociobiological conception of morality that are severely misaligned with the 
nature of morality as most often conceived. The more fundamental, 
meta-ethical explanation of what morality is and what moral guidelines are 
like requires similarly focused critique.
c. From biologically sound altruism to morality: meta-ethical issues .
Ruse makes several statements about the characteristics of morality 
which would be considered meta-ethical, some of which have been 
described already. His claim that morality is prescriptive, universal and 
nonsubjective will not be criticised, as this description is relatively 
widespread. Other aspects, however, are more vulnerable to criticism.
i. Contingency of moral principles
It is one thing to say that the capacity we call morality is contingent 
on the evolutionary process; in other words, that we did not have to be 
moral creatures. It is, however, entirely different to say that the moral
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beliefs we hold are contingent, in the sense that they could be entirely 
different while we still remained moral beings. Ruse makes both claims: 
the first has already been accepted but found to licence no conclusions 
regarding the actuality of that which we believe about morality.^^^ The 
second claim requires a more directly ethical argument.
Ruse supports the contingency of our moral beliefs with the 
argument that if they were not contingent, and if our biology were different, 
moral codes would be absurd. If we had evolved from creatures that, for 
example, 'need to eat each other's faeces', some of what we consider to be 
objective moral guidelines would make no sense.^^^ This, however, places 
too strict a criterion on the objectivity of morality, a criterion that is not 
inherent in any of the three words which have been used by Ruse to 
characterise it (universality, prescriptivity, nonsubjectivity). In order to 
believe moral truths to be of any reasonably objective nature, there is no 
stipulation that, with any possible biological constitution, every normative 
guideline in morality must be exactly the same as it is with our present 
constitution. Surely, if adultery is wrong, our being able to marry is a 
necessary condition. Likewise, if killing is wrong, our being living creatures 
is a necessary condition. The normative guidelines in any ethical code, no 
matter how robust, depend to some extent on the nature of that organism 
which they concern. If we had the biology of termites, as Ruse imagines, 
there would clearly be no prohibition against feeding our children faeces.
But as it is, we are not termites, and the normative rules we embrace are 
therefore different. One does not have to be of any particular philosophical 
position, naturalist or not, to believe that our moral principles can only exist 
as they are because we are the way we are.
the argument of section D.ld. 
270r u s c  (1989), 270.
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This does not suggest a relativism about morality. Assuming that a 
moral creature with a biology different from our own is possible, our 
normative guidelines, in fact, might be interpreted as applications to our 
specific human nature of broader principles common to various possible 
natures. There is nothing in Ruse's argument to contradict the possibility 
that at a certain level, ethical principles are universal not only to all humans, 
but also to all possible moral creatures of whatever (hypothetical) biological 
constitution. In this case, it would only be as we describe the natures of 
individual moral creatures that these broader principles translate into more 
relevant guidelines for each type of creature. Therefore, his illustration does 
not prove anything except the fact that if we had a different biological 
constitution, we might have different moral principles on the normative 
level— a fact that no one need deny. So, Ruse's claim that moral principles 
are contingent is misleading, as it does not prohibit, nor even promote any 
degree of scepticism about, the objectivity of morality or the actuality of 
moral guidelines.
ii. Strict emotivism
Ruse's theory as to the origin of moral guidelines claims that 
morality is nothing but sentiment, in accordance with Wilson's belief.^^^ 
This presupposition is not mandated or even hinted by any of the findings of 
sociobiology or general evolutionary biology that have been discussed here, 
and yet Ruse and Wilson both adopt the view without much attempt to 
justify their position. Many philosophers believe emotion to be an important 
part of morality in some way, but whether morality is solely a matter of
271rusc (1986), 236; Wilson (1975), 3-4.
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feelings is a very hotly debated point in moral ph i lo s oph y , an d  one's 
position on the matter requires some support. An obvious class of 
alternatives is some degree of rationalism. Peter Singer makes this point:
'There is an alternative to regarding ethics as no more than 
the outpouring of our emotions. Ethical judgments may have 
a rational component. In his zeal to take over ethics, Wilson 
overlooks this position, held by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the 
Stoics, Aquinas, Kant, Sidgwick, and many other 
philosophers. The debate over the roles played by reason and 
emotion in ethics has been at the center of Western ethical 
philosophy since its beginnings in ancient Greece; yet 
Wilson assumes without argument that reason has no 
significant part to play in ethics.'^^^
To Ruse and Wilson, one may present the perennial problems that 
have dogged strict emotivism. For instance, that moral disagreement is 
possible and susceptible to some degree of rational argument has been 
identified as something without which a theory cannot possibly be 
considered ethical.^^^ Emotivists find it difficult either to incorporate or 
explain away such aspects of morality. This and other arguments will not be 
elaborated here. Instead, one point will be mentioned regarding the way 
Ruse establishes his emotivism and, consequently, his meta-ethical 
scepticism.
Wilson began the elaboration of sociobiology in his magnum opus 
with the claim that 'The biologist' knows that the work of 'ethical 
philosophers' is the consultation of emotions.^^^ It is this presupposition, 
not defended but assumed fi:om the beginning, which lays the foundation for 
Wilson's project: to use this realisation, plus sociobiological knowledge, to
272smith (1994a), th .l. Significant arguments against or alternatives to emotivism in 
recent decades include T. Nagel (1970); Foot (1972); (1978); Midgley (1981); B. 
Williams (1981); Korsgaard (1986); Brink (1986), (1989), 39ff.; Hare (1989); (1989a); 
Wallace (1990); McDowell (1978); (1979); (1995); Dancy (1993); (1995); Blackburn 
(1995); Lawrence (1995).
273singer (1981), 86-7.
274smith (1994a), 38-9.
275wilson(1975),3.
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'explain ethics and ethical philosophers... to all depths'.^^^ Michael Ruse, 
working from Wilson's results, seeks to use them to determine the nature of 
morality. As has been repeatedly described here, one of his conclusions is 
that our morality, no matter how objective it may seem to us, is actually a 
set of figments of our imagination, genetically-induced hallucinations. They 
serve a purpose, but not at all like that which we have always thought.
The peculiar thing about this train of reasoning is that the conclusion 
follows from that first presupposed claim of Wilson's, twenty years before 
Ruse's most significant elaboration of his ethical theory. Sociobiological 
ethics has begun and ended with the claim that morality is really subjective, 
in that it is a matter of emotion on the order of, in Wilson's words, 'hate, 
love, guilt, fear, and others'. This having been Wilson's springboard, it is 
strange to see it presented as Ruse's destination. In this light, the conclusion 
that moral guidelines are subjective and meta-ethically unjustifiable is not 
surprising, given that this view was already implicit in the raw materials 
which Ruse used in the construction of his theory. Insofar as he uses 
Wilson's emotivism-laden view of the connection between biological 
altruism and morality to begin his case, subjectivism and consequently 
meta-ethical scepticism are foregone conclusions. A very strange 
conclusion within the context of Wilson's strict emotivism, perhaps unheard 
of in moral philosophy, would be that moral guidelines were also justifiable 
and truly objective in the sense of referring to a moral truth above and 
beyond our biological constitution. Such would require a peculiar, 
presumably coincidental match between what we happen to feel for 
biological reasons, and what is justifiably and objectively right regardless of 
our biology. Meta-ethical scepticism of the sort Ruse describes, therefore, 
seems inevitable given his presuppositions. Given this fact, Ruse's uses of
276ibid.
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evolutionary theory and models of biological altruism are, to the end of 
justifying his meta-ethical scepticism, irrelevant.
Moreover, the sanie sociobiological evidence could be used in a 
context which does not justify his position at all, if the initial 
presuppositions about morality are different. If one is already a meta-ethical 
sceptic, sociobiological data can help one to fill out one's position, as it has 
in Ruse's case: morality is nothing more than a set of emotional 
predilections which serve the biological function of assuring that we exhibit 
certain types of behaviour. However, if one is not a meta-ethical sceptic to 
begin with, one is not likely to get beyond page 3 of Wilson's Sociobiotogy 
without insoluble philosophical disagreement. Such a person can accept all 
of what is presented and documented as the empirical matter of 
so c i o b i o l o g y b u t  can have a much different view on the meta-ethical 
significance of kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, and so on. If morality is 
thought to be not at all like emotions constructed to assure biological 
altruism (which, if the arguments of the foregoing pages are sound, seems to 
be the case), then one can agree with everything Ruse and Wilson say about 
the emotions or psychological tendencies towards biological altruism which 
have evolved, without assenting to that drastic presupposition/foregone 
conclusion, that the emotions or tendencies which are being discussed define 
morality.
iii. The illusory nature of meta-ethics (except for Ruse's)
Perhaps the standard type of critical argument offered to any 
meta-ethical theory is the claim that it mischaracterises central features of 
morality. Philosophers have understandably begun to employ this familiar 
strategy in critique of Ruse's theory. He has been criticised, rightly or 
wrongly, for inadequately accounting for 'the full-fledged moral modalities
constraints on the applicability of this term see section D. la.
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of prescriptivity and universality that are associated with the experiences of 
obligation and duty'.^^^ He has been said to have neglected the fact that 
'impartiality and categorical content are among the defining characteristics 
of the m o r a l ' . I t  has been claimed that he does not recognise the 
'importance of the agent's knowing and being able to reflect upon the value 
of his own acts' which is 'a central aspect of ethical conduct being ethical at 
a ll'280 Qj. necessary element to morality of determining 'how the 
conflicting desires of different individuals are to be adjudicated'.^^ ^
Whether any of these accusations is meta-ethically well-founded, 
however, is likely to be viewed by a defender of Ruse's theory as an 
irrelevancy. The reason for this is that the theory claims meta-ethics itself to 
be part of the illusion. According to the theory, the universality, 
prescriptivity, and nonsubjectivity of morality are manufactured by our 
genes in order to assure certain behaviours. Meta-ethics is the field within 
which those three features, and presumably others, are discovered and 
explicated as features of moral experience. Any non-Rusean meta-ethics is 
therefore the philosophical study of an illusion, or the attempt to elucidate 
the truth of a matter whose one truth is that all the other 'truths' are merely 
the result of a genetically-induced hallucinosis. If one wishes to entertain 
notions of impartiality and categorical content, of knowledge, reflection and 
disagreement in morality, then Ruse need not refute such claims 
philosophically. He need only apply one of two general arguments. If the 
feature at hand would tend to reinforce our likelihood of performing 
effective altruism (e.g., categorical content). Ruse can claim it to be part of 
the illusion. On the other hand, if the feature would tend not to reinforce our 
likelihood of performing effective altruism (such as the possibility of moral
^^^Rottschaeffer and Martinsen (1990), 386, 
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disagreement), Ruse can accept this as well, as merely a feature of the 
evolutionarily necessary implausibility of his view. There are good 
evolutionary reasons why we should view Ruse's theory as ridiculous even if 
it were true. As he says, 'if we recognized morality to be no more than an 
epiphenomenon of our biology, we would cease to believe in it and stop 
acting on it.'^^^ Any features of morality which seem to contradict Ruse's 
theory are thus actually supporting it, for they can be said to have been 
developed in order to ensure that we never discover the truth about 
morality.^^^ In his own words, 'Just as the Freudian argues that those who 
deny his or her explanation thereby confirm it, so the evolutionist argues that 
those who find his or her explanation implausible support the very point 
which is being made!'^^^
The problem with such a dictatorial, 'heads-I-win, tails-you-lose' 
strategy, is that it elevates beyond the bounds of falsifiability what is 
intended as a theory to be tested. If a theory includes some means of 
incorporating any opposition to itself, it has theoretically removed the 
possibility of being weighed for its merits and found wanting. Although 
wrong in any theory, the illegitimacy of such a strategy is especially obvious 
in the context of Ruse's naturalism. He claims that science is the proper 
realm within which to understand his meta-ethical theory, and that science 
necessarily requires the operations of'adjusting, revising, rejecting', among 
others.^^^ But, by using the argument above. Ruse is claiming that any 
attempt at rejection from the perspective of meta-ethics can be incorporated 
into his theory, and all such objections can therefore be disarmed. His
282Ruse(1991), 507.
283This, of course, is shorthand for the actual mechanism: those proto-humans who were 
able to 'see through' the illusion would not be altruistic, whereas those who had ideas which 
caused them to be fooled by the illusion would be altruistic. Altruism being adaptive, those 
who could see through the illusion would tend to decrease in the population relative to the 
others.
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theory, under such a conception, is invulnerable from the perspective of 
meta-ethics. To those v/ho disagree with him about the nature of morality, 
he has stated: 'All I can say... is that their genes are deceiving them and, as 
usual, they are doing a good job.'^^^ This negates any possible meta-ethical 
argument, but at the expense of his scientific world-view. In maintaining his 
theory as an invulnerable dogma, which can incorporate attempts at 
opposition. Ruse has transformed what he intended to be a scientific position 
into a matter of blind faith. Only by seriously considering meta-ethical 
arguments can a scientific theory of morality claim to have incorporated 
meta-ethics. Otherwise, it seems all too convenient, as well as 
question-begging, for a theorist to claim that all other meta-ethical theories 
but his own are parts of an elaborate illusion.
As a final note on the illusory nature of meta-ethics, the extent of this 
illusion must be emphasised. Ruse claims not only that certain genes 
control our thoughts in certain ways, but that they do so to such an extent 
and with such elaboration that moral philosophy can proceed for thousands 
of years within the illusion. This illusion is so complex and has such 
refinement and depth that hundreds of philosophers can spend their lives 
expounding on it. Ethics can be approached from the perspective of 
individual virtues, or from the perspective of an overarching idea. One can 
concentrate on a property such as goodness which could be attributed to 
concepts and objects apart from human actions, or on a property such as 
rightness which is centred on human action. One can discuss morality in 
terms of rules or consequences; describe its relation to aesthetics or 
metaphysics or religion; enlarge upon the meaning of moral terms and the 
fimction of moral language; and entertain various hypotheses as to the way 
in which we come to know, decide or distinguish in morality. Moral 
principles can be applied to the entire range of human endeavours, including
286ibid.,291.
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business, law, the environment, medicine, and technology. Ethics is an area 
which has seen an immense amount of reflection, introspection, and thought 
in at least the past few millenia. In order for Ruse's theory to be correct, the 
mechanism for producing such an illusion must be psychologically powerful 
enough to withstand all of this scrutiny, and the illusion itself must be so 
intricate and complex that moral philosophers can spend this much energy 
and time delving through it. Given these gargantuan requirements of the 
illusion, it seems as though such a theorist has a great responsibility to 
defend his idea against the history of moral philosophy which stands in 
opposition to it. This is especially so when, as is the case here, no 
mechanism nor empirical evidence has been presented for how such an 
illusion could have come into place or how extensive it is claimed to be.
iv. Comparison with moral experience
All of the claims against Ruse which were mentioned in the 
beginning of the last argument (iii) have the commonality of comparing the 
treatment of morality in his work to what the critics believe is properly 
considered morality. This comparison is reminiscent of G. E. Moore's Open 
Question Argument, where two terms such as 'good' and 'pleasure' are 
compared in order to discern whether they are the same concept. Ruse's 
theory is synthetic, however, and as such it is not liable to the types of 
criticism that could undermine a semantic theory. However, as was shown 
towards the end of the last chapter,^*^ even synthetic theories have been 
criticised for ignoring what is considered by critics on the basis of moral 
experience to be the case. To take an extreme example, no one would take 
Ruse's theory seriously if he had claimed that morality was a physical object 
made of wood on which people sit. This is true regardless of whether the 
theory was defended on the basis of the meamngs of words, or on the basis
287n.D.3.
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of scientific evidence. It might be said that experience, in a very broad 
sense, speaks too strongly and obviously in opposition to such a claim. 
Therefore, at least to some extent, this type of criticism of synthetic 
naturalism does have plausibility. The general question, then, is whether 
Ruse's characterisation of morality is close enough to experience to warrant 
consideration as an ethical theory, rather than just a theory of biological 
altruism or tendencies towards sociability, etc. Merely to state that morality 
is the same as tendencies towards sociability begs this question, which is no 
more justifiable than in the case of claiming morality to be the same thing as 
a chair.
The difficulty with such criticisms, however, is how to determine 
which of two experiences called 'morality' (the one criticised or the one 
underlying the critic's position) to accept as the truer account. If, as Ruse 
believes, there is a proper way to understand morality, and other ways are 
improper, the question remains as to how to adjudicate between two people's 
conceptions of it. A feature of synthetic naturalism, unlike semantic, is that 
one's theory does not have to accord with linguistic convention. In terms of 
the Open Question Argument, criticism of semantic naturalism could rest on 
what might be agreed upon as the 'ordinary language conception of 
morality', an a priori claim.^^^ This would be taken as morality A. When 
criticising an ethical theory, say one that defines morality B, one could 
simply compare A and B. Insofar as they differ, the Open Question 
Argument suggests that B fails to account for all that is in A, and so is 
refuted as an analytical account of morality. With synthetic naturalism, 
however, there is no morality A that is considered an a priori foundation for 
such criticism. The synthetic naturalist, whether reductive or nonreductive 
of moral terms, claims that natural science points out a particular ethical
of course, is the ideal situation for analytical philosophers. In reality, things are 
not as clean; there are serious differences of opinion as to what the 'ordinary language' 
conception of morality includes. See II.C.4a.
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theory, even if some serious moral philosophy is required to elucidate that 
ethical theory. ^
One way of assessing synthetically naturalistic theories is by a 
method analogous to the examination of semantic theories. The Open 
Question Argument relies on the relation between the meanings of a 
proposed ethical definition, md the actual meanings of moral terms. 
Likewise, we can rely in synthetic arguments on the relation between 
proposed and actual facts or states of affairs. In a way, this is what has been 
done all along in the critical half of this chapter. First, what Ruse claims to 
be the facts of science on which he bases his meta-ethic were challenged. 
Second, what is evidently Ruse's moral experience was compared and 
contrasted with what many others experience as morality.^^^
This second mode of critique requires some elaboration. As has 
already been discussed, there are several discrepancies between morality as 
Ruse portrays it, and other conceptions of morality held by people. For 
instance, according to Ruse's morality, certain significant groups such as the 
immoral and people who are unable to perform altruistic actions, are not 
morally considerable unless they are family members. Neither non-human 
entities nor one's own person are appropriate for inclusion in the realm of 
moral considerability either, except via other people. Prejudice against, 
perhaps even retaliation towards, certain individuals such as those that do 
not return kindness and those who forgive wrongdoing rather than hold 
grudges, is a necessary part of the scheme of morality. Morality, 
furthermore, is entirely a matter of emotional drives towards certain 
behaviours, with no possibility for rational discussion or resolution of 
disagreements. On the other hand, it is very possible, and actually very
289;n the following discussion, the term 'moral experience' will be used, and might be 
thought to imply that we have no choice as to the moral rules we live by. Although this is 
Ruse's position (Ruse (1989), 269; (1995), 252f), the use of this term is not intended to beg 
this question.
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common, to find people espousing a view of morality which differs firom 
Ruse's on all of these matters.
Take P to be a person who disagrees with Ruse on the nature of 
moral experience in all of the ways mentioned in the last paragraph. In 
order for P to have a reason to think his beliefs as to what morality is all 
about are an illusion. Ruse's view would have to present an interpretation of 
P's own experience of morality, rather than that of some experience which is 
not P's own, or of an experience which is not of morality. The examples 
above show that Ruse presents a theory that provides an interpretation of 
experiences P  does not have (e.g., the experience of finding objective 
guidelines to adhere only to the relationships between reciprocating 
members of a society), and so P has no reason to take such things as having 
anything to do with morality. Also, Ruse's theory provides an interpretation 
of experiences P has, but not what P  would consider moral experiences 
(e.g., the desire to hold grudges against those who do not return kindness), 
and so P has no reason to take those experiences or their interpretation as 
pertaining to morality either. The lack of reason in both of these cases stems 
firom the fact of P's experience, something which is not adequately reflected 
in the theory Ruse presents.
This does not mean that any ethical theory P  might produce is the 
correct one. P  could be misinterpreting his experience of morality. P could 
be misunderstanding its significance. As Ruse suggests, P could even be 
living an illusion with respect to it. However, the only way in which P 
could have any reason for believing this, is for a theory to start out by 
presenting a picture of morality which accords with P's own experience. If 
Ruse's theory presents a picture of something which does not look much like 
what P  experience as morality, P has no reason to believe that what Ruse is 
talking about is morality. Therefore, even if a theory is entirely internally 
consistent, it can still be rejected as an ethical theory if it presents a view of
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morality which does not coincide at the level of basic experience with that 
which one finds morality to be about. In fact one must, on pain of 
self-contradiction, reject that theory, or else deny one's experience. This 
mode of critique is analogous to arguments provided against previous levels 
of naturalism. Just as Hume's Law claims logical naturalism to represent 
incorrectly the conventions of logic as many people accept them; and just as 
the 'naturalistic fallacy' claims semantic naturalism to have used language 
that fits ill with many people's views of the meanings of words; likewise the 
present argument is that Michael Ruse's synthetic naturalist theory achieves 
its ends only by representing moral experience in a way which does not 
resemble that of many people.
One might suggest that this argumentation is unfair to Ruse, who 
might be postulating a correct view of morality, rather than the view which 
everyone holds now. It may be that all of those people whose experience is 
incongruent with Ruse's description of it are simply wrong. This might be a 
worthy defence of other views, but not that of Ruse. The reason is that Ruse 
is attempting a descriptive account of morality. He is not preaching to us as 
to what we ought to take as morally right and wrong. He is claiming that we 
already do have views of right and wrong, and he is explaining, with 
sociobiology, why we believe the way we do. We hold our genes in 
common, and so we should hold our moral experience in common, for our 
moral experience (Ruse claims) flows fi'om our genetic code. Any discord 
between Ruse and others as to the nature of moral experience is a piece of 
evidence against the notion that Ruse's theory is an description and 
explanation of human moral experience. He is definitely describing 
something, but whether that something is morality depends on what one 
takes morality to be. If, as Ruse believes, we have no choice about oin 
moral experience because it is part of our biology, then his theory is false 
because it fails to describe adequately certain aspects of what people do
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indeed experience as part of morality. If, on the other hand, we are 
unconstrained by our biology enough to have some ability to choose our 
moral precepts, then there is no assurance that we will happen to choose 
moral precepts in line with the theory Ruse presents. Therefore, whether 
one is a determinist about moral experience does not matter: Ruse's theory 
does not work either way.
£ . Conclusions
Synthetically naturalistic ethical theories describe morality within 
the confines of what science says about the world. In order to be able to 
assess the merits of such theories, one must attend to both the science and 
the moral philosophy which are involved. Attention to science is required in 
order to determine whether the factual claims that are the foundation for the 
theory are both accurate and adequate. Attention to moral philosophy is 
required to the extent that the ethical theory makes descriptive claims 
regarding the nature of moral experience or the way in which people regard 
morality. In this chapter such attention was given to the science and moral 
philosophy involved in one such ethical theory: Michael Ruse's 
'evolutionary naturalism'.
An examination of the scientific basis for Ruse's claims provides 
great insight into both their accuracy and their adequacy. Evolutionary 
biology, particularly as combined with modem genetical theory, has 
provided a solid foundation for the more recent discipline of sociobiology. 
Sociobiology is in some sense a particular application of evolutionary 
theory, but it breaks new ground and therefore encounters new problems. 
Certain empirical matters have not been definitively settled in the young 
science even apart fi-om human morality, although some are basic
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assumptions necessary to its practice. Examples of these assumptions are: 
the continuity between nonhumans and humans such that empirical evidence 
gathered primarily from the latter can be applied to the former; the 
insignificance of both culture and choice relative to the genes in shaping 
psychological/behavioural traits; the existence of answers in terms of 
adaptive value to questions of how traits have become widespread in a 
population; and the relative insignificance of group Selection except in 
special circumstances which are ultimately based on conventional natural 
selection facilitated by the replication of genetic information. These 
assumptions have varying degrees of empirical support at the present time, 
and all have been subjects of varying degrees of debate in recent years. If, 
as has been granted for the sake of this chapter's argument, these 
assumptions are correct to a sufficient extent for sociobiology to be a 
workable discipline, such evolutionary explanations of biological altruism as 
kin selection, reciprocation, and manipulation are appropriate and 
well-supported.
More significant problems arise as such information regarding 
biological altruism is applied to human morality, as is attempted in Ruse's 
works. Ruse's claims that his position is an empirical one ^ e  inconsistent 
with the actual way in which he presents and defends his theory. The only 
empirical evidence provided is that which supports biological or effective 
altruism. However, connections between effective and intentional altruism, 
and between intentional altruism and morality, arc also made. As to the 
truth of these connections there are reasons for serious doubt. First, in order 
for a connection between effective and intentional altruism to be maintained, 
intentional altruism itself must produce behavioural effects in line with 
effective altruism. There are significant barriers to this, however. Not only 
do effects often fail to square with our intentions, but intentional altruism 
continues to operate outside of the crucial boundaries which are in place
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with respect to biological altruism. Outside of those boundaries, intentional 
altruism is significantly maladaptive. Intentional altruism as a whole, then, 
is doubtful as an adaptive strategy. Second, in order for the connection to 
morality to be made, the psychological illusion of objective guidelines must 
be an efficient and adaptive means of producing behaviour in line with 
effective altruism. Ruse does not recognise the existence of a broad range of 
alternatives. These are simpler, and are actually found in nature, as opposed 
to the idea of illusory objective guidelines which would be extremely 
psychologically complicated, is not found in any other aspect of human or 
other animal existence, and is entirely speculative. The support that is 
provided for the hallucinatory mechanism for altruism is the peculiarly 
non-self-regarding nature of altruism, but this claim confuses effective 
altruism with intentional altruism. We are disposed to be 'altruistic' in 
certain ways, according to sociobiology, in the same way and for the same 
reason that we are disposed to be 'selfish' in other ways. Both tend to 
contribute to the persistence of one's own genetic information. There is no 
peculiarity of altruism, then, that should require an outlandish mechanism to 
assure that behaviour. There are also internal problems with the idea that 
illusory objective guidelines could be adaptive, such as the 'situation-action' 
time lag due to the reflection and deliberation that is required in order to 
make moral decisions, and the fact that objective guidelines often fail to 
produce behaviours. Therefore, not only is there not a valid connection 
between effective altruism and intentional altruism, but Ruse's idea of 
illusory objective guidelines is not a plausible biological hypothesis as to the 
way in which altruistic behaviour could be assured.
In addition. Ruse's secondary argument, regarding the contingency of 
morality on the evolutionary process, fails to establish his conclusion that 
morality cannot be truly objective. His argument depends on at least two 
assumptions: that there is no adaptive value to a genuinely objective
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morality, and that something with no adaptive value would not become 
actualised in human psychology. Ruse's own theory seems to undermine the 
first assumption, but even if it is true the second assumption is an abuse of 
evolutionary theory. There is no warrant for the claim that something 
cannot exist if it is not adaptive.
There are also arguments from the perspective of moral philosophy 
which tell against Ruse's theory. Since Ruse is claiming to provide a 
descriptive account of the moral guidelines which humans do have, any 
significant discrepancies between his theory and the moral beliefs of people 
is evidence against the idea that what Ruse is describing can be considered 
morality. In fact, many such discrepancies are found. For instance, few 
would clmm that it is moral to withhold moral considerability from those 
who do not exhibit altruistic behaviour themselves, either by their own 
choice or for one of many reasons not in their control. On Ruse's theory, 
however, such exclusivity must be a vital aspect of morality if it is to be a 
vehicle for effective altruism. On Ruse's theory the identity of the 
individual in a situation is of vital importance; but in morality it tends not to 
be. This same argument can be repeated with respect to nonhuman entities, 
and even oneself. With regard to the latter, the history of moral philosophy 
is replete with discussion of the relevance of duties to oneself. In fact, many 
significant theories present this as the root of all morality. Ruse, in order for 
his theory to be sound, must deny the fact that people do have such moral 
beliefs. Other normative discrepancies between Ruse's ethical theory and 
the moral experience of many , people are found in the particular types of 
actions which are or could be sanctioned from the perspective of effective 
altruism. All of these arguments show that as a description of the moral 
guidelines embraced by people. Ruse's theory rules out many things which 
are widely regarded as moral principles, and claims many things to be 
morally obligatory or permissible which are widely regarded as immoral.
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At the meta-ethical level, Ruse's theory raises important issues which 
are not adequately dealt with. First, his argument for the contingency of 
moral principles is based on an extraordinary and radical conception of the 
objectivity people ascribe to normative moral guidelines. Second, necessary 
to his theory is a strict emotivism whereon moral guidelines are perceived as 
sentiments and acted upon because of their force. Ruse does not argue 
cogently for this extreme and controversial position. Actually, he argues in 
a circle, as the position plays a role in both the 'empirical' basis for and the 
meta-ethical conclusion of his theory. The illusory nature of objective moral 
guidelines is a foregone conclusion, therefore, given his initial assumptions. 
Third, central to Ruse's theory is that meta-ethics as a discipline is 
wrongheaded because it deals with the nature of moral guidelines, which 
themselves are hallucinations. Ruse thus presents his own meta-ethical 
theory as the only undeceived meta-ethical theory as a matter of assumption, 
and by so doing has incorporated into his theory the instant refutation of all 
other meta-ethics. This begs the question, and raises Ruse's theory beyond 
the bounds of rational argument. Any possible moral philosophical 
problems with his theory can simply be considered by him as part of the 
illusion of morality (if it is contrary) or as part of the reality of it (if it is 
advantageous). Fourth, and building on the previous arguments. Ruse's 
theory of morality is at its root a matter of describing what people do 
consider to be morality. This is the content of the illusion which he claims 
to be widespread since it is rooted in the genetic information of humans. 
However, what Ruse has characterised as the illusion is so different from 
what many people actually consider morality to be about, that there seems 
no reason to consider what he describes to be morality.
These lines of argument, both the scientific and the moral 
philosophical, show there to be fundamental problems with Ruse's theory. 
As a whole, the connections that are made between effective altruism.
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intentional altruism, and human morality are not supported by empirical 
evidence, but on the contrary are very dubious. The incongruencies between 
effective and intentional altruism, the unlikelihood of objective guidelines 
being the vehicle for the former, and the unsoundness of the arguments in 
support of these points, render this sociobiological account of morality 
highly implausible. Moreover, the differences between the moralities 
embraced by people and the picture provided by Ruse's theory are so great 
that one must conclude that which is described in the theory not to be 
morality. This is true at the normative level, where people's beliefs diverge 
widely from that which they would have to be in order for Ruse's theory to 
be true. It is also true at the meta-ethical level, where problems raised with 
Ruse's theory are overcome only by begging the question or misrepresenting 
the nature of the moral beliefs held by people.
The sociobiological thesis which formed the empirical basis for 
Ruse's moral philosophy was simply that there are good evolutionary 
reasons for humans and other social animals to behave in certain ways which 
do not directly benefit themselves. One reason for this is the incongruency 
between the set of actions that promote the persistence of one's genes and 
the set of those that promote one's own individual welfare. Another reason 
for this is that certain actions can benefit oneself in the long run even though 
they are a net disadvantage immediately. Perhaps this sociobiological 
information can explain why we are psychologically motivated to care for 
our young, to help our relatives, and to co-operate in society. Sociobiology 
can perhaps provide an explanation as to why being kind to those who are 
kind to us is not generally difficult, whereas being kind to those who are 
indifferent or hostile to us usually is. Sociobiology gives some content to 
the idea that it is 'natural' to be more caring towards one's own family and 
community than to those far away. It may provide a biological explanation 
as to why such things as patriotism, xenophobia, cliques, esprit de corps.
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nepotism, concern for reputation, friendship, and loyalty are prevalent 
aspects of our society. It may explain why people so easily hate hypocrites 
and traitors, and why those who repay evil with kindness are often branded 
as spineless or feebleminded. Sociobiology may provide an explanation 
why we have a psychological tendency towards these things; but there 
seems no reason at all to suspect that this psychological tendency is what our 
morality consists in. Many of those things can be morally right or at least 
permissible, whereas many others be morally wrong. Psychological 
tendency may tell us what comes easy (probabilistically speaking), and so 
we may now begin to understand why some things are so easily done 
whereas others are so difficult. To confuse this with morality, however, is to 
claim that whatever comes easy, or whatever one has a psychological 
tendency to do, must be right. Perhaps some hold this position; but surely it 
should not be foisted upon us as having any basis in science.
A question left open for discussion at this point is whether there is a 
theme in this critique that can be developed into a more generally applicable 
argument relative to synthetic naturalism. To provide an answer to this 
question is the project of the next and final chapter.
Chapter IV: SYNTHETIC NATURALISM AND THE 
ARGUMENT FROM MORAL EXPERIENCE
Synthetic naturalists attempt an experientially based, a posteriori 
account of morality and its significance. With a few exceptions,^ this is the 
point to which naturalism in ethics has come at the end of the twcnlictli 
century.^ Naturalistic moral philosophy has been urged in this direction by 
repeated criticisms of other types of naturalism which relied more heavily on 
the structure of logic and language.^ Like .any other philosophical theories, 
synthetically naturalistic theories are subject to scrutiny to determine 
whether they are internally consistent and do not contradict any known facts. 
Like any other naturalistic ethical theories, they are subject to examination 
as to their adherence to the dogma of naturalism: that only principles, 
properties or terms that are accessible to science can be employed. A 
peculiarity of synthetic naturalist theories, however, is the fact that they 
claim hot to take an a priori approach to understanding what morality and 
moral concepts are. This means that statements asserting fundamental truths 
about morality are not self-evidently true, nor do they gain their justification 
from the fact that they follow logically from or are analytically equivalent to 
other kinds of true statements. According to the synthetic naturalist, in order 
to describe the nature of morality one can and must appeal to experience.
Igee n.C.4b.
2see II.C.4C, D.1-2.
3por those other types of naturalism, see LB. 1-2. For the criticisms, see II.B-C. For how a 
synthetic approach is thought to overcome them, see II.C.5.
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with the constraint that all principles, properties and terms involved are 
appropriate for use in scientific explanations.
As was shown in the critique of Michael Ruse's evolutionary 
naturalism in the last chapter, however, there can be significant disparity 
between the descriptions of the nature of morality provided by a synthetic 
naturalist theory, and the nature of morality as it is often held by people. To 
what extent this is problematic, and what (if anything) this means for 
naturalism, will be the focus of discussion in this chapter.
A. The Argument from Moral Experience
1. SYNTHETIC NATURALISTS AND COMMONALITIES IN MORAL 
EXPERIENCE
a, Causal theories o f reference: looking to moral speakers for the meanings 
o f moral words
Aside from reliance on the a posteriori rather than the a priori, 
critical commentators Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have identified 
five other distinctive features of the synthetic approach to naturalism.^ Four 
of these have already been discussed to varying extents in this thesis. One is 
the synthetic naturalist's reliance on the fact that a single entity can be 
represented or referred to with two terms which are not synonymous.^ A 
second is the distinction made between reductive and nonreductive forms of 
naturalism.^ A third is the claim first defended by Saul Kripke and Hilary 
Putnam that some a posteriori assertions can be true necessarily, in the sense
^Horgan and Timmons (1991), 450-2. 
^See I.C.3, II.C.5, D.l.
^See I.B.3, Ü.D.2.
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that they are true 'in all logically possible worlds'.^ Fourth is the view,
based on recent developments in the philosophy of mind, that some
properties (moral properties in this case) might be 'functional' properties in
the same way that the mind is said by some philosophers to be a 'function' of
the body.^ As has been shown in the relevant sections, not all synthetic
naturalists utilise all of these claims; however, all of these claims are
distinctive to synthetic naturalism and are not used in support of logical or
semantic naturalism.
One final distinctive feature of synthetic naturalism discussed by
Horgan and Timmons has not yet been discussed explicitly in this thesis.
They discuss a particular approach to understanding how terms in languages
refer to entities, an approach embodied in 'causal theories of reference'. This
import from Kripke's philosophy of language^ is encapsulated by Horgan
and Timmons with the description that with respect to certain types of terms
(moral terms in this case), their 'reference is "grounded" by relevant causal
hookups between speakers and the world'. A degree of clarification of the
nature of these 'causal hookups' is provided by Kripke himself:
'In general, our reference depends not just on what we think 
ourselves, but on other people in the commumty, the history 
of how the name reached one, and things like that. It is by 
following such a history that one gets to the reference.'^ ^
So, according to causal theories of reference, certain entities in the world are 
responsible for causing a term to be used by any given speaker in a certain 
way. Although these entities include the actual referent itself, 
predominantly these entities are comprised of other people who use that 
term. As stated in one discussion of this type of theory, 'a speaker within a
^See I.B.2a. The seminal works referred to are Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975). Knpke 
(1980) and Horgan and Timmons (1991) explore some of the implications of this point. 
^See n.D.2.
^Kripke (1971), (1972).
 ^^ Horgan and Timmons (1991), 452.
^Kripke (1971), 79.
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language speaking group can trace his use of the term back to the referent of 
the term by virtue of his connection with other speakers of the language'. 
Furthermore, causal theories of reference emphasise that they do not 'depend 
upon what zin individual or group thinks a term refers to, but on the shared 
reference accepted by the whole community of speakers of a language that 
uses it to refer to something.'
Horgan and Timmons describe the pervasiveness of this approach 
among synthetic naturalists, and explain how particular synthetic naturalists 
defend and utilise it. In the course of this discussion, the pioneering 
synthetic naturalist Richard Boyd is recognised by these commentators as 
one of the most explicit defenders of such a view. In Boyd's own words, 
'The reference of a term is established by causal connections of the right sort 
between the use of the term and (instances of) its referent'. The point
here, and the relation to synthetic naturalism, is that a replacement for 
analytical semantics has been sought by synthetic naturalists in order to 
organise and provide meanings for our moral terms, and the most significant 
replacement to date^^ has relied on these 'causal hookups between speakers 
and the world'. Furthermore, as the above passages show, these causal 
hookups are rooted in how people do in fact use those terms. Knpke's 
primary indication for determining the reference of terms, again, was 'other 
people in the community'. More specifically, the proper reference of a 
term is 'the shared reference accepted by the whole commumty of 
speakers'. ^  ^  One straightforward implication of this new approach to 
semantics is that although synthetic naturalists do not justify their ethical
 ^^ Powers (1992), 460.
Hibid., 461.
^Boyd (1988), 195.
i^The causal tiieory of reference is significant enough for Horgan and Timmons, in the 
review portion of their aforementioned article, to describe it alone as the replacement for 
analytical semantics in the new wave of naturalism.
16Kripke(1971),79.
I ^ Powers (1992), 461.
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theories on the basis of the meanings of words, they do not ignore semantics 
altogether. They do recognise that terms must have senses and referents in 
order for communication with words to be at all possible. Moreover, any 
synthetic naturalist, since a priori definitions for moral terms are not 
acceptable,^ ^  must look somewhere other than analytical semantics to find a 
basis on which to organise our moral language and thereby understand each 
other when we refer to moral properties, states of mind, ideas, et cetera. 
Horgan and Timmons claim that in this search for a basis of reference for 
moral terms, synthetic naturalists must rely on how people actually use the 
relevant terms. This view is explicitly defended by Boyd. This parlieular 
feature, inherent in at least many notable varieties of synthetic naturalism, is 
very similar to a certain feature in Ruse's theory which facilitated a great 
deal of the criticisms offered in the last chapter.
b. Rusean ethics: looking to moral agents for the nature o f morality
In the last chapter, most of the critique of Ruse's theory from the 
ethical perspective included a comparison of the stated or unstated 
implications of Ruse's theory with common conceptions of morality held by 
moral teachers, philosophers and people.^^ In many cases the suggestion 
was made that there is a significant disparity between the way Ruse portrays 
human morality as people experience it, and the way many people do in fact 
find morality to be. This type of criticism of Ruse is valid because Ruse's 
theory rests on a particular description of what people do, as a matter of fact, 
find morality to be like.^^ In accordance with this, he says that he knows no 
other way for people really to understand (and agree with) his 
characterisation of moral experience than for them to 'examine themselves
18Boyd(1988), 196; Ruse (1995), 2.
19Boyd(1988), 195.
20see III.D.2c.iv, which follows upon work done thoughout III.D.2. 
See ni.D.2c.iv, esp. last paragraph.
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deeply and carefully'.^^ Therefore, for a defence of his thesis Ruse appeals 
to what he believes to be commonalities in the way people experience 
morality. Accordingly, many of the criticisms of Ruse in the last chapter are 
illustrations of the lack of certain commonalities which would (if they 
existed) have lent plausibility to his case.^^
c. The connection:, reliance on commonalities
Ruse discusses commonalities most often in terms of what people 
find morality to be like on the level of what might be called moral 
experience. For example, he talks of the 'sense of "right" and the 
corresponding sense of "wrong"',^^ the 'logically odd sense of oughtness',^^ 
and the level of human experience of morality on which there is 'universality 
and common acceptance of moral norms across Homo sapiens'?"^ Horgan, 
Timmons and Boyd, however, talk more often in terms of moral language, 
as has already been shown. Nevertheless, Ruse does believe that 
corresponding with our distinctive moral experience there is a 'difference 
between the language of ethics and the language of other aspects of the 
human life'.^^ And, although Horgan and Timmons refrain from extensive 
comment on the connection between moral language and any particular 
experience, they do suggest that, at least from the perspective of synthetic 
naturalism, 'differences in causal regulation' between humans and some 
other (mythical) type of moral creature, and thus differences in the meanings 
of moral words, would be 'due at least in part to... differences in 
psychological temperament'.^^ In other words, a distinctively non-human
22rus0 (1991), 505.
23 See IU.D.2.
24rusc and Wilson (1986), 426.
2%use (1995), 245.
26rusc (1985a), 233.
27rusc 0995), 257. Ruse does not delve into the particulars of how he sees moral 
language and moral experience interrelate, however. See in.C.3.
2^Horgan and Timmons (1991), 465. They are careful to point out that even if this is the 
case, it is doubtful that only one psychological feature is relevant.
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psychological experience as regards morality would very probably cause the 
mythical creatures' moral language as well to be different from ours. Boyd 
too relates his moral theory ultimately to human experience by tying what 
we believe about morality at a very basic level to various kinds of 
experiences of need.^^
So, although there is variation in the ways synthetic naturalists refer 
to the commonalities among moral beings upon which their theories depend 
(some discussing things more often in terms of language and others more 
often in terms of experience), a clear connection between Ruse's theory and 
those of many other synthetic naturalists is a reliance on such 
commonalities. If Ruse were to withdraw his commitment to such 
commonalities, he would no longer have a basis on which to defend his 
meta-ethical theory, for his theory arises precisely out of the way in which 
morality is held by him to be experienced by people. He would then have to 
offer his meta-ethic only to those people, if any exist, who share his 
experience of morality, rather than as the one general truth of the matter for 
all moral subjects. Likewise, if synthetic naturalists like Boyd were to 
withdraw their commitment to such commonalities, they would be opening 
the door to an indefinite number of ways in which morality could be 
experienced, and therefore an indefinite number of ways in which moral 
terms could be used. This would mean that no particular reference for any 
given moral term could be established, and so their task of replacing the 
disfavoured analytical semantics would have failed. So, this connection 
among synthetic naturalists is a strong one, and therefore provides a 
worthwhile focus for critical examination.
Since on some common views— as the citations from Ruse, Boyd, 
and Horgan and Timmons in the beginning of this subsection attest— moral
29Boyd (1988), 204.
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experience is logically prior to the language we use to represent it,^^ 
hereafter discussion will be in terms of moral experience (how we find 
morality to be) rather than moral language (how we talk morally or talk 
about morality). However, for those of a contrary view, the discussion can 
be reinterpreted in terms of moral language just as sensibly. The fact that 
there is this connection between Ruse's theory and other synthetic naturalist 
theories, together with the fact that it was this particular feature of Ruse's 
theory which facilitated much of the last chapter's critique, opens the 
possibility that the strategy of critique which featured in that chapter can be 
generalised for use with respect to other synthetic naturalist theories.
2. FOCUSING CRITIQUE OF SYNTHETIC NATURALISM ON ITS 
CLAIMS OF COMMONALITIES AMONG MORAL AGENTS
a. General form o f the argument
It may be the case t o t  there are other ways for synthetic naturalists 
to determine the meaning of moral terms besides what Horgan and Timmons 
have called the 'causal regulation theory', which relies heavily on 
commonalities among moral beings. Or, if this theory of semantics is not 
used, there may be a way in which to lend plausibility to a synthetic 
naturalist theory that does not rely on commonalities in the moral experience 
of people. However, to judge fi’om two separate reviews of meta-ethical 
theories (one by Darwall, Gibbard and Railton arid another by Horgan and
^^However, it is not necessarily chronologically prior: any given person might learn and 
use the language of morality before, or even in the continuing absence of, ever having the 
experience. By logical priority here is meant that on some common views, a statement 
regarding moral experience does not logically presume a statement regarding moral 
language; whilst a statement regarding moral language often presumes one or more 
statements regarding moral experience. Any controversy which might arise at this point 
does not compromise the present argument, however, but merely affects the decision as to 
which terms to use in its presentation. The argument must be made in terms of either moral 
experience or moral language, and the former has been chosen here; but the point would be 
the same either way.
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Timmons), the leaders of naturalism in the post-analytic scene are 
philosophers such as David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton, Gilbert 
Harman, Simon Blackburn, and Richard Brandt.^ ^  Each of these do make 
claims which exhibit dependence on such commonalities.^^»^^ It is in the 
context of the many theories with such a reliance on commonalities among 
moral agents that this discussion continues.
The final argument of the last chapter suggested that although 
Michael Ruse's evolutionary approach to synthetic naturalism describes an 
experience which he claims is fundamental to morality and common to 
humanity, there are several reasons to believe that this contradicts many 
people's experience of morality. This being the case, those whose moral 
experience differs widely from Ruse's characterisation are not likely to see 
any plausibility in equating the description Ruse provides with morality.^^ 
This sheds doubt on the possibility that what Ruse portrays is actually 
fundamental to morality and common to humanity as he says. But, as has 
been shown in the last section. Ruse is by no means alone among synthetic 
naturalists in his significant reliance on supposed commonalities in moral 
experience. A general and simplified statement of an argument applicable in 
any such case is:
31 Morgan and Timmons (1991) discuss only Boyd and Brink; Darwall, Gibbard and 
Railton (1992) describe all of the above.
^^Bvidence of this is widespread, e.g. Harman (1975); Blackburn (1987), 55; Railton 
(1995a), 268-75; Brandt (1996), 201. For examples of particular claims that are stated as 
commonalities in moral experience, see, e.g. Blackburn (1984), 188 on the moral state of 
mind being an attitude; Brink (1986), 37 on the kind of emotive force that attaches to 
moral judgments; Boyd (1988% 184-5, 204-16 on the similarity between moral 
beliefs/methods and scientific beliefs/methods.
33^0 extent one's dependence on commonalities of moral experience is important to 
one's claims must be shown in each particular case, as was done very briefly with respect to 
Ruse and Boyd in the two parts of the last subsection; the importance of this will be 
discussed towards the end of this subsection.
34jj| Ruse's case, moral experience is claimed to be a set of felt rules in accordance with 
effective altruism, rules which are accompanied by senses of prescriptivity, universality, 
and nonsubjectivity. These are intended as descriptions of human experience of morality. 
If moral rules are not 'felt' by one in the way Ruse describes, or if the particular rules felt 
are not in accordance with Ruse's claims, then the Argument from Moral Experience may 
be employed against that theory.
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Insofar as any theory exhibits a reliance on supposed commonalities 
in the moral experience o f moral agents, and insofar as the views o f moral 
agents contradict this, such a situation renders the particular theory 
implausible.
This is the thrust of what might be called an Argument from Moral 
Experience. That it is a gross simplification of an argument can be 
illustrated by means of four different types of counterargument, any of 
which the synthetic naturalist can employ when accused of falsely supposing 
certain things to be common elements of the human experience of morality.
1. Synthetic naturalism relies on the findings of science; and since 
these are incomplete at any one time, so must the theory be. Any false 
characterisation of morality may be corrected by future advancements, just 
as inconsistencies between a scientific theory and experience can be 
corrected by advancements in scientific theory.
2. There is no guarantee that any given moral agent will be of 
sufficient (a) mental capacity and (b) moral maturity or aptitude, to dissent 
properly from the theory offered by the synthetic naturalist.
3. The first 'insofar' in the above encapsulation of the argument is 
vague. There would have to be a standard set up by which one can measure 
the degree of reliance which a theory has on the commonalities it supposes 
to exist among people.
4. The second 'insofar' is also vague. There would have to be a 
standard set up by which the degree of dissent from a particular supposed 
commonality can be properly evaluated.
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Responding to these four kinds of counterargument will create a 
more precise picture of the form an Argument from Moral Experience takes. 
Rather than seeking to undermine the logic of the argument, each of these . 
counterarguments serves to remove pressure that the argument would 
otherwise place on the synthetic naturalist. The first does this by looking to 
a greater body of knowledge than was originally offered by the naturalist. 
The second looks to the possibility of the dissenter being incapable of 
making the argument properly. The third and fourth look to the difficulty of 
the different kinds of quantification necessary for the argument to yield a 
specific result.
The first counterargument places a certain constraint on the 
Argument from Moral Experience: namely, that the argument restrict itself 
to the theory as currently proposed. The synthetic naturalist can argue that 
because of the unpredictable nature of scientific enquiry,^ ^  a critic of an 
ethical theory that is based on scientific enquiry cannot look into the future 
and claim that under no conditions could an advancement ever be reached 
which would resolve present appearances of inconsistency. But, on the 
other hand, neither can the synthetic naturalist look into the future and claim 
that such an advancement will indeed be reached. If the naturalist's response 
to a critic is that the currently proposed theory does not provide all the 
explanation necessary to understand the matter fully, the synthetic naturalist 
has the responsibility to provide the rest of the explanation, or else admit a 
step of faith. When and if further information arrives, 'the theory as 
currently proposed' changes, and so the critic must re-evaluate the new 
theory. Otherwise, if no changes are made to the inconsistent theory, the 
original criticism stands. So, tiic first objection to the Argument from Moral 
Experience is met with the condition that any particular criticism of an
^^See Medawar (1984), essay #2, entitled 'Can Scientific Discovery be Premeditated?'.
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ethical theory is explicitly admitted to affect the relevant theory only as it is 
currently presented.
The second counterargument ostensibly creates a greater problem for 
the critic. Since the Argument from Moral Experience ultimately depends 
on the mental and moral aptitude of moral agents (because they find 
morality to be different than what is claimed by the theory in question), 
there is a chance that a dissenting argument might proceed not from a true 
difference of experience of morality, but rather from an insufficient aptitude 
in one or both of these areas. The problem with using this argument against 
a critic, however, is that once the subject of insufficient aptitude is broached, 
the same problem of quantification which the naturalist has raised in relation 
to other issues for the critic (see counterarguments 3 and 4) arises here for 
the naturalist. The question becomes: How are mental aptitude and moral 
aptitude measured? Biologist Stephen Jay Gould has documented some of 
this century's failed attempts at quantifying mental aptitude, and he suggests 
that the prospect is no more promising today . E v e n  if Gould is wrong, 
and some reasonably accurate measure of mental aptitude is either available 
today or will be in the near future, this does not preclude criticism of 
naturalistic theories on the basis of moral experience. Rather, this standard 
of mental capacity measurement would serve as another dimension which 
must be taken into account in both the presentation and critique of ethical 
theories. The naturalist cannot put forth an ethical theory as if to a 
community of approximate mental equals if there are relevant mental 
differences that can affect the understanding of morality and moral theories. 
In short, if the naturalist argues that a particular critic is mentally 
incompetent, support must be provided for this in the form of a process 
through which that assertion can be demonstrated or otherwise defended. 
This must include, among other things, a description of the types of mental
36s. Gould (1981).
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incompetence which are relevant and the particular way in which critics 
might fall short. Otherwise, the naturalist's accusation of a critic's mental 
ineptitude is not a valid philosophical criticism because there is no way in 
which it can be scrutinised or evaluated.
With respect to moral aptitude the situation is even more 
complicated than in the case of mental aptitude, for in addition to the 
requirement of defence and quantification placed on the naturalist, many 
standards by which moral aptitude might be judged will be prejudiced in 
favour of one or another ethical theory. For instance, to judge moral 
aptitude on the basis of the content of one's genetic code may be appropriate 
if Michael Ruse's theory is correct, but not if it is incorrect. To judge it on 
the basis of one's degree of adherence to societal norms may be appropriate 
if a particular sort of culture-based morality is correct,^^ but not if the nature 
of morality is otherwise. So, to raise the issue of the possibility of a critic's 
moral incompetence will be begging the question unless a standard can be 
arrived at which does not prejudge matters of controversy in ethics. Since 
this essentially involves looking for matters of commonality among moral 
agents, which is precisely the matter at issue with the Argument fi-om Moral 
Experience, one must avoid a vicious circle which can develop: the critic 
raises questions regarding the commonality of certain features supposed by a 
naturalistic theory, the naturalist in turn raises questions of the critic's 
aptitude on the basis of a particular standard, and the critic raises furüier 
questions regarding the commonality of the features underlying that 
standard, and so on. If the naturalist brings up the possibility of a critic 
being of insufficient moral aptitude, it is the naturalist's responsibility to 
defend this point, which will not be a simple matter on account of the high 
probability of controversial meta-ethical assumptions underlying any such
3 7 Specifically, the kind of theory which proposes that x is good or right if it conforms to 
the norms of a given society s.
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position. Therefore, the second counterargument against the Argument from 
Moral Experience, while certainly posing worthwhile questions, creates 
problems that are at least as significant for the naturalist as they are for the 
critic. Indeed, only alter the naturalist provides a set of criteria for mental 
and/or moral competence, and defends his accusation of a critic in terms of 
those criteria, can a critic understand or respond to such an accusation.
The third objection to the Argument from Moral Experience calls for 
a quantification of the degree to which a theory depends on its claims 
regarding commonalities among moral agents. This objection, like the first, 
can be met by placing a limit on what can be said by the critic. In order for 
the Argument from Moral Experience to present a worthwhile criticism, it 
must be accompanied by a demonstration of what elements of the theory are 
threatened by the falsity of the supposed commonality. In some cases these 
elements may be unnecessary to what the theorist sees as the core of the 
theory, and can be discarded if found to imply false conclusions. In other 
cases, these elements may actually be at the centre of the theory, in which 
case the theory must undergo more extensive revision or else be abandoned. 
This stipulation, however, is essentially the same as in any programme of 
argument- critique— rebuttal, and poses no new problems for the Argument 
from Moral Experience as long as arguments presented are accompanied by 
a demonstration of the aspects of the criticised theory which have implied 
the false commonality. This is the quantification requested by the third 
objection, and provided that it is included, this objection is met.
For an example of the demonstration required here, one can take the 
criticism of Michael Ruse's ethical theory in the last chapter. Ruse's theory 
was broken down in that chapter into four classes of several elements each, 
such that criticisms could be precisely attached to the respective elements of
no
the theory. First, presuppositions of sociobiology were described; 
38m.B.l.a-d.
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second, the particular version of the naturalist paradigm Ruse adheres to was 
outlined;^^ third, the logical progression by, which he makes his claim was 
separated into four premises and a conclusion;^^ and fourth, implications 
were drawn from certain premises and described in their own right.'^^ 
Criticisms were delivered to Ruse's theory in the context of these particular 
elements. Because of this, those elements of his theory which are called into 
question by the criticisms offered in that chapter can be clearly seen, and so 
this does away with the imprecision which otherwise would bring about an 
objection on the naturalist's part.
The fourth and last predicted counterargument to the Argument from 
Moral Experience as phrased generally is a call for quantification of a 
second variable, (the first being the degree of dependence of a theory on the 
commonalities it implies). The second variable is the degree to which moral 
agents disagree with the supposed commonality. The question the naturalist 
might pose is this: .Does one dissenting voice render a theory untenable, or 
is there some percentage (and what is it?) of humanity that can dissent and 
yet allow a theory still to maintain a level of plausibility? In raising this 
question the naturalist seeks to provide some room within which to 
manoeuvre in a situation where a supposed commonality has some degrete of 
real or apparent exception. Technically, the answer to this question is that < 
the Argument from Moral Experience permits no unresolved dissent at all.
If the representation of morality by the naturalist is such that a certain 
commonality is relied upon, then the existence of any dissenter A means 
that, strictly speaking, such is not a commonality. This having been said, it 
is by no means the end of discussion for A to dissent. As a naturalist would 
undoubtedly be quick to point out, there arc more contingencies than mental 
or moral incompetence that could result in an inconsistency of any given
39iii.c.2.
4O111.C.3.
^^From premise 3, III.D.lb-c, 2.b-c; from premise 4, HI D.Id.
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person's view with the theoretical prediction. For examples, a 
communication breakdown, lack of information, misunderstanding, 
insufficient introspection, and perhaps even one's ulterior psychology could 
be responsible for the disparity. A way in which to discover and remedy 
these or other possible contingencies is through thought and rational 
discussion. Discussion directly aids communication and information and 
may correct a misunderstanding. Together with thought, it may also . 
promote the necessary introspection and dispel extraneous prejudices which 
can produce dissent which is in principle resolvable. Differences which 
persist after rational discussion, or in situations where (if such can be 
shown) no limiting factor affects the understanding of the critic, are to that 
extent still unresolved.^^. Any unresolved inconsistencies between the 
moral experience of a dissenter and the prediction of a naturalist theory tell 
against the theory, because the theory involves a claim to commonality as 
part of its basis.^^ Hence, a complicated programme of quantification of 
dissent is not necessary in order for the Argument from Moral Experience to 
be effective in pointing out faults in a theory. What is necessary, is attention 
to any reasoned dissent, and the continuing attempt to resolve it. If this is 
the way in which moral philosophy is practised, then an obstacle to the 
Argument from Moral Experience is removed, and the fourth objection to it 
no longer stands.
This resolution of the fourth potential objection to the Argument 
from Moral Experience can be viewed in the same way that Darwall, 
Gibbard and Railton recommended similar objections to the Open Question 
Argument be resolved. They claimed that the Open Question Argument
with any description of an argument, its success assumes that the dissenter is being 
honest and open-minded, which of course may not be the case in practicality.
^3 Whether the theory should be abandoned because of that counter-evidence, even if the 
faults are serious (quantification of which is described in the last two paragraphs) is another 
question, which requires an enquiry into whether another theory or possible revision exists 
which does not experience such problems.
Chapter IV 269
should be recognised as a serious criticism whenever it was presented within 
certain conditions, and so no quantification of the percentage of the 
population dissenting is needed or even helpful; but, at the same time, the 
Open Question Argument should be seen in any particular case as an 
argument whose surety requires continuing discussion.^^ The present 
argument, in the same vein, is that the fourth objection to the Argument 
fi-om Moral Experience is met, as corresponding objections to the Open 
Question Argument were, if the argument is not viewed in a misleading 
fashion. It is neither dependent for its validity on the number of people 
presenting it, but nor is it a weapon to be used once and for all with utter 
conviction in any particular instance. It is a tool which can be applied by 
even a single dissenter, but must be continually applied and tested by 
attempting to resolve the dissent rationally.
In summary, all of the four counterarguments to the simplified 
statement of the Argument from Moral Experience are helpful to an 
understanding of the particular boundaries and conditions within which the 
argument can properly operate, without undermining its validity in general. 
The first objection the naturalist might offer is met by assuring that the 
argument is claimed to be relevant only to the theory in its current form and 
complexity, and does not make any statements regarding the possibility of 
advancements, additional information or modification which might resolve 
any present inconsistencies. The second objection actually places a difficult 
responsibility on the naturalist who raises it, to provide some non-prejudicial 
standard by which to judge the mental or moral competence of the critic. 
Should this be provided in any case, the critic will be able to be measured 
for this supposed shortcoming, and the validity of the Argument from Mord 
Experience will depend on the results of that test. (If the standard of 
measurement itself is disputed, then determining the validity of the critic's
44See II.C.3a.
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argument will have to await the outcome of that dispute). The third 
objection a naturalist might offer to the Argument from Moral Experience is 
met if the critic's use of the argument includes a precise demonstration of the 
elements of the naturalist's theory that are called into question by the lack of 
the proposed commonality. This will serve to quantify the reliance of the 
naturalist's theory on the particular points that the critic is calling into 
question. The fourth potential objection is met if the critic's argument is 
admitted to be valid whenever presented within the foregoing guidelines, 
and so a particular number of people do not have to dissent in order for the 
argument to be valid. However, at the same time, any particular 
presentation of the Argument from Moral Experience requires discussion on 
the matter in order to be decisive, rather than being a peremptory statement 
of fact. As long as the critic of naturalism adheres to these stipulations and 
presents arguments in this way, the Argument from Moral Experience is not 
undermined by any of the objections listed in the beginning of this section.
b. The Argument from Moral Experience as a proposed strategy for critique 
o f synthetic naturalism
To the extent that synthetic naturalism relies on claims that moral 
agents possess certain commonalities in the way they experience morality or 
hold the nature of morality to be, the general form of argument in the 
foregoing section can be employed in critique of synthetic naturalism. The 
Argument from Moral Experience can be used to assess the validity of these 
claims to commonality, within the guidelines and limitations outlined above 
in the responses to the four kinds of objections. The ethical critique of 
Michael Ruse's naturalistic theory in the last chapter shows that this kind of 
argument does have utility with respect to at least some synthetically 
naturalistic theories, and the connection made in this chapter between Ruse's 
ideas and the 'causal theory of reference' held by other synthetic naturalists
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suggests that this kind of argument may actually have wide applicability 
within the meta-ethical category of synthetic naturalism.^^
Even though Arguments from Moral Experience, concentrating as 
they do on claims to commonality among moral agents, have a wide 
theoretical applicability within contemporary naturalist meta-ethics, this 
does not license a general prediction here of the results of that application. 
No foretelling of the fate of synthetic naturalism one way or the other just 
because of the relevance of this strategy of critique can be done without 
begging the question. As was stated in the response to objection 1 above, 
and as is implicit in the many pages of analysis and critique that were 
necessary with regard to Michael Ruse's particular theory, this kind of 
argument must be applied to each different theory, and prospects for an 
inductive generalisation regarding the validity or otherwise of synthetic 
naturalism are limited by the fact that there are many different claims which 
naturalists might make to having found commonalities in the moral 
experience of people. By way of analogy, G. E. Moore went so far with 
respect to his own argument against semantic naturalism, to say that if one 
'will try this experiment with each suggested definition in succession, he 
may become expert enough to recognise that in every case' the argument 
renders the semantic naturalist theory implausible.^^ Although his 
argument, or contemporary reformulation of it, has been successful with 
respect to semantic naturalism in general, which might seemingly vindicate 
Moore's inductive leap, many critics have come to agree that such prediction 
was improper.^^ It is therefore widely believed now that Moore should 
have restricted himself to the more modest claim that his argument was 
applicable, to, rather than a rejutation of, semantic naturalism in general. 
Whether application of the argument would refute all theories to which it
^^See A.lc. 
46Moore (1903), 16. 
47see n.C.3a.
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was applied, should have been left to be decided by the application of the 
argument to particular theories.^^ Accordingly, only the more modest claim 
is made here regarding the presently proposed strategy of critique of 
synthetic naturalist theories of ethics.^^ What can be said at this point is 
that the peculiarities of synthetic naturalism are such that the Argument fi*om 
Moral Experience is well suited to critique of this kind of ethical theory.
This has been shown both in general (by means of a significant common 
thread among prominent synthetic naturalists, a thread which the argument 
targets),^^ and in a specific case (Michael Ruse's evolutionary 
naturalism).^ ^
B. Conclusion
The point just made forms the final premise in a single line of 
reasoning throughout this thesis. This line supports the point that by means 
of only one precise way of defining and subdividing naturalism can that 
approach to ethics be understood sufficiently to place historical and 
contemporary critique of it in correct perspective, to explain and demarcate 
the current surge of interest in naturalism, and to suggest an appropriate way 
forward for critique. In this section an explanation will be rendered of how 
the present project has yielded the above conclusion. .
Naturalism as an approach to ethics has been criticised adamantly 
fi-om different perspectives in the history of philosophy.^^ Moreover, the 
two most common and significant kinds of criticisms have survived to the
^^Moore's contribution in Principia Ethica was application to the theories of Herbert 
Spencer and Henry Sidgwick.
49por more on this point, see II.E.Intro.
50see A.I.
51m.D.2.
62introduction.B., II.B-C.
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end of the twentieth century (with clarification and/or modification) and are 
consistently able to withstand attempts of naturalist moral philosophers to 
undermine them.^^ Accordingly, each of these two significant kinds of 
criticisms has been commonly claimed to render naturalism invalid as an 
approach to ethics.^^ Naturalism in ethics, however, far firom experiencing 
a dearth of popularity in contemporary moral philosophy, has rather enjoyed 
a rejuvenation of interest.^^
One might simply see this situation as a paradox in contemporary 
meta-ethics, but this characterisation fails upon closer analysis of the 
documented criticisms of naturalism. The first of the two types of criticisms 
concentrates on demonstrating the invalidity of a particular claim which is 
often used by naturalists to support their theories: namely, that premises 
consisting of nonmoral terms can be used logically to derive conclusions 
containing moral terms.^^ The second type of criticism concentrates on 
demonstrating the invalidity of a different claim, which is also commonly 
used by naturalists in support of their theories: that moral terms can be 
defined, or their meanings exhaustively expressed, using solely nonmoral 
terms.^^ Moreover, the current naturalistic trend in moral philosophy does 
not depend on either of these statements explicitly^ ^  or implicitly.^^ In 
fact, most contemporary naturalists are united with the critics of naturalism 
in rejecting the two statements.^^ Instead, these naturalists defend the 
statement that the results of enquiry into facts or actual states of affairs are 
necessary and sufficient to explain the principles, properties and terms used 
in moral experience and moral discourse.^ ^  Therefore the situation with
63i i .b .2, C.3-4.
64ibid.
55n.D.l-2.
66por the claim, I.B.l; for the critique, II.B. 
^^For the claim, LB.2; for the critique, II.C. 
6»II.C.4c-5.
69lc.
6O11.B.3 and II.C.4C-5, respectively. 
61l.B .3,n.D .l-2.
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naturalism is not a paradox; rather, three distinct viewpoints are being 
considered 'naturalism' in various contexts.
That there are three different naturalisms does not follow from this 
set of circumstances; seeing naturalism in this way is a confusion. The 
three statements defended by respective groups of naturalists (and 
denounced by respective groups of critics) correspond to levels on which 
naturalism can be justified: the logical, semantic, and synthetic.^^ The 
logical relation between these is such that the second can be true even if the 
first is false, and the third can be true even if the first two are both false.^ 
Once this is realised, the apparent paradoxes, and any confusion surrounding 
the relevance of the two main lines of historical criticism of naturalism, 
disappear. Naturalism is a single meta-ethical position, with a workable 
definition agreeable to naturalists regardless of the level of justification they 
choose.^^ However, the level of justification chosen determines what types 
of criticisms are appropriate for the naturalist. A logical naturalist is 
susceptible to the first (logical) line of criticism of naturalism; a semantic 
naturalist is susceptible to the second (semantic) line of criticism of 
naturalism.^^ These two are not interchangeable, and here lies the 
distinction between the two historical lines of criticism of naturalism 
(attributed often to David Hume and G. E. Moore respectively), and the 
reason for the limited applicability of each.
Here lies also the support and explanation for the fact that the third, 
synthetic, level of justification is not susceptible to either line of historical 
criticism, for these target the logical and semantic levels and the synthetic is 
independent from them:^^ This justifies the current rejuvenation of interest
62i.B.ia, 2a, 3a; and also H.A. 
63ibid.
64i.c.
66introduction.A, LA.
66ii,b and C respectively.
67n.C.5.
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in naturalism despite those criticisms, and calls for a new and different kind 
of critique levelled at this third level of justification specifically.^^
A form of critique of naturalism tailored specifically to the synthetic 
level can be developed if this understanding of naturalism is reached. The 
synthetic level of justifying naturalism involves a reliance on scientific 
enquiry (to a greater extent than did either of the other levels) as well as 
moral philosophy.^^ This provides a starting point for development of a 
method of critique. Additional progress can be made by using a case-study 
approach with an eye to developing a generalisable strategy of critical 
analysis-- i.e., a strategy that is not limited to the peculiar assertions of one 
theorist, but has wide applicability within the camp of synthetic naturalism. 
For instance, Michael Ruse defends his currently influential synthetic 
naturalist theory on the basis of claims that moral agents in general share 
certain views about and within morality.^^ Detailed criticism of these 
claims raises doubts as to their validity, and therefore to the validity of the 
ethical theory which arises fi-om them.^^ When the potential for 
generalisation of this type of argument within synthetic naturalism is 
explored, the kind of claims that Ruse makes is found to be very common in 
synthetic naturalism. The reason for this is that inherent in synthetic 
naturalism is a rejection of the importance of the analytical tradition of 
semantics in determining the reference for moral terms. Many, perhaps 
most, synthetic naturalists have replaced this type of semantics with another, 
the 'causal theory of reference'.^^ For its utility in ethics, this approach 
depends on precisely the kinds of commonalities among moral agents that 
can be examined by the type of argument used with regard to Michael Ruse's
681I.E. For examples of some recent attempts at this, see II.D.3. 
69ii.e, m.D.Intro.
2O111.C-D, theme encapsulated in D.2c.iv.
^^III.D, results summarised in E.
'72iv.A.1.
73rv.A.la
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theory7^ Therefore, testing synthetic naturalists' claims to commonality 
among people's moral experience and/or moral language is an appropriate 
way forw^d for critique of naturalism7^ Furthermore, this way forward 
can only be seen in the light of the logical/semantic/synthetic distinction 
applied to naturalism, the conceptual difference between these levels and the 
definition of naturalism per se, and accordingly the scope and limitations of 
past critique of naturalism, all of which elaborated earlier.
Hence, in the contemporary situation where naturalism is very 
popular and yet extremely variously linderstood,^^ only by subdividing 
naturalism into logical, semantic, and synthetic levels of justification, and by 
defining it separately fi-om these levels of justification (most commonly in 
terms of'science', as has been done here^^) can three particular 
advancements be made in contemporary meta-ethics. First, historical and 
contemporary critique of naturalism can be placed in correct perspective; 
second, the current surge of interest in naturalism can be explained and 
demarcated; and third, an appropriate way forward for critique of naturalism 
can be outlined. The need to clarify and make advancement in each of these 
three areas has been shown to be significant in recent years. Inadequacies 
and ambiguities in the meta-ethical literature have been pointed out 
regarding the definition and subdivision of naturalism,^^ the understanding 
of criticisms,^^ and the explanation of the current surge of interest and 
appropriate ways forward for critical examination of it.^® The point here is 
that all of these problems, as well as others,^ ^  can be overcome if naturalism 
is understood in a certain way, and analysed accordingly.
24iv.A.1c.
26rv.A.2; specifically with regard to Ruse, see III D 2c.iv 
26introduction.A, and II.E.2.
72introduction, and LA.
2^Introduction.A, and I.B.3a.
79introduction.B, and II.A.
^®Much of chapter II deals with this; see, e.g., C.5c, E.
Three more examples: the common problem of confusing the naturalist claim itself with 
the level on which support is provided for it (see LB. la, 2a), that of using the term •
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'naturalistic fallacy' indiscriminately to refer to both Hume's and Moore's arguments as if 
they were the same (see II.B.l, C.2c), and failing to recognise and/or deal with the 
particular epistemological presuppositions of Moore's Open Question Argument (which has 
not received remark in this conclusion but was dealt with in II.C.2b).
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